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PART ONE
FEEDBACK IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
It is often suggested by legal scholars that the
United States Supreme Court can operate effectively
only within the parameters of public acceptability. 1
The underlying assumption in such suggestions is that if
the Court is to serve as an institution promoting social
change its decisions must not overstep those parameters;
it may lead but it must not outpace its audience. To the
extent that its policies offend the prevailing sensibili-
ties of various publics or conflict with the sentiments
of other political institutions it runs the risk of being
attacked. Since the Court's authority depends in large
2
measure upon consensual acceptance of its actions it
must be constantly alert to its critics.
The Court is particularly vulnerable to the demands
of other political institutions. It would seem that the
greater its offense or the longer it continues, the
greater is the probability that the Court's vulnerability
^See especially, Robert McCloskey, The American
Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), p. 22.
2Glendon Schubert, Judicial Policy-Making (Glenview,
111.* Scott, Foresman and Co.” 1965), p. 65.
2will be probed. Attacks which begin with criticism of
the disposition of one case may end with a challenge to
the Court as an institution. If, as most observers of
judicial behavior suggest, individual attitudes and
values constitute the principal variables in the deter-
mination of judicial decisions; and if, as is often the
case, there occurs a lag in the restructuring of a Court
majority's values to conform with those of other political
actors who are more responsive to electoral change, ten-
sion is institutionalized between the judicial subsystem
and the rest of the political system. Such tension,
particularly in periods of general national unrest, may
escalate into outright political warfare upon the Court.
Outrage with reapportionment and school prayer decisions
—
including attempted constitutional amendments; the Con-
gressional battle over Title II of the 1966 Omnibus
Crime Bill; the Senate filibuster over confirmation of
Justice Fortas' nomination to the Chief Justiceship are
obvious recent examples of such challenges to Court
decisions
.
3
See, for example, Glendon Schubert, The Judicial
Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court
Justices. 1946-1963 (Evanston, 113.71 Northwestern
University Press, 1965) and Harold Spaeth, The Warren
Court: Cases and Commentary (San Francisco; Chandler
Publishing Company, 1966 )
.
3Historically, the Court has responded to chal-
lenges according to their vehemence. Ulhen an attack is
particularly foreboding, such as the 1937 court packing
episode, some members usually find it useful to rethink
and modify subsequent opinions in order to placate at
least the most powerful of their adversaries. This is
not to suggest that the Court necessarily follows the
election returns—although on some occasions it un-
doubtedly has, if only in the long run. Rather it asserts
that at least some of the Justices have appeared to recog-
nize that the Court, as a political institution, must,
at times, defer to the prevailing sentiments within the
larger political system. If its members wish to preserve
Court power they must take care not to promote what are
widely considered to be grave errors of judgment.
If one accepts a M systems , ' model of the legal
process 4 in which the Court converts certain inputs
(demands and support) into outputs (decisions and
4See, for example, Schubert, Judicial Policy-
Making ; Jay A. Sigler, An Introduction to the Le gal System
(Homewood
,
111.: Dorsey Press, 1968) ; Thomas P. Jahnige
and Sheldon Goldman, eds., The Federal Judic ial System:
Readings in Process and Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1968); and Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige,
The Federal Courts as a Political System (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971)
.
4policies) the attitudes of the Court's audience, par-
ticularly those in a position to affect the Court's
political future, can be considered an important input.
The process of turning attitudes regarding outputs into
new inputs is the phenomenon of "feedback." Court out-
put produces an impact upon not only the litigants but
also upon all who feel either encouraged or threatened
by it. The responses to this impact may be transmitted
back to the Court in forms ranging from simple criticism
to noncompliance or even reprisal. As Wasby notes, "the
impact of the Court has an impact on the Court.
Analyses of impact have been numerous, serving
the dual purpose of examining the policy-making function
of courts and placing them in their proper political
context.^1 Unfortunately, too many such studies begin
with the valid assertion that "the Court's decision is
c
Stephen L. Wasby, The Impact of the United States
Supreme Court (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1970)
,
p. 42.
^Typical examples include: Theodore L. Becker,
ed. f The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (New York:
Oxford University Press
,
1969) ; Richard m7 Johnson, The
Dynamics of Compliance (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern
University Press, 1967); William K. Muir, Prayer in the
Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1967) ; David H. Everson, ed., The Supreme Court as Policy
Maker: Three Studies on the Impact of Judicial Decisions
5often the beginning--not the end--of the controversy,"*^
but then proceed to make the error of thinking that
impact is the end of the controversy. Richard Wells
and Joel Grossman have rightly criticized impact
studies for focusing attention upon a point in the
process rather than on the process itself. 8 Yet, while
several scholars have acknowledged this relationship,
few studies have explored the way in which impact
9produces new decisions.
(Carbondale, 111: Public Affairs Research Bureau,
Southern Illinois University, 196B), F or a recent
synthesis of the various theories of impact as well as
a summary of many empirical findings, see Wasby, op.
cit
.
Charles 5. Sheldon, The Supreme Court: Poli-
ticians in Robes (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Glencoe Press,
1970), p. ix.
0Richard S. Wells and Joel B. Grossman, "The
Concept of Judicial Policy-Waking," in Jahnige and
Goldman, The Federal Judicial System , pp. 294-304.
^The only systematic examination is Stuart Nagel,
"Court-Curbing Periods in American History," in Becker,
pp. 35-47, in which Nagel uses as a criterion of the
"success" of Congressional curbs subsequent "retreats"
by the Court. Stephen Wasby has recently indicated the
ultimate need to depart from limited examinations of
impact and to turn instead, to longitudinal explorations
of impact's effect on the Court’s decisional process and
subsequent effect on the political environment. Wasby,
p. 244.
6One productive approach to the systematic study
of impact as a process has been the use of "systems"
analysis. Briefly stated, systems theorists suggest
that the judicial subsyst em--which shall, for purposes
of convenience be referred to simply as the judicial
1 0system —and the larger political system of which it
is a part both strive to persist by minimizing political
stress. 1 ' When decisions run counter to the values and
desires of the members of the Court’s publics, stress
is created which threatens that persistence. Feedback,
then, serves as a control mechanism for the redress of
the imbalance by alerting the Court that it must alter
the directions of its decision. Feedback is thus thought
to be an essential feature of a legal system to maintain
a balance between norms and procedures and between the
^Although it is recognized that the term "judic-
ial system" is usually employed, and properly, to iden-
tify at least all federal courts, this study focuses upon
the Supreme Court, treating it as a contained system,
the "upper-court myth" notwithstanding.
I^See S. Sidney Ulmer, "Homeostasis in the Supreme
Court," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Behavior: A
Reader in Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Co., 1964), pp. 162-180; also, Sigler, An Introduction to
the Legal System . Schubert, on the other hand, disagrees:
Judicial Policy-Making , p. 4. In general see David
Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York:
Wiley P ress, 1965) .
7legal system and other institutions. 12 When the
Court is either intransigent in the face of cumulative
negative feedback or is unaware of the existence of
negative support, stress must be reduced by the actions
of other institutions either by alteration of the judi-
cial system to change the Court's output, or by amelio-
rating the effects of the controversial policy. Thus
without a feedback mechanism and the ability to respond
to it there can be no system-persistence. 1 ^
One need not, of course, draw an analogy between
biological organisms and social organizations. The
relationship between output and feedback—as a stress-
reducing control mechanism—need not be seen as logi-
cally necessary. Nonetheless, the use of such a model
as an heuristic device for the ordering of empirical
data and for generating empirically testable hypotheses
appears both useful and historically applicable. There
are many instances in which the Supreme Court has altered
its decisions when confronted with extensive negative
feedback, particularly from Congress and the executive.
12James Marshall, Intention in Law and Society
(New York: Funk & UJagnalTs Co., 1968) , p"! 182
.
1
^Easton
,
A Systems Analysis of Political Life ,
p . 32 .
BOn the other hand, there are no examples of the Court’s
escaping some form of retribution after failing to heed
such feedback.^ This does not necessarily suggest a
relationship between feedback and all new Court direc-
tions; but if pronounced negative feedback precedes
Court policy shifts there is certainly the implication
of such a relationship.
The analysis of feedback presented here utilizes
this less rigorous systems approach. A model will be
employed in an effort to explicate the existence of
reactions to Supreme Court decisions, the ways in which
such reactions are brought to the Court's attention, and
the alternatives such feedback presents to the Court.
Two major sources of feedback will be emphasized and
the primary subjects of analysis: Congress and the
legal fraternity. The powers of the former vis-a-vis
the Court are manifest, hence Congressional feedback is
likely to be particularly salient. The powers of the
legal fraternity are both manifest and latent, comprising
the gamut from lower court noncompliance and reinterpre-
tation to law review criticism. One area of decisions
1
^McClosky
, pp. 223-224.
9will be studied--that involving the rights of criminal
defendants. This area is not only one which has brought
a great deal of adverse reaction, but also is one in
which the Court has felt it necessary to make broad
new guidelines for police and for courts. This is also
the only issue-area of judicial policy of which a recent
study has found public awareness to be increasing.^
Contrary to the opinions of some observers, the fact
that this issue has in the same period become the one
of primary salience to the Court is thought not to be
merely coincidental. Specifically, Supreme Court
criminal procedure decisions during the last seven terms
of the Warren Court will be examined along with responses
to them in order to ascertain the patterns of feedback
and their effect on subsequent Court policy. Also to
^Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public
Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Prelim-
inary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitima-
tion of Regime Changes," in Joel B. G r ossman and Joseph
Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiers of Judicial Research (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, I nc . , 1969 ) , pi 278
.
16 Glendon Schubert, The Constitutional Polity
(Boston: Boston University Press , 1970 ) , p"i 164
.
10
be investigated is the extent to which feedback becomes
sufficiently cumulative and intense to inspire other
responses of the larger political system to alter or
ameliorate the effects of Court policy.
I. The Political Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court since its inception, has, of
course, been inextricably involved in important questions
of public policy. In his observations of American demo-
cracy, Tocquoville found particularly surprising the
fact that in the United States most political issues
are translated into legal questions susceptible of
1 7
settlement by courts of law. There are several reasons
for this unique legal-political role. First, as Herbert
Jacob has suggested, all courts, in the exercise of
their simple norm-enforcement function, indirectly make
1 8
policy by helping to evolve new norms. In addition,
some courts are in a position consciously and directly
to make policy by challenging such norms or by sup-
1 9
porting them in the face of challenge. Second, the
1 7
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America ,
Ch. VI, edited by Richard D. Heffner (New York: New
American Library, 1965), pp. 72-77.
1
^Herbert Jacob, Justice in Americat Courts ,
Lawyers, and the Judicial Process (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company^ 1965) , p. 23
.
1
9
Ibid
. ,
p. 26.
11
function of all courts is largely an interpretive one,
and neither the Constitution nor legislative enactments
are so clear as to preclude judicial discretion. Indeed,
while nominally constrained by such doctrines as stare
decisis, courts have a great deal of freedom in deciding
what precedents apply to a given situation^ and in
selecting which principle of statutory construction is
O A
proper.^' Moreover, such discretion is enhanced by the
fact that many of the highest appellate courts--part icular^
ly the Supreme Court— have almost complete freedom of
choice as to the cases they will hear and hence as to
the issues which they will consider. ^2 Finally, the
20To accept the doctrine that law must be consis-
tent and thus must adhere wherever possible to past
decisions does not eliminate the necessity of choice
among precedents. As Cardozo pointed out, "within the
confines ... of precedent and traditions, choice moves
with a freedom which stamps its actions as creative."
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
(New Havens Yale University Press, 1921 ) , p^ 115
.
^Walter Murphy, "The Judiciary: Judicial Values,"
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New
York: Crowell, Collier, and Macmillan, Inc., 1968),
V ol
. 8
, p . 317 .
2^See Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Mathew
Muraskin, and Daniel Rosen, "The Supreme Court's Certior-
ari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory," in Glendon Schubert, ed.,
Judicial Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press,
1963), pp. 111-132.
12
scholarship of the legal realists of the last half-
century and of contemporary "judicial behavioralists"
has discredited the conception of judges mechanically
applying legal rules to concrete cases. 23 Rather it
is clear that like other political actors, considera-
tions of individual values, perceptions of individual
and collective roles, and views as to what is politic-
ally feasible all play a part in judicial decision-
making.
The Court, through most of its history, has
vigorously exercised a policy-making function, assuming
an "activist" role in the political process. Although
the propriety of that role has been widely debated, 24
it is nevertheless widely recognized. But having placed
* See Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal
Realism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968).
24
IYia ny critics have suggested that the Court,
because of its remoteness, powerlessness, inaccessibility,
etc., is "a most unsuitable instrument for the formation
of policy." Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress (New York: Harper and Row, 1970)
,
p. 175} some have suggested that the Court refrain from
exercising its power of judicial review and defer instead
to the elected branches of government. Wallace Mendelson,
Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1961 ) , pp . 114-
131. Yet others take the view that judicial activism
is both an inherent necessity and a positive virtue,
13
the Court in its proper context as a full partner in
the political process, one must immediately recognize
the limits which are inherent in that position. The
range of choice open to those exercising the power of
judicial policy formulation is not unbounded and a judge’s
final course of behavior is one among limited choices
available to him. 2b Choices are determined largely by
the social and political demands from the Court’s environ-
ment and judges must be well aware of both their poten-
tialities and their limitations. There are two major
categories of restraint upon the policies which the Court
articulates: those internal and those external to the
institution
.
Perhaps the most obvious internal restraints are
the Court's administrative rules of jurisdiction— e.g.,
the case or controversy rule, standing to sue—and
especially when exercised in behalf of civil liberties.
Martin M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court
and Judicial Review (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice-
Hall, I nc
. ,
1966 ) j Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and
the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (Englewood
Cliffs
,
N . J . : Prentice-Hall , Inc., I960).
25C. Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the
Vinson Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954),
pp. 186-188.
14
justiciability. The size of the Court’s docket is also
a limitation in that the physical dimensions of time
precludes the determination of all its cases. A further
internal restraint is the need for a majority of judges
to decide a case, a reality which sometimes necessitates
the kinds of bargaining and compromise that often charac-
terize other political decision-making bodies. 26 The
high visibility of the Court is another restraint since
it exposes the Court to attack by professional peers and
the disgruntled publics upon which it primarily depends
27for its unique power in the political system. Finally,
each judge is restrained by his intellectual limitations,
his personal values, and his particular perception of his
28
role and that of the Court. Some judges accept judicial
26See Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial
Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),
especially Chapter 3.
97
Shapiro, Freedom of Speech , p. 29; Jack W.
Peltason, ’’Judicial Process: Introduction,” Internat-
ional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences . Vol. 8,
pp. 289-290.
O Q
See George Braden, "The Search for Objectivity
in Constitutional Law," 57 Yale Law Journal 571 (1948),
573-579.
15
self-restraint—and a concomitant deference to the
elected branches—as an article of faith; others do so
for reasons of expediency. Role perceptions are the
result of many of the same socialization processes as
affect other members of the political system. Judges
are, like legislators, "children of their time" and as
Cardozo noted, "the great tides and currents which en-
gulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course,
and pass the judges idly by." 30
External restraints are those arising from the
29Judicial self-restraint, as a popular role
concept, thus provides a means by which a judge can
avoid particularly sensitive issues. Such an internal
restraint is very often used in response to visible
external restraints, thus minimizing resistance.
C. Herman Pritchett, "Constitutional Law: Introduction,"
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
.
Vol.
3, 297; Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An
Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States
.
England, and France (New York: Oxford University Press,
1968)
, pp . 354-355 . Roche has suggested that for such
political purposes two types of restraint are appropriate
procedural self-restraint, such as simple docket discre-
tion, and substantive self-restraint, including the
political question doctrine, the use of judicial par-
simony, and so on. John P. Roche, "Judicial Self-
Restraint," American Political Science Review . Vol. 49
(1955), pp. 765-768. For other means of avoiding con-
tentious issues, see Sigler, pp. 190-197.
30Cardozo, p. 168.
16
environment within which the Court operates. This
environment includes the general public, organized and
unorganized; the news media; the legal fraternity; and
particularly the rest of the national political system
Congress and the executive. Legal scholars have recent-
ly come to realize that the study of judicial behavior
i3 not unlike the study of legislative behavior in that
factors extraneous to courtrooms and legal briefs form
an important part of the causative chain leading to
decision. Although some scholars contend that such
external limitations on the Court as its lack of purse
or sword are essentially passive, Schubert and others
have argued that regime restraints on the Court are
primarily active, differing only in degree from those
32
restraining Congress or the executive. Decisions by
the Court are safer to the extent that they affirm
decisions of the elected political bodies--to do other-
wise tends to alienate not only those institutions but
33
the public which elected them. Moreover, public
31 Peltason, "Judicial Process: Introduction,"
p. 289.
32 Schubert, The Constitutional Polity , p. 143.
33 Spaeth, The Warren Court , pp. 22-24.
17
opinion itself constitutes an outer boundary for policy-
making from which the Court is thought seldom to
deviate. 34 Judges thus respond to stimuli generated by
the rest of the political system, i.e., by their exter-
nal environment. The nature of the restraints that
environment imposes upon the Court and the degree of
Court response to those restraints is the primary concern
of this study.
The Supreme Court's role in the political process
makes it inevitable that it will decide complex and
controversial cases. Yet the fact that the total number
of cases upon which the Court has the opportunity to pass
is quite small means that these difficult decisions con-
stitute a large percentage of the total and are thus
35highly visible. It is not surprising, then, that the
institution often has been embroiled in political contro-
versies, some of which have reached "crisis" proportions.
They have involved either attacks upon particular decis-
ions or upon the Court's institutional position in the
34
|YlcC loskey
,
The American Supreme Court , pp. 20-22.
33 Paul J. Mishkin, "Foreword: The High Court,
The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law," 79
Harvard Law Review 56 (1965), 67.
18
political system- -the latter including feedback to many
decisions in several areas. Subsequent to such instances
of negative feedback the Court has made alterations in
the direction or scope of its policies. One form of
alteration has been the implicit or explicit overruling
of the controversial precedent or a purposive interpre-
tation of fact situations to distinguish the new decision
from the one under attack. The Court's overruling of
36Hepburn v. Griswold less than one year after its
announcement is an example of the former, while the
distinguishing of the facts in Barenblatt v. United
States from those of Wat kins v. United States is an
example of the latter. 3 ® Another form of alteration has
been reversal in a whole field of decisions characterized
36
8 Wall. 603 (1870)
.
3 ^
Leqal Tender Cases
,
12 Wall. 457 (1871).
38
Barenblatt v. United States
,
360 U.S. 109 (1959);
Watkins v. United States
,
354 U.S. 178 (1957). Although
it involves new interpretation of a similar fact situation
rather than the outright reversal of precedent, the Baren-
blatt decision is generally admitted to be a retreat from
Watkins
.
C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitutional
System (New York: McGraw Hill
,
1967 ) , p^ 43 ; Alpheus
Mason and William Beaney, American Constitutional Law
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.s Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964),
p. 56} Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press
,
1962 ) , p~! 229; Dean Alfange,
Jr., "Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court,"
30 University of Cincinnati Law Review 113 (1961), 114,
157-159.
19
by broad doctrinal shifts in Court policies. The two
outstanding examples of such pervasive shifts both
significantly altering the Court's subsequent place in
the political context—were the reversals of 1837 and
351937. Both minor policy alteration and broad doctrinal
alteration may be brought about by the addition of new
personnel or by changes in views or attitudes of parti-
cular judges because of such factors as perceived changes
in prevailing legal thinking, a change in role perception,
•z qj:?While there seems to be no doubt as to the
nature of the Court's shift in 1937, there has been a
great deal of academic debate over the nature of the
Taney departure from the policies of the Marshall Court
in 1837. Some, including both of Taney's major biogra-
phers, have urged that the change was only one of emphasis,
thus not in the larger sense doctrinal. Carl B. Swisher,
Roger B. Taney (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1935),
pp. 584-87j Walker Lewis, Without Fear or Favor: A
Biography of Roger Brooke Taney (Boston: Hought on Mifflin
Company, 1965 ) , p . 276 . Others disagree. See William W.
Crosskey, "Mr. Chief Justice Marshall," in Allison Dunham
and Philip B. Kurland, eds., Mr. Justice (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 25. Most of these schol-
ars seem to have erred in viewing the Marshall period as
a whole. It has been pointed out by one student of the
era that while Taney was fairly consistent with the
policies enunciated from 1824 to 1835 he was quite incon-
sistent with those more representative of Marshall between
1816 and 1824. Murphy, Congress and the Court , p. 28.
For a clear differentiation between the earlier and latter
Marshall periods, see Charles Grove Haines, The Role of the
Supreme Court in American Government and Politics : 1789-
1835 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), pp. 610-611.
In its first term the Taney Court disposed of three cases
held over from the Marshall years, each in a manner
20
an overt response to political pressures, or even
senescence. It is difficult in any concrete instance
to distinguish one cause from the rest and corresponding-
ly to suggest the primacy of any one factor. Moreover,
it is also difficult to determine precisely the moment
and degree of Court change. Response to feedback may,
after all, be manifested not by shifts in Court policy
but simply by diminishing sizes of majorities. In order
to help clarify these relationships a model of feedback
has been constructed.
opposite from the earlier Marshall preference. See
Charles River Bridge Company v . Warren bridge Company
.
11 Peters 438 (1837), Mayor of New York v. M i 1
n
.
11
Peters 102 (1937), and Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky
, 11
Peters 257 (1837). In two of these cases, moreover, the
Marshall Court had made preliminary votes, both reversed
by Taney's majority. The Charles River Bridge case had
earlier been decided 3-1 for the petitioner and with
Duvall and Johnson would have been 4-2. Charles Grove
Haines and Foster H. Sherwood, The Role of the Supreme
Court in American Government and Politics: 1835-1864
(Berkeley
,
University of California Press, 1957 ) , p . 35
.
In 1837 the votes of the holdover members remained the
same but the addition of Taney, Barbour and Wayne, all
of whom voted differently from their predecessors, made
the outcome 4-2, favoring the respondent. Briscoe v.
Bank
.
previously 3-1 for the petitioner now became 6-1
for the respondent. Lewis, p, 307. Moreover, there are
clear doctrinal differences in these dispositions from
other Marshall precedents. Compare Charles River Bridge
with Dartmouth College v . Woodward , 4 Wheaton 518 (1819)
;
compare Mayor of New York v. Mi In with Gibbons v. Ogden ,
9 Ulhaaton 1 ( 1824). and Brown v. Maryland , 12 Wheaton 419
(1827); compare Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky with Craig v.
Missouri
,
4 Peters 410 ( 1830)
.
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II. Sources and Types of Feedback
Feedback, as the response of the Court's many
publics to antecedent output, comprises the pressures
both positive and negat ive--exert ed on the Court for
similar or different outputs in the future.
Court decisions always generate some form of
feedback because courts serve the dual function of
deciding concrete cases between particular litigants and
providing through those decisions general legal policies
which extend to non-litigants who may find themselves in
similar circumstances. When these groups become suffi-
ciently hostile to the Court's policies "a higher tri-
bunal," as Hyneman has called it, comes into existence
and the case against the Court is argued in every possible
public forum.^ When the verdict is in and the sentence
is to be executed there are myriad opportunities to
nullify a Court decision. Peltason has itemized several:
the Court may be persuaded to overrule itself ; Congress
may be persuaded to overrule the Court; lower courts may
reinterpret or evade a decision; administrators may
refuse compliance or even actively oppose enforcement by
40Charles S. Hyneman, The Supreme Court on Trial
(New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 18.
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others; ultimately, the Constitution itself may be
amended. On the other hand, such feedback may not
be designed to reverse the Court's past policies but
simply to worry the judges into not continuing them in
the future. z Thus, a constitutional amendment may fail
to obtain sufficient support for passage yet come close
enough to persuade the judges to rethink the policy
which prompted it.
Feedback may serve as an immediate response to a
particular decision; as a somewhat more diffuse response
to a whole area of decisions or to the disposition of an
entire issue; or, infrequently, as a very general re-
sponse to the Court itself, not differentiating individual
decisions or even issues. These three types of feedback
may be referred to as; (1) "case-specific" responses,
such as those generated by the first legal tender case;
(2) "issue-specific" responses, like the "Red Monday"
decisions of 1957; and (3) "generalized" responses, such
as those evidenced in 1837 and 1937.
^Jack W. Peltason, Federal Courts in the Political
Process (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday and Co., 1955),
pp. 58-62.
42 Harold Chase, "The Warren Court and Congress,"
44 Minnesota Law Review 595 (I960), 635.
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The following are some of the more obvious forms
of feedback:
!• Further litigation
. As a form of case-
specific response, Goldman and Jahnige have suggested
that the major form of feedback may be the new cases
which are introduced in the legal process as a response
to past decisions .
^
Clearly, this is one of the few
facilities available to the Court for information of the
/» /i
outcome of its policies. A decision may, and usually
does, provoke those whose interests seem to be furthered
by a particular decision to strike while the judicial
45iron is still hot. The decision in Baker v. Carr
,
for example, brought on a multitude of malapportionment
suits from similarly aggrieved parties.
2. Litigation advocacy . A closely related type
of feedback is the participation in the legal system by
interests which aid others in litigating cases. Decisions
^Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige, "Systems
Analysis and Judicial Systems: Potential and Limitations,"
unpublished paper presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, p. 15.
^Joel Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy
Analysis: The Supreme Court and the Sit-in Cases," in
Grossman and Tanenhaus, p. 422.
45 369 U. S. 186 (1962)
.
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affecting the fortunes of a particular class or inter-
est group may call into action participants who litigate
cases, promote test cases, provide funds for litigation,
or serve as amicus curiae
.
46 The latter, particularly,
serves as an important information source, 47 The nature
and degree of litigation advocacy may also serve as a
guide in the study of feedback. 48
3, C rit icism
. Criticism is certainly the most
common form of external feedback and may be either case-
or issue-specific. All observers of the Court's policies
may avail themselves of various vehicles through which
their opinions can be articulated. Criticism of the
Court is prevalent in newspapers, law reviews, in state
and national legislative bodies, or in the meetings and
journals of various interest groups. Obviously, criti-
cisms generated by those in a position to engage in more
See Clement E. \l ose, "Litigation as a Form of
Pressure Group Activity," 319 Annals of Political and
Social Science 20 (September 1958)'; Nathan Hackman,
"Lobbying the Supreme Court—An Appraisal of 'Political
Science Folklore'," 35 Fordham Law Review 15 (1966)}
Clement \J ose, Caucasian's Only (Berkeley: University of
California Press
,
1967 )
.
47
It is ironic that as the need for information in-
creases, there has been a tendency to restrict this source
of information. Samuel Krislov, The Supreme Court in the
Political Process (New York: Macmillan Co , , 1965) , pp
.
72-73.
^Hackman, op. cit .
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direct anti-Court action are likely to be the most
effective. It is certainly plausible to argue that the
statement of the 1958 Conference of State Chief Justices
was persuasive in prompting the switch from Watkins to
Barenblatt
,
49 But even simple editorial criticism has
been thought to be effective when counter-criticism is
no better placed, as in the flag salute cases. 50
4. Lower court reinterpretation
. Since the
Supremo Court typically leaves to lower courts the task
of applying Court policy in specific cases, lower courts
have great leeway to modify significantly Supreme Court
decisions. When a decision seems particularly fore-
boding to a lower court it may limit its impact by
49Walter F. Murphy, "Lower Court Checks on the
Supreme Court," in Jahnige and Goldman, The Federal Judi-
cial System
, pp. 307-313.
50 See David R. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The
Flag Salute Controversy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962 ) , p"i 251
.
51 Murphy, "Lower Court Checks on the Supreme
Court," p. 307. The ability of state courts particularly
to neutralize the effect of Supreme Court decisions is
well documented. Note, "Final Disposition of State Court
Decisions Reversed and Remanded by the Supreme Court,
October Term 1931 to October Term 1940," 55 Harvard Law
Review 1357 (1942) and Note, "Evasion of Supreme Court
Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts since 1941,"
67 Harvard Law Review 1251 (1954).
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confining it to the narrowest possible ground, even if
to do so violates the clear intent of the Court’s opin-
ion. The way in which the very specific decision of
Mallory v. United States 5 ^* was handled by the lower
courts in the District of Columbia provides a good exam-
ple of such tactics. 53 Since the Supreme Court must
wait for an appeal of the lower court decision or for
a similar case to arise before it can clarify its pre-
vious policy, such misinterpretation is often very effec-
tive.
5. A ppointment . Altering the political complexion
of the Court by filling vacancies with judges sympathe-
tic to the views of the executive or Congress may be
considered a primary form of feedback. It may on the
one hand signal the Court as to the prevailing attitudes
of the elected branches or, on the other, to alter voting
alignments so as to affect output. This latter feedback
is often the ultimate response to a Court which has not
paid sufficient heed to other feedback. In spite of
strategic retreats by the later Marshall Court majority,
52
354 U.S. 449 (1957)
.
C “T
Murphy, "Lower Court Checks on the Supreme
Court," p. 309.
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for example, it was finally the replacements of Marshall
and Duval by Taney and Barbour which produced the doctri-
nal shift of 1837 and stemmed the tide of anti-Court
activity# The first legal tender case was reversed
less than a year after it was rendered only because of
Grant’s appointments of Strong and Bradley. The Senate,
too, can play an instrumental feedback role in the
appointment process. That body has refused to confirm
proportionally more appointments to the Supreme Court
55than to any other office. The filibuster over the
nomination of Abe Fortas to the Chief Justiceship in
1968 was a clear signal of the intensity of Senate opposi-
tion to the direction of the Warren Court. On the other
hand, it must also be said that the appointment power
per se is only a "blunt instrument" in terms of likely
Court response. Although over time judicial discretion
is limited by the appointment process, there is usually
a period of dissonance between the appointer and the
^Haines and Sherwood, p. 15.
C 5
Joseph P. Harris, Advice and Consent of the
Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by
the United States Senate (Berkeley, Calif . : University
of California Press, 1953), p. 303.
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Court duo to the fact of life tenure. 56
The same, however, cannot be said of the related
power--exercised by Congress and often proposed by the
executive— to alter the size of the institution so as
to provide room for subsequent appointments. The size
of the Court was manipulated seven times between 1801
and 1869, in each instance to alter Court policy," 7
Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing proposal, although
never enacted, was a sufficient threat to produce the
"switch-in-time" of 1937. The forced resignation of
Fortas in 1969 may have accomplished both the function
of informing the Court of the intensity of Senate dis-
pleasure and of providing an additional appointment by
59
which President Nixon could affect Court policy.
56
Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress
.
pp. 88-90.
c 7
Schubert, Judicial Policy-Making , p. 11.
58
See Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judi-
cial Supremacy (New York: Random House, 194l), pp . 189-
96, 207-235. It is, of course, true that Roberts' vote
in West Coast Hotel Co . v, Parrish , 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
was cast before the Court-packing plan was announced.
See Felix Frankfurter, "Mr, Justice Roberts," 104 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 34 (1955). Yet some
such measure had long been considered and came as no
surprise
.
59
See Goldman and Jahnige, The Federal Courts as
a Political System, pp. 14-16.
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6 ‘ Statutory reversal
. There are basically two
types of legislation which Congress can employ to re-
spond to Supreme Court decisions to which it is opposed:
Court-curbing proposals, designed to affect the Court’s
institutional structure or function; and decision-
reversal proposals, designed to modify the impact or the
legal character of specific outputs. 60 The former will
be considered as a form of reprisal but the latter is
an important--and pervasive— feedback mechanism itself.
If the most important policy-making function of the Court
is in the realm of statutory interpretation, 6 ^ then it
becomes necessary, in attempting to persuade the Court
to change its policies, that Congress make its designs
clear in the instrument under consideration. When the
Court interprets a statute in a manner considered erro-
neous by Congress or when the Court begins to decide
cases contrary to Congress' wishes in a field thereto-
fore foreign to it, remedial legislation can serve both
to inform the Court and to alter policy. Of twenty-one
cases of statutory reversal between 1945 and 1957, fifteen
°Harry P. Stumpf, "Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Poli-
tics," 14 Journal, of Public Law 377 (1965), 382.
61 Loren P. Beth, Politics, the Constitution, and
the Supreme Court (New York : Harper and Row, 1962), p. 59.
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were provoked by conflicts between Congress and the
Court. After the controversial decision in Jencks v.
6 3United States
.
which greatly limited the evidentiary
operations of the federal government in criminal cases,
Congress passed the Jencks Act, restoring most of what
the Court had destroyed. Subsequently the Court made
clear that it had understood Congress’ message when it
accepted the Act in terms much broader than necessary,
thus softening its earlier position in the face of con-
gressional attack,^ 4 Much the same can be said for the
more authoritative policy-making tool, the exercise of
judicial review. In over thirty percent of the ninety-
four cases in which the Court has held acts of Congress
unconstitutional, Congress has reversed the decision
either wholly or substant ially .
^
On the other hand, it is also clear that Congres-
62 Note, "Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court
Decisions: 1945-1957," 71 Harvard Law Review 1324 (1956;
.
63353 U.S. 557 (1957)
.
64 G. Kenneth Reiblich, "Summary of October 1958
Term," Supreme Court Reporter , Mol. 79, October Term 1958
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., I960), p. 154.
See Palermo v. United States . 360 U.S. 343 (1959); Rosen^
367 (1959); and Pittsburgh
360 U.S. 395 (1959).
berg v
Plate Glass
United States
Company v
360 U.S.
United States.
65Abraham, The Judicial Process , pp. 333-335.
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sional reversal is not a simple matter. 66 Chase found
two predominant reasons for the failure of the Congre-
ssional attack during the 1957-58 crisis: neither
opinions nor specific interests approached unanimity as
they must; and the Court's institutional sanctity made
the attack appear to many as a violation of the separa-
ft 7tion of powers. Perhaps, then, one might conclude
that the application of statutory reversal as a communi-
cator of displeasure is as important in its threat as it
might be in its actual passage.
7. Constitutional amendment
. In theory, if the
Congress is at odds with the Court over an interpretation
of the Constitution it is free to propose an amendment to
the Constitution which will reverse the Court's errant
decision. The Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteen-
th, and Sixteenth Amendments were all in part designed
to overrule Court policies. 60 Recent proposed amendments
66 See William m . Beaney, "Civil Liberties and
Statutory Construction," 8 Journal of Public Law 66
(1959), 79.
6
^Chase, p. 633.
68
The Eleventh Amendment sought to reverse Chls-
holm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793); the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments sought to reverse
Dred Scott v. Sanford , 19 Howard 393 (1857); the Six-
teenth Amendment sought to reverse Pollock v. Farmers
Loan and Trust Company , 157 U.S. 429 and 158 U.S. 601
(1895) .
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were explicitly designed to reverse the school prayer
and reapportionment decisions. 69 Clearly, this type of
feedback is similar to that of statutory reversal both
in its intent and in its effect. It has been used even
less often because of the extreme difficulty of secur-
ing ratification of an amendment. Moreover, as in the
case of statutory reversal, the Court has been known to
reinterpret an Amendment so as to mitigate its antici-
70pated effects. Thus, again there is a compelling
argument that amendment is more effective as a communi-
cator of information as to the nature and intensity of
Congressional opposition than it is in actual implementa-
tion.
8. Noncompliance . On extreme occasions, when the
execution of a particular policy laid down by the Court
is entirely at odds with the values and designs of lower
courts, state and local administrators, law enforcement
officers, or even the national executive, these groups
69SJ Res 6, 91st Congress, 1st Sess., Congression-
al Quarterly Uleeklv Rnports . February 7, 1969, p. 229.
70See, for example, Cohens v. Virginia , 6 Wheaton
264 (1821) which greatly offset the effect of the Eleventh
Amendment. McCloskey, p. 64.
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may refuse to comply. When those who are given responsi-
bility for the effectuation of Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the Court itself shoulder that burden, 71
the Court generally has little recourse. Other than its
institutional prestige, which in such an instance was
being flouted, its only weapon for enforcement is the
contempt citation--not a very potent one in crisis situa-
72tions. Compliance, it is often said, is the final
73test of legitimacy; legitimacy is essential to the
Court's exercise of authority.^ 4 Disobedience of a
Court decision, particularly in concert with other
instances of disobedience, may inform the Court of a more
general lack of support. The judges know that a prospec-
^As was said to be the response of President Jack-
son to the Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia , 6
Peters 515 (1832)
.
7 9
In a recent case of noncompliance the Supreme
Court, for only the second time in its history, ordered
a lower court judge to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt. The charge was later withdrawn. I_n
re Herndon , 394 U.S. 400 (1969). See Civil Liberties ,
February 1969, p. 31.
73
Wichael J. Petrick, "The Supreme Court and
Authority Acceptance," 21 Western Political Qua rterly 5
(1960), 7.
74[YlcCloskey
,
p. 72. For example, the failure of
the C ourt -packing plan of 1937 is generally attributed to
the public support for the Court as an institution even
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tive decision may not bo obeyed and that disobedience
over time itself breeds further disobedience. Of course
the degree of compliance that is likely in a case depends
largely on the audience. If a decision is aimed at only
a few, as in the reapportionment cases, it is more likely
to secure compliance than when it is aimed at many, such
as in the case of school prayer. The effect of non-
compliance may also be related to such considerations of
size. It is probably true that the Court’s awareness
7 f»that Brown v. Board of Education would have differen-
tial impact in different areas prompted a piecemeal and
gradual plan of enforcement.
9. Reprisal . The notion of reprisal as a form of
feedback has, it would seem, two possible forms. Ordi*-
narily,the term considers some form of punishment for
previous transgressions. On the other hand it may also
refer to institutional alterations which, while perhaps
having the effect of punishment, are designed to force
in the face of public hostility to particular decisions.
See Murphy, Congress and the Court , pp. 58-62.
^Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress
,
p. 91.
?6
347 U.S. 483 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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the Court into new policy directions. Like all the
other varieties of feedback discussed, reprisals may
have the effect of informing the Court of the propriety
of reversing itself—thus the threat again becoming as
important as the actual implementation. But in analyti-
cal terms as well as in the intent of their proposal,
reprisals are those "final" alterations of the Court’s
structure or function in the absence of favorable Court
response to other feedback. Thus, certain proposals
must in some circumstances be considered as reprisals
which in other circumstances are among the less severe
forms of feedback previously mentioned.^®
There are several forms of chastisement that
reprisal might take. The Court has often been threatened
77This is the distinction which Stumpf makes be-
tween court-curbing and decision-reversal proposals.
See Supra
, p. 29, fn. 60. He also believes it to be a
distinction made in practice by legislators. Stumpf,
p. 382.
7 8Thus, for example, although Richard Nixon's
nominations of "law and order" men to the Supreme Court
seem to be normal "appointment" feedback, the tenor
and circumstances of their proposal gives the impression
that they were used as means of reprisal.
36
with the withholding of financial support and at times
such threats actually materialize. 79 Another form often
threatened but only once effectuated is impeachment. 00
On the other hand impeachment is so severe a reprisal
that even a serious threat of its use may induce resigna-
tion. 81
There are three general categories of reprisal
of the second— i.e., structure-altering— form: Restric-
tions on judicial review, restrictions of appellate
jurisdiction, and changes in the size and personnel of
the Court. While these may occasionally be case-specific
8 2
responses, they are most often issue-specific and
7 9 In 1964 the cutback of proposed pay increases
for Supreme Court Justices was termed by Rep. Charles
S. Johnson to be "an act of vengeance for recent decis-
ions." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports , march 12,
1965, p. 408.
8 n
In 1805 articles of impeachment were brought
against Samuel Chase by the House although he was later
acquitted
.
8
1
The case of Justice Fortas is instructive. See
infra
.
p. 326 . Although less serious a threat, there
were demands in both houses for the impeachment of the
entire majority of Watkins v. United States . Murphy,
Congress and the Court
, p. 116.
82 See, for example. Grant's appointments of
Strong and Bradley to reverse Hepburn v. Griswold .
McCloskey, pp. 114-15.
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sometimes generalized. Challenges to the power of
judicial review have been common in Court crises.
Beginning in 1921, particularly as a response to the
Marshall Court anti-states’ rights decisions, there
were numerous proposals to curb this ultimate authority,
including proposals to give the Senate appellate review
Q*7
of decisions striking down state laws, and proposals
to require extraordinary majorities in the exercise of
judicial review. In the heat of the crisis of 1957-
58 similar bills were introduced together with an
additional one which would have permitted states to
disregard constitutional decisions which departed from
precedent and were based on "non-legal" considerations. 65
The very commonness of such proposals, however, may
well have sapped their effect for any purpose but that
of information. As Charles Black points out, the secur-
ity of judicial review is best reflected in the fact that
8
^Haines, pp. 480=85.
84Charles Ularren, The Supreme Court in United
States History , Vols. I and II (Little, Brown and Co.:
Boston, 1922) , \/ol. I, p. 685.
85Murphy, Conaress and the Court , p. 116.
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at any time Congress might have "worried it to death’s
Q pdoor"— but never has. Proposed restrictions of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction have been hardly more
effective, and in fact have succeeded only once. Yet,
since the Court itself upheld the restriction in that
instance; since the Supreme Court's place in the consti-
tutional scheme derives primarily from its relationship
to other courts; and since these relations are created
8 8by Congress, such threats seem to carry greater
authority than attacks on judicial review. Although
some scholars have argued that Congress' control of the
89
Court's appellate jurisdiction is extremely limited,
Congress has not hesitated to threaten unlimited restric-
tions. From 1822 to 1826 measures to repeal Article 25
90 _
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were hotly debated. in
86Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspectives in Constitu-
tional Law (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . s Prentice-Hall, 1970),
p . 13
.
87
See Ex Parte McCardle , 7 Wallace 508 (1868).
88 Black, Perspectives , p. 11.
89Henry M . Hart, "The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts," 66 Harvard Law
Review 1362 (1953).
9
°S R e Haines, pp. 500-23; Warren, p. 663.
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1957 and 1958 the J enner-But ler bill restricting the
Court's jurisdiction in state and federal anti-subver-
sive cases came perilously close to passage. 91 The use
of the appointment and confirmation powers as means of
reprisal has already been mentioned. Since appointment
is an inevitable restructuring process, it need not
always be viewed as a form of feedback. On the other
hand, in many circumstances appointment has served as
feedback either in the benign "informational" sense or
in the more malignant "chastisement" sense. Of the
nineteen rejections and fifteen "unusual delays" in con-
firmation noted by Abraham, several involved attempts to
pressure the Court while many others involved "personal
go
senatorial vendettas."
Considered in sum, these three categories of
structure-altering reprisal comprise the bulk of ant i-
Court activity. Of the 165 court-curbing bills intro-
duced in Congress by 1959 the dispersal was remarkably
evens 30% dealt with regulating or abolishing judicial
review; 28% with restrictions of appellate jurisdiction;
^Murphy, Congress and the Court , pp. 154-70;
207-08.
92 Abraham, The Judicial Process, pp. 78-86.
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and 29$> with the size or personnel composition of the
C ourt
.
^
Although such actions as those outlined above
are threatened far more often than they are implemented,
there are enough notable examples of the Court moderating
its position either to avoid more serious clashes with
the other political institutions or as a by-product of
94structural change, that they may be dealt with in
systemic terms.
The sources of feedback are equally varied, and
no one tactic is the peculiar province of any one public.
Nearly all Supreme Court decisions receive some attention
in Congress. Congress may criticize, threaten, or
reverse by statute; it may affect appointments and the
size of the Court; it may even propose Constitutional
Amendments. The Executive may appoint new members or
limit administrative compliance; he may propose anti-
Court legislation to Congress; perhaps most important,
he can influence public attitudes, thereby promoting
93Nagel, "Court-Curbing Periods in American
History," p. 45.
^Jacob, Justice in America , pp. 194-95.
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95feedback from other sources. Another significant
administrative source of feedback is that of local
government, primarily responsible for implementation
of many of the Court's decisions, in which there is a
tradition of defiance. It is at least apparent that
what initially seems to be strictly a matter for Court
disposition often becomes a matter of politics at the
97local level. This is particularly true for the police,
obviously a very critical feedback source in the present
study. For example, Skolnick has found that community
power structures—those responsible for the control of
"rewards"—tend to influence police behavior away from
9 8
compliance with pro-defendant rulings. Even without
such pressures, the policeman, with the natural "adminis-
trative bias of the craftsman" and a "presumption of
^Krislov, pp. 139-40.
96
I bid .
, p. 147.
97
James R. Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn,
"The Allocation of Justice: A Political Approach," 14
Journal of Public Law 326 (1965), 147.
Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial; Law
Enforcement in Democratic Society" (New Y ork : John Wiley
and Sons, 1967 ) , pp . 241-42
.
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regularity," is likely to take a very hostile attitude
to such court-imposed obstacles to laui enforcement,*^*
The intensity of that hostility can be expected to alter
the effectiveness of Court policy.
Another source of feedback to be treated is the
legal fraternity, that vast "inner republic of bench and
bar."*'^ The ability of lower courts to evade Supreme
Court decisions has already been considered , ^ ^ Lower
court judges are also free to criticize the Supreme
Court verbally, either in dicta or in " of f-t he-bench"
statements. Such criticism may convince the Court to
alter its policy or it may serve to encourage those with
more formal power--C ongress or the execut ive--t o act
i 02
against the Court, or to refuse compliance. Perceived
as legal authorities in their own right, lower court
99
Ibid
., pp. 196-99} 233.
1 DD (YlcCloskey
,
The American Supreme Court , p. 72.
"’^There is an interesting debate as to whether
there exists substantial difference in feedback from
state and federal courts. See Murphy, "Lower Court Checks
on the Supreme Court," p. 30B; Spaeth, The Warren Court ,
pp. 22-24; Jahnige and Goldman, p. 305. In the present
study no attempt is made to distinguish the effects of
these separate sources of lower court feedback.
1 02Jahnige and Goldman, p. 306.
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judges and lawyers also serve as important molders of
public opinion. Thus, in some sense, criticism or non-
compliance from the legal fraternity may mirror public
attitudes. Marshall suggests that the type of decision
being communicated by the legal fraternity to the public
will greatly affect ultimate impact. Substantive changes
in the law are often less difficult for lawyers and
judges to accept and communicate favorably than procedural
changes since the latter require the sacrifice of prac-
ticed skil Is . ^ ^
In such circumst ances--and even in cases in which
they are affected as citizens rather than prof essionals--
lawyers and judges are likely to respond negatively as a
group through professional organizations . ^ ^ These in-
clude professional associations of the bar, of govern-
mental officials, or of judgesj or they may include
organizations of members of the legal fraternity such as
1 (
the Judicial Conferences at the state or federal levels.
^
^Marshall
,
p. 184.
"*^Wasby, p. 79.
105The Conference is not only a source of criticism
of Supreme Court decisions; it is also a frequent advocate
of remedial Congressional legislation. This has been
notably true in response to criminal procedures decisions.
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The role of legal interest groups as sources of feedback
is important as lobbies directly to the Court or indirec-
tly to Congress? as an influence on public opinion; or
as instruments through which other groups seek to affect
a n £judicial policy. The effect of such groups as oppon-
ents of the Court is probably not as important a feed-
back as their absence as proponents. In the former
capacity their effectiveness is limited by their varia-
bility. Some groups are less central to the legal system
than others, some are involved in their opposition more
frequently and intensely than others; hence they seldom
operate in concert as seems to be a requisite for succoss-
1 07ful attack. On the other hand, as advocates for the
Court, even individually, legal interest groups have
played a primary feedback role. The importance of the
bar's defense of the Court in the latter part of Marsh-
108
all's tenure has been mentioned; even more obvious was
Murphy
,
"Lower Court Checks on the Supreme Court," pp.
308-09.
105 Schubert, Constitutional Policy , pp. 152-53.
^
^Uiasby
,
pp. 78-79.
1 08 |YlcCloskey
,
p. 75; Warren, Vol. 1, p. 713.
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the similar role played by the ABA in the 1937 crisis; 109
the absence of such traditional professional support in
1957-1959 uias extremely damaging. 110 Support of legal
interest groups seems closely related to the policies
at issue. Nagel has found that judges who were members
of the ABA tend to be more prosecution-minded than non-
members. One might f therefore, expect to find that the
level of ABA support, so important to the Court in the
past, was less forthcoming in response to the liberal
UJarren Court criminal procedure decisions.
Sheldon Elliot, "Court Curbing Proposals in
Congress," 33 Notre Dame Law Review 597 (1958), 605.
110Not only was there no positive support by legal
interest groups, there was substantial negative support.
In 1958 the State Chief Justices voted 36 to 8 to support
a resolution condemning judicial policy-making "without
proper judicial restraint." Alpheus Mason, The Supreme
Court from Taft to Warren (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1968)
,
p. 243. At its annual meeting
in 1957 the ABA specifically refused to support the
decisions of the 1956 Term. Murphy, Congress and the
Court
,
p. 118. See Robert B. McKay, "The Supreme Court
and its Lawyer Critics," 28 Fordham Law Review 617
(1959-60) .
Ill
Stuart Nagel, "Judicial Backgrounds and Crimi-
nal Cases," 53 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and
Police Science 333 ( 1962 ) .
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Another source of feedback within the legal
fraternity is the professional criticism emanating from
the law schools. Traditionally a basis of strong posi-
tive support, it is often felt that if the sanctity of
the Court is destroyed there the Court's authority dimini-
shes. Support is transmitted primarily in the law
reviews, the "fourth estate of the law" upon which there
has been an increasing reliance by members of the Court. 113
Whether or not such reliance reflects primary influence
is a matter of debate; 11 ^ but regardless of the degree of
effect, citation of legal periodicals in opinions does
indicate that legal scholars and social scientists are
1
1
5
often active participants in the judicial process.
^^Martin M. Shapiro, Law and Politics in the
Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964)
,
pi 27
.
113
See Chester A. Newland, "Legal Periodicals and
the United States Supreme Court," 3 Midwest Journal of
Political Science 56 (1959).
^^Newland thinks not; ibid .
,
p. 73. But see
Wright Patman, "Lobbying Through Law Reviews," in Walter
Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, eds., Courts. Judges, and
Politics (New York: Random House, 1961) , pp . 308-311
.
113David Danelski, "Public Law: The Field," Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , Vol. 1,
175, at 177.
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They serve to provide information as to the effects of
decisions and to give important professional criticism
to which the judges are particularly sensitive. 116
Similarly, the press can exert an important in-
fluence on the Court either directly by informing the
judges as to the state of public opinion or indirectly
by creating public opinion which itself is a direct
117influence upon the Court. On the other hand, given
the small percentage of the public that is attentive to
or informed about the Court or is likely to be effective
as opponents, 11 ® perhaps it might be wise to discount
public opinion per se as a source of feedback and con-
comitantly the role of the press in influencing it. Vet
it is also clear that legitimacy, in a diffuse sense,
depends heavily upon the support of that small propor-
tion which is informed and able to affect other sources
116 Jahnige and Goldman, p. 324.
1l7 Ibid., pp. 316-17. See generally, Chester A.
Newland, "Press Coverage of the United States Supreme
Court," 17 W R stern Political Quarterly 15 (1964), and
David L. Grey, The Supreme Court and the News Media
(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
11SSrb Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus,
"Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Lourt: A
Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court
Legitimation of Regime Changes," in Grossman and Tanen-
haus, pp. 273-303; Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "The Public Views
the Supreme Court," in Herbert Jacob, ed., Law , P o 1 i t j-_9_s-L
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119of feedback, and upon the ordinary satisfaction of
the uninformed
.
1 2tJ In both cases the role of the press
as communicator of Court policy is significant. For the
former, prior information affects attitudes; 121 for the
latter, continued generation of negative specific support
is likely, over time, to erode the important base of
positive diffuse support. The absence of diffuse support
of the Court as an institution has been shown negatively
to affect attitudes about specific decisions and conso-
quent levels of compliance. 1 ^"1 Thus the relationship
between the press and public opinion is a close and an
important one for the Court.
There is abundant evidence that Supreme Court
justices are often cognizant of the likely impact of their
and the Federal Courts (Bostons Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1967), pp. 194-212? and John Kessel, "Public Per-
ceptions of the Supreme Court," 10 Midwest Journal of
Political Science 167 (1966).
"'^Murphy and Tanenhaus, pp. 294-95.
12
^Dolbeare, "The Public Views the Supreme Court,
p. 210.
121 Kessel, "Public Perceptions of the Supreme
Court," p . 183
.
122Kenneth Dolbeare, "The Supreme Court and the
States: From Abstract Doctrine to Local Behavioral Con-
formity," in Becker, pp. 206-13; Robert H. Birkby, The
Supreme Court and The Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to
the 'Schempp' Decision," in Becker, pp. 106-14.
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future decisions or of the impact of antecedent ones.
One notes, for example, the Justices' interest in such
information by questions directed to counsel during
123
argument, or in of f-t he-bench statements made by them
after some decisions as to the volume and character of
A O A
direct public responses. Whether and to what extent
such feedback affects particular court decisions is one
of the subjects of this study. It can be examined only
in a relational sense: that is, given the existence of
pronounced negative feedback and a later change in court
policy-making, it can be inferred that the one was asso-
ciated with the other. But of perhaps greater interest
to the student of the Court, and the second subject of
this study, is the pattern which feedback takes. The
Court, it was suggested at the outset, ignores its critics
only at its peril. Failure to respond to feedback may
stem from inadequate communication of negative feedback
to the judicial authorities; it may be the result of
Court intransigence; or it may be the result of political
decisions by the judges that a threat will not escalate
^^Wasby, p. 69.
124
Ibid.
,
p . 71
.
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into an outright attack. If the judges mis— judge and
if feedback is severe, the Court inevitably faces a
crisis situation the result of which can well be a blow
to its institutional hegemony. The patterns of feed-
back are, then, of preeminent importance to the Court's
ability to maintain its status as a policy-maker.
III. Feedback: Theoretical Model
Systems analysis, either as a theoretical construct
or as a "conceptual framework," needs neither detailed
explication nor defense here. Derived from a basic
125
communication and control model developed in physiology
and refined in the fields of electrical engineering 1 26
and cybernetics, systems theory examines social and
political processes in terms of universal goals and
1 2S
Walter B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body , 1932
(rev. and enl. ed . New York: Norton , 1963)
.
1 9
Claude I. Shannon, "The Mathematical Theory of
Communication," 27 Bell Systems Technical Journal 397
(1948); C. Dale Harris, Introduction to Feedback Systems
(N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons"! 1951 ) .
127
Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine , 2nd ed.
( Cambridge : MIT Press , 1962 ) .
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128functions. The political or social system is con-
ceived as the process by which conflicts are communica-
ted to authorities for resolution and in which the
effects of such resolutions constitute an important in-
fluence as to how subsequent conflicts will be treated.
Thus, for all systems theorists, the motive-force of the
process is persistence; the systematic performance of
essential functions in order to subvert naturally disin-
tegrative forces in the environment. 1 ^ The process is
often simplified as a flow-model in which inputs are con-
verted into outputs, the impacts of which are fed back to
the conversion structure in the form of new or altered
The seminal influences for such analyses have
been in sociology; Talcott Parsons, The Social System
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 195l) ; Structure and
~
Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, I ll . : The Free
Press
,
I960); in political science, David Easton, "An
Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," 9 W orld
Politics 383 (1957); A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N . J . s Prentice-Hall
,
1965) ; and A.
Systems Analysis of Political Life
,
op. cit
. ; and Karl
W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free
Press, 1963); and in judicial behavior, Glendon Schubert,
Judicial Policy-Making ; Walter Murphy, Elements of Judic-
ial Strategy
, pp. 31-36.
"'‘^Goldman and Jahnige, "Systems Analysis and
Judicial Systems," p. 9.
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inputs
.
Basically, systems theory in political science
may be viewed from two rather different vantage points:
first, as "an integrated and generalized set of concepts,
hypotheses, and validated propositions"; or second,
simply as "a set of techniques and as a framework for a
systematic process of analysis."' u In the first sense,
the work-product of systems analysts— in terms of use-
ful high-level theory or empirically established infor-
mation— has been disappointing. As a theoretical propo-
sition, the analysis suffers from several weaknesses.
1 3iAs Gregor and others have appropriately suggested,
the physiological analogy is unsound. The social system
is not a self-generating mechanism with a natural homeo-
static tendency. Thus, systems theorists are in a sense
trapped by a vocabulary that is not of their making and
their conclusions are consequently misleading. Homeo-
stasis, for example, is a notion of very different signi-
ficance when applied in biology than when applied in
130 0ran R. Young, Systems of Political Science
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968),
p. 19.
131
a . James Gregor, "Political Science and the
Uses of Functional Analysis," 62 American, Political
Science Review 425 (I960).
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sociology. Secondly, unlike the biological organism or
the electrical circuit, social organizations are not
susceptible to precise measurement. The vagaries of
human behavior and perception produce methodological
difficulties in applying the systems model to the real
world. Together these difficulties have often prompted
a misallocat ion of values. Having described social
organizations as naturally seeking to provide certain
essential functions and having analogized the system as
homeostatic, there is often a bias toward preservation
of the status quo and a concomitant failure to regard the
dynamics of social processes.
On the other hand, seen from the second vantage
point, the "conceptual framework" has served some very
useful purposes. The descriptive concepts derived from
the analogy have provided means of patterning and organiz-
ing complex data; 132 the model has encouraged examination
of the processes of social phenomena and an awareness of
the interdependence of the elements of the system. As
an heuristic device, systems theory has substantial
explanatory value. Although social systems are not
132 Young, pp. 19-23.
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analogous to the linear model in the sense of their
susceptibility to precise mathematical analysis, most
of the characteristics of the linear model are still
relevant. Thus, one of the most fruitful products
of systems analysis has been the hypotheses it has gener-
ated subject to subsequent investigation. It is in this
more limited sense that the feedback model presented
here is developed.
Assumptions
. It is useful at the outset to
examine several assumptions of systems analysis. Primar-
ily, social systems are thought to be guided or persuaded
by attention to one goal
—
persistence or homeostasis.
Stagner has described homeostasis in a biological system
as the tendency to seek to restore steady states after
imbalance. 134 Thus, it may be useful for Ulmer in the
same way to describe the judicial subsystem as dynamically
homeostatic. 135 On the other hand, some systems theorists
have rejected the term in favor of "persistence" because
of the inaptness of the biological analogy and because of
l33Arnold Tustin, "Feedback," Scientific American
Vol. 187, No. 3 (Sept., 1952), pp. 52-54.
134Ross Stagner, "Homoestasis , " International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 6, 499.
l35Ulmer, "Homeostasis in the Supreme Court," p. 166.
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a belief that "homeostasis" imposes too great a concep-
tual limit on the dynamic qualities of the social
136process. In either case, the system is seen as
having: (l) a theoretically steady state; (2) thresh-
olds above and below that steady state beyond which
outputs cannot go without jeopardizing the persistence
of the system; (3) sensory input mechanisms to signal
violations of the thresholds; and (4) mechanisms to return
1 37the outputs to within the parameters of the thresholds.
Persistence depends, then, upon a "negative feedback loop"
to sense dangerous disequilibrium beyond the thresholds
and to transmit information of the disequilibrium to the
decision-maker. 1 '-1 ® (See Fig. 1) Thus, the feedback
1 39
model is appropriately compared to the learning process.
136 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis ,
pp. 88-89; 99-100.
1
'-’^Stagner
, pp. 499-500.
l3B Ibid
. ,
p. 500.
l39Karl UJ . Deutsch, "Communication Theory and
Social Science," 22 American Journal of Orth opsychiatry
469 (1952), pp. 480-482.
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FIGURE I. EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF FEEDBACK
output feedback
A second and related assumption of this equili-
brium model is that of het orostasis
.
The process by
which systemic equilibrium is restored to the threshold
of a steady state after disturbance may create another
disturbance Y^. In order that, in the process of redress-
ing one disturbance the Court not create a graater one,
it is assumed that the feedback mechanism recognizes a
"hierarchy of steady states,"— i.e., if equilibrating X
140
disturbs Y_, Y^ will always be of a lesser value than X.
Thus, for example, while the retreat in Barenblatt v.
United States offended many of the Court's publics, one
may infer that equanimity with Congress was of greater
systemic value to the Court than equanimity with its
libertarian defenders.
Two final assumptions of systems analysis are also
relevant. First, positive support increases in proportion
140Stagnor, p. 500
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to the satisfaction of demands; second, authorities
constantly seek to increase support, ^ ^ Thus, because
of a positive relationship between demand-satisfaction
and positive support and a negative relationship between
positive support and negative feedback, one would expect
to find a negative correlation between demand-satisfac-
tion and subsequent negative input, of which feedback is
a part.
The Feedback model . On the basis of these assump
tions a communications model of feedback may be construe
ted (see Figure 2). While not intended to offer the
FIGURE 2. FEEDBACK MODEL OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
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141 Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life,
p . 364
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precision of elaborate electronic switching models of
feedback, it does offer a conceptualization of the
various routes information may take from the point of
impact to the point of input. Like any feedback model,
it assumes linearit y--again only for conceptual purposes.
That is, there is no lost energy in the process; all that
is contained in the impact structure can be accounted for
somewhere in the system and eventually in one of the feed-
back structures.
Impact must be seen in terms of the Court's func-
tions in the political process. IDasby has suggested that
perhaps the most important impact of a decision is not
its effect in meeting or failing to meet certain demands
but in changing the nature of future demands. In
turn, the nature of those new demands produced by impact
seems closely related to the perceived difference between
a Court decision and public norms and expectations.
Richard Johnson, utilizing theories of "cognitive disso-
nance," has suggested that the ways in which that differ-
ence may be treated produce differing forms of feedback.
Thus, a cognitive dissonance between what one does in
response to a decision and other conflicting values may
be brought into consonance by concentrating on positive
142iDasby, p. 15.
59
elements of the chosen alternative by differentiating
dissonant parts of the rejected alternative, by creating
a transcendent structure to support the action taken,
or by attacking or denying the rejected alternative. 143
Whether one complies with or fails to comply with a
decision thus depends upon the relative effort required
to adopt one of these strategies effectively. If he is
a litigant, has access to the judges through law jour-
nals, or has the responsibility for implementing the
decision, he may communicate his action directly back to
the Court through a primary feedback loop ('). In the
absence of such access he may appeal to another subsystem
for redress or communicate his response to an intermediate
transmission structure.
Transmission is the process by which some impact
is articulated to those with the power or position to
exert pressure on the Court--thus an indirect or secondary
feedback loop (
" ) . While some groups may by-pass the
transmission mechanism others rely on these intermediaries
for relating their attitudes and bruised expectations to
the feedback structure. Congress, for example, may attack
the Court as a direct response to impact or as an indirect
143 Johnson, The Dynamics of Compliance , pp. 16-24.
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response to interest group or constituency pressures. 144
Newspaper criticism may exert a direct influence on the
judges, may serve as a transmission device for public
opinion, or may stimulate public opinion which is then
transmitted to the feedback structure by some other
1 45
mechanism. But impact may also be distorted by the
transmission vehicle. 14 ^ While such information loss is
4 i n
theoretically measurable, it is sufficient here merely
to point out the decreased efficiency of a feedback sys-
tem with such a breakdown and to conceptualize the loss
as an accumulating untransmitted or latent feedback .
The feedback structure is conceptualized as the
point at which the various forms of feedback accumulate
for communication as new input. Primary feedback is the
direct--i . e
. ,
untransmitt ed--response of those closest
to the prior outputs the legal fraternity by lower court
144See Murphy, Congress and the Court , p. 245.
145Kessel, p. 183.
14S See Newland, "Press Coverage of the United
States Supreme Court."
147 Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Social
Science," p. 474.
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interpretation, by law review criticism, or by further
litigation; the executive by noncompliance; the
legislature by statutory reversal. Primary feedback
is thus generally case-specific and immediate in the
time necessary for the completion of the communication
flow. It is also likely to constitute the bulk of feed-
back. Secondary feedback is less proximate to the con-
version structure and probably less immediate. Congress
or the executive may be prompted by groups directly
affected by outputs or even by each other to criticize
the Court. Secondary feedback can be case-specific but
is more often issue-specific and may even bo generalized.
Since the availability of transmission vehicles is limi-
ted, choices have to be made as to which impact will be
transmitted and to whom. In turn, what are ordinarily
case-specific responses are collected for the sake of
economy and become issue-specific feedback. Finally,
and only rarely, feedback may be tertiary ("')• Gener-
alized, indirect, and remote, tertiary feedback differs
from primary and secondary also in the focus of its
attack, which by-passes the input structure and visits
146Sigler refers to this as "internal feedback,"
pp. 35-39.
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its attention on the conversion process. Primarily an
executive or legislative response, this feedback usually
takes the form of structure-altering reprisal.
Feedback may, for many reasons, remain unaccom-
modated by the conversion structure. There may be acute
information loss such that inputs fail to reflect impact;
decision-makers may be intransigent or unpersuaded as to
the threat posed by negative feedback; gatekeepers may
fail to permit the articulation of important demands. 1 ^ 9
Since the system is conceived as a linear one, these un-
accommodated negative support attitudes and demands
accumulate as latent feedback which may become manifest
at a later time in conjunction with other feedback. For
example, Stumpf suggests that although the feedback gener-
ated as a result of the 1956 Term was subdued, it was
later rekindled in school prayer and reapportionment
crises. ^ ^ Although the opponents of Mallory failed to
secure remedial legislation in 1958 the issue was reac-
tivated to such a degree that similar attempts were made,
149Goldman & Jahnige, "Systems Analysis and
Judicial Systems," p. 11.
150Stumpf, pp. 378-79.
63
this time with greater success, ten years later. 151
Overlapping feedback is similarly impcrtant to the
fortunes of the Court but is more theoretically than
empirically identifiable. It is undoubtedly true that
noncompliance in one area is likely to make noncompliance
in another more likely. ^ ^ Moreover, opponents whose
negative feedback in one area is unaccommodated may join
forces with opponents in another. Thus, Stumpf believes
the critics of the school prayer decisions, frustrated in
their efforts to curb the Court, turned their attention
to reapportionment where legislative sympathy seemed
1 53greater. The success of the Court’s opponents in
1958 was due largely to the availability of a loose coali-
tion of critics. Alexander Bickel has proposed that
"^Murphy, Congress and the Court , pp. 219-23;
see infra
, p. ?93 . Mallory seems to have remained a very
important decision for Senator Thurmond for whom it seems
to have been particularly salient over a decade after its
disposal in the hearings attendant to Fortas' nomination
as Chief Justice. See infra , p. 298*
15
^See Krislov, p. 148.
153 Stumpf, p. 380.
154
Murphy, Conoress and the Court , p. 246.
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there is a f ini
t
b limit to tho number of controversial
issuos tho Court can effectively deal with at one
time, While this is undoubtodly trus, tho extent
to which feedback from one case or issue contributes to
feedback from another is more a matter of speculation
than measurement.
Like any communication system, the feedback model
is fraught with points of stress and potential dysfunc-
tion, Although feedback is tho essential stabilizer in
the legal process there is no well developed mechanism
for it. Law is often notoriously sluggish in recognizing
changes in social norms and responding to institutional
A C
f.imbalances. The transmission process may distort or
even fail to transmit actual impact responses. Gate-
keepers may inhibit the articulation of new demands.
Perhaps of greatest importance, there is often too long
a delay in the communication process for the system to
adjust. Ordinarily feedback is immediately attendant
to output to permit rapid system adjustment (Tig. 3a),
But as the time delay between feedback and output in-
creases so does the tendency for "self-excitation”
15
^Bickel, p. 94.
^^Marshall
, p # 183.
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1 57(Fig. 3b), Complex legislative feedback loops--such
as those labeled secondary or tertiary—are most likely
to produce such laps. In these circumstances, or
even in the more common dysfunction of intransigence by
the decision-maker, the place of reprisal and other
restructuring forms of feedback seem peculiarly appro-
priate ,
FIGURE 3. FEEDBACK OSCILLATION
a . b
.
These systemic stresses and the original assump-
tions of the model suggest three hypotheses about the
operation of feedback in the judicial system which will
be explored in the remainder of this study:
^^Tustin, pp. 51-52,
158
Sigler, p. 46.
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H y pot hes is #
1
. Cumulative negative feedback will
be accommodated by perceptible policy changes by the
Court. The more intense the feedback and the more
clearly communicated the more immediate will be the
Court's response.
Hypothesis #2 . Primary, secondary, and tertiary
feedback can be conceived as forming a hierarchy of
efficiency for system maintenance. Primary feedback is
most efficient, being the most immediate, the most speci-
fic, and the least susceptible to information-loss. On
the other hand, it is also the most common and least per-
suasive. Secondary feedback is more persuasive but is
less specific and less immediate. Transmission structures
may distort impact and pose the problem of too great a
time lag. The least efficient feedback in terms of
system maintenance is tertiary feedback which is greatly
delayed and has effects far beyond the outputs immedi-
ately under attack. Thus it is hypothesized that the
system will rely most heavily upon primary and secondary
feedback mechanisms.
Hypothesis 7^3 . In the event that the system fails
to respond to cumulative negative feedback of the primary
and secondary varieties, increased utilization of tertiary
67
feedback will occur. Or, if the Court should respond
to primary and secondary feedback but its critics either
do not recognize or are not appeased by it, then this
third form of feedback will be initiated.
IV. Feedback: Limits of the Model
There are, of course, distinct limits upon the
model's applicability to the real world and consequently
upon the hypotheses drawn from it. Some of these limits
apply peculiarly to the Court and its pursuit of systemic
persistence. Unlike the model, the Court may not have
adequate information as to demands and support; it
cannot fully control the parties to a case nor fully
implement its own decisions; it cannot always assess
their impact.
Students of the feedback process also suffer from
an inability to measure precisely the impact of Court
policies. Stephen UJasby outlines some of these percep-
tual difficulties for both the judge in trying to respond
to feedback and the student in trying to measure it. In
the first place, presumed positive feedback constitutes
positive support only if the actor so intends , and intent
159Wells and Grossman, p. 303.
68
is a notoriously elusive concept. 1 ^ 0 Thus, although
support for Gibbons v. Ogden seemed high in 1824, it
was probably due more to the fact that a despised mono-
poly had been destroyed than to approval of the Supreme
A fl A
Court, Secondly, while it is often quite easy to see
the direct effects of a decision upon a party to the
case, it is much more difficult to see the indirect
effects which may also generate feedback. Beaney and
Beiser found it very difficult to trace accurately post-
decision conduct and finally had to depend either upon
the judgments of well-placed observers or upon the fre-
quency of subsequent cases, neither a very reliable index
of indirect effect. Thirdly, Wasby points out that
since decisions occur in a milieu of general events,
all of which affect feedback, it is often a mistake for
one to assume that any one decision produced a certain
impact. 1 ^ This, of course, is the central problem with
^^Wasby, pp. 28-29.
^ ^ (YicC loskey
,
p. 70.
162William M. Beaney and Edward N. Beiser, "Prayers
and Politics: The Impact of Engle and Schempp on the
Political Process," in Becker, pp. 20-34, at p. 21.
163Wasby, p. 32.
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overlapping feedback. Fred Graham has pointed out that
the Warren Court's pro-defendant decisions in criminal
procedure cases coincided with a period in which there
i A
was a greatly increasing rate of crime. It is thus
quite difficult to determine whether anti-crime legisla-
tion during the 1960's was feedback to the Court or a
response to increasing crime, or perhaps both. Finally,
and perhaps the most difficult task for judges in assess-
ing impact, is the weighing of the differential effects
of decisions. How can one know, for example, whether a
certain degree of legitimacy will compensate for a cer-
tain loss of utility, 166 or whether one source of weak
feedback is a greater threat than another source of
stronger feedback? Shapiro properly notes, for example,
that it is not as important what people think as whether
and how they will act on their opinions. 166
Another obstacle in an examination of feedback is
its non-additive character. Although shifts in Court
policy may be measured with considerable precision, it is
164Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound ,
(New York: Macmillan, 1970) , Ch. 4
.
~
16
^Krislov, pp. 135-36.
1 f
^Schubert, The Constitutional Polity, p. 165.
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always difficult and often impossible to compare such
movements to corresponding feedback with similar accu-
racy. While one may correctly judge that criticism
of the Court was greater one year than in the previous
year, it is impossible to determine how much greater or
to judge equally well whether the sum total of feedback
was greater one year than another. A consequence of
this dilemma is that broad examinations of feedback have
been largely subjective and narrative.
There are also several difficulties which beset
the student of feedback beyond those of measuring impact
or following post-decision effects. These problems have
to do with the assessment of the Court's response to
impact and hence are of particular salience to this study.
Simply having found a period of cumulative negative feed-
167
Nagel has attempted with some success to quanti-
fy feedback at different times and to measure the success
of each in prompting policy alteration by the Court.
Nagel, "Court Curbing Periods in American History," V e t
even Nagel's data, while peculiarly quantifiable, demon-
strate well the non-additive nature of feedback and its
attendant difficulties. Although one can count the number
of court-curbing bills proposed in Congress, he cannot
easily compare their intensity nor can he quantify all
forms of Congressional feedback. What, for example, might
account for full retreat in 1802-1804 and no retreat in
1893-1897 when one anti-Court bill was reported out of
committee in each? Nagel, p. 37.
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back followed by a reversal of Court policy may suggest
a causal relationship. But to speak of "aftermath" is
not to demonstrate cause and effect and one must be
careful not to commit the fallacy post hoc ergo propter
16 8boc
. The model may anticipate such a sequence of
events in a well integrated system and hence presume
causality. But the validity of the model’s assumptions
is unproven and their applicability to the real world
unsubstantiated. Thus, causality can only be inferred
from sequence.
Another set of difficulties is to be found in the
nature of the decision-making process itself. Spaeth
has found that since personal attitudes are the primary
determinants of decisions, feedback usually works in
such a way as to intensify the effect of various stim-
1 fi 9
uli. It is therefore particularly difficult to judge
the effect of similar feedback on Courts of different
personnel. What may be adequate to persuade one judge
to alter policy outputs may be inadequate for another.
Second, since feedback does not change attitudes but
168Wasby, p. 27.
169Spaeth, pp. 374-75.
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changes perceptions of stimuli, it may have its greatest
effect in causing the Court to avoid an issue or to
decide it on narrow grounds. 170 Although one may infer
positive intent in such cases, these inferences are even
less reliable than those which can be made following
actual decisions.
There is, finally, another form of feedback which,
while theoretically identifiable, is particularly diffi-
cult to recognize in operation and impossible to measure.
This is what Savas refers to as "feedforward," accommo-
dating decisions in anticipation of negative feedback
171to the decision's alternative. Such anticipatory
decisions may take the form of avoidance of a case as,
1 72for example, in Coleqrove v. Green where Frankfurter
apparently recognized a likely hostile response to a
decision on the issue; or they might take the form of
decisions contrary to what the Court would ordinarily
have decided. The difficulty in the last instance is
170 Ibid
. ,
p. 376.
171 E. S. Savas, "Cybernetics in City Hall,"
Science (may 29, 1970), p. 1070. See also Wasby, p. 6B.
1 72 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
.
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that feedforward may play a role even where there is
feedback to previous similar decisions. Yet one cannot
determine the extent to which a decision is made in
anticipation of a negative response, in conformity with
the judges' values, or in response to extant feedback.
It is impossible to say with certainty whether the "stop-
and-frisk" decisions were a response to previous
feedback or a response to feedforward or a degree of both.
The same feedforward may also affect those institutions
upon which Court output has its impact. Thus, Beaney and
Beiser found that Congressional hostility to the school
prayer decision was produced not only by what the Court
had done but what it was expected to do in the future. H
Since feedback is not always discernible and even
that which can be identified is not additive, no attempt
will be made to measure precisely the amount or intensity
of feedback. Movements of the Court will be examined in
detail and then compared to those visible instances of
173
Terry v. Ohio , 387 U.S. 929 (1968); Sibron v.
New York, 389 U.S. 950 (1968); Peters v. New York , 389
U.S. 950 (1968).
^ 7
^Beaney and Beiser, p. 23.
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feedback occurring during the same period. Since the
analysis of feedback, while systematic, is still largely
subjective, the conclusions to be drawn must necessarily
be tentative.
Because of these limitations no claim will be made
that the hypotheses were conclusively confirmed or dis-
confirmed. However, it is suggested that if, over time,
increases in negative feedback to the Warren Court's
criminal procedure decisions appear to coincide with
retreats in Court policies, support is had for Hypothesis
#1. If, over time, the feedback to which the Court is
believed to have responded is mostly primary and secon-
dary, support is had for Hypothesis #2. Finally, if in
the absence of perceived policy change following a period
of intense negative feedback, there is a considered and
credible effort to alter the structure of the Court,
the findings would support Hypothesis #3.
As a related issue, it might also be asked what
would constitute a "retreat" by the Court in the terms
of the hypotheses. Goldman and Jahnige have posed to
the student of feedback the question of whether respon-
siveness to feedback is an institutional or an individual
phenomenon, and whether it tends to be consistent over
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a number of decisions or merely episodic. In a sense
the present study begs that question by treating indivi-
dual responses primarily as institutional ones and by
considering long-term shifts in voting behavior some-
what more than momentary aberrations. On the other hand,
some attention must be given to the problem.
Clearly there are some instances in which the
Court has retreated from a previous decision by over-
ruling it outright. There are other less obvious occas-
ions in which a decision so deviated from a prior princi-
ple that it can plausibly be deemed a retreat. In either
case, however, the retreat may be accomplished by as few
as one changed vote, and either type of shift by the
Court may constitute a single aberration or a consistent
pattern. In this study two methods of investigation of
retreats are used so as to consider both problems. First,
and primarily if percentages of aggregate cases or votes
favorable to criminal defendants change from one Court
Term to another, a consistent shift is noted. Second,
and more subjectively, specific opinions are examined
from term to term for evidence of doctrinal inconsisten-
A 7 C
Goldman and Jahnige, "Systems Analysis and
Judicial Systems," p. 19.
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cies in one or a number of decisions. If such shifts
are brought about by one or more changes in the Court's
voting alignments— or indeed even by changes due to
personnel alterations--in response to feedback, the
first hypothesis will have been supported.
PART TUIO
THE WARREN COURT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
One of the most promising areas for the testing
of the foregoing hypotheses seems to be the Warren
Court's application of procedural guarantees to defen-
dants in criminal cases. The Court has given consider-
able priority to such cases, undoubtedly as a logical
outgrowth of its early commitment to civil rights.
^
Clearly, emphasis from 1953 to 1968 has focused upon
2the realization of a truly egalitarian society both in
racial affairs and in standards of criminal justice.
Since 1953 the number of criminal procedures cases
decided by the Court has increased at an average rate
•7
of 21/6 and since 1962 have constituted about one-fourth
of the Court's full docket. 4
^A. Kenneth Pye, "The Warren Court and Criminal
Procedures," in Richard H. Saylor, Barry B. Boyer, and
Robert E. Gooding, Jr., eds., The Warren Court; A Criti-
cal Analysis (New York, 1969), p. 65.
2 See Philip Kurland, "Foreward: 'Equal in Origin
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Bran-
ches of the Government,'" 78 Harvard Law Revi«w J- 43
(1964)
.
3
Seo Fiq# If p •
4See November issue of Harvard Law Review , 1963
to 1967 (reports of docket composition ended in 1967).
7 B
With such a high rate of attention and an inclina-
tion to a particular kind of disposition it uias perhaps
inevitable that a concomitant degree of attention would
be paid by other institutions to the Court's efforts.
Few areas of judicial policy have been as thoroughly
misunderstood or as widely condemned as the Warren
Court's criminal procedures decisions. The reasons for
such condemnation are not hard to find. An increased
willingness on the part of the Court to adopt what Her-
bert Packer has described as a "Due Process" model of
the criminal justice system, giving priority to the pro-
tection of individual rights even though they may belong
to convicted criminals, has a value subtle and often
remote to most Americans. The contrary "Crime Control"
model, preferring order even at the expense of some degree
of dignity and constitutional rights for those proved
guilty, is more obvious and immediate."* As former Attor-
ney General Nicholas Katzenbach has noted, the defense of
the Court's holdings is complex and difficult while the
argument against them is simple and seductive: the decis-
ions are "handcuffing the police" and "coddling the
5See Herbert L. Packer, The Cimits of the Criminal
Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968),
pp. 149-73.
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criminals." 6 In a country beset simultaneously by an
acute "fear of crime" and an increasing rate of crime
it is not unexpected that such easy arguments would be
translated into an attack on the Supreme Court.
Thus, in a relatively short and well defined
period, beginning with the appointment of Carl Warren and
culminating with his retirement, an extraordinarily large
number of decisions in a single area have created feed-
back of every variety described from every source con-
ceivable. The nature of that feedback will be examined
later. First, however, it is necessary to determine just
what the movements of the Court have been.
The assertion that the Warren Court has effected
a revolution in criminal law--as it has in almost all
civil liberties issues --is perhaps only a slight exag-
geration. Certainly the Warren Court has been concerned
with closing the gap between the much-touted ideals of
justice in our criminal legal system and reality. In
6
See Richard Harris, The F ear of Crime (New Yorks
Praeger, 1969), p. 9.
^Anthony Lewis, "Earl Warren," in Sayler, et al .
,
Q
Pye, pp. 58-63.
p . 1
.
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doing so, however, the Court's pace has varied. Revo-
lution there has been; but in spite of a great deal of
ink that has been spilled to the contrary, the movement
has not been unhesitating and the path has not been
altogether straight. In order to assess the politics
of judicial decision-making in the area of criminal
rights it is essential to understand the nature of that
path and some of its consequences.
I . Methods of Analysis
For the purposes of this study, the Warren era
has been divided roughly in half: the period from 1953
to 1962 and the period from 1962 to 1969. Analysis will
concentrate on the latter segment. There are several
reasons for this treatment. In the first place, a
thorough examination of the Court's work, the feedback
it has generated, and the Court's response necessitates
truncation. In the second place, treatment of "the
Court" in the first period is a good deal more mislead-
ing than in the second. Between 1953 and 1962 there
were six changes in Court personnel, two of which brought
about major alterations in conservative-liberal align-
81
merit. From 1962 to 1969 there were only two changes:
one constituted no shift in the liberal-conservative
balance of powers and the other occurred late in the
1
1
period. Moreover, it was not until Arthur Goldberg
took the vacant seat of Felix Frankfurter at the begin-
ning of the 1962 term that the Warren Court gained a
clear liberal majority. Thus there is an ideological
continuity in the second period which corresponds, at
least in theory, with the liberal revolution mentioned
above. Finally, the first terms of the Warren Court
were ones of consolidation and hesitation in the area
of criminal law. It was only during the second period
that the Court made a clear commitment to apply the
standards guaranteed against infringement by the federal
government to the states. This application, more than
Brennan replaced Minton in 1956; Goldberg re
placed Frankfurter in 1962. See Bickel, The Supreme
Court and the Idea of Progress , p. 4.
1 D
Goldberg was replaced by Fortas in 1965.
^Clark was replaced by Marshall in 1967.
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any other factor, provided the necessary uieapon for wag-
ing a successful revolution.^ For these reasons, exami-
nation of the first period will bo quite perfunctory and
analysis will concentrate almost exclusively upon the
Court's last seven terms.
The universe of cases studied during these terms
1 3totaled 179. They comprised all constitutional cases
involving the application of procedural rights for crimi-
nal defendants under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments, including those decided per curiam if accompanied
by a written opinion. In addition, fifteen cases invol-
ving general "due process" considerations and four deal-
ing with habeas corpus procedure were included. "Due
1 2During the 1950's only those protections thought
to be "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty"
were applied to the states through the 14th Amendment.
This use of substantive due process, eschewed by the Court
after 1937 in economic cases, was built by Cardozo in
Palko v. Connecticut
,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), and preserved
by Frankfurter and others. But beginning with ivia pp v.
Ohio 376 U.S. 643 (1961), the Warren Court proceeded dur-
ing the next seven terms to incorporate the actual protec-
tions of most of the Bill of Rights. A new dimension was
given to the Pa lk
o
doctrine of incorporation which effec-
tively repudiated it. This repudiation and the piecemeal
adoption of Justice Black's views expressed in Adamson v.
California
,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), at 68, have provided the
essential vehicle for the reform in criminal procedures.
See Archibald Cox, The Ularren Court; Constitutional Deci-
sion as an Instrument of Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968)
,
pp . 71-73
.
1
3
For a complete list of the cases see Appendix II.
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process" cases were of several kinds* those in which
the Court construed a federal statute or regulated a state
court practice so as to insure the "fairness" of the
criminal process; 14 those in which individual actions
had violated the doctrine of fair play; 15 and those in-
volving state practices with regard to the availability
of adequate appeal mechanisms for indigent defendants. 15
In most of these the term "due process" was used by the
Court. The habeas corpus cases involved constructions
of the availability of the court obligations under feder-
1
7
al habeas corpus application from state as well as
1 Bfederal jurisdictions. The universe did not include
otherwise appropriate cases in which constitutional
issues were raised in addition to those apposite to
criminal procedural rights: civil rights cases, such as
14See, for example, lYlcCarthy v. United States .
394 U.S. 459 (1969) and Boykin v. Alabama . 395 U.S. 238
(1969)—the "plea of guilty" cases.
^ 5See, for example, Miller v. Pat
e
,
386 U.S. 1
(1967) .
l5 See, for example, Draper v. Ulashinoton , 372
U.S. 487 (1963).
^See T ownsend v. Sain , 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
^ 5 See Sanders v. United States. 373 U.S. 1 1,1963).
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the "sit-in” prosecutions; free press-fair trial cases;
Fifth Amendment legislative investigation or loyalty
security cases.
In most Supreme Court litigation many separable
issues are raised. In a feui of the cases included in
this study the judges expressed opinions on more than
one of these issues. For five cases it was possible to
determine the votes of all members for each of two issues;
for one it was possible to determine the votes of all
members for each of three. issues; and for one more it
was possible to determine the votes of all the members
1 9for one issue and of seven members for another. These
fifteen issues were treated as fifteen separate cases
rather than only seven.
Several statistical measurements were employed to
facilitate a thorough examination of the behavior of
the Court and of its individual members in these cases.
It was assumed that if a more accurate estimate of beha-
vior could be had the possible relationships between court
19
In this latter instance the remaining two
judges were treated as "not participating"— see Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Company (Part #1), 391 U.S. 216 ( 1968)
,
Appendix II, No, 125.
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action, feedback, and court reaction would become clearer.
Although most of the measures used are standard, two are
in some respects unique and require elaboration.
Attitude scaling
. Guttman scaling as used by
students of judicial behavior offers a measurement of
individual attitudes on a dimension along which judges
can be ranked* the construction of scalograms for each
term then permits longitudinal comparisons of rankings.
^
Although some students of judicial behavior have criti-
cised this use of scale analysis, the bases for their
criticisms have been found to be unsubstantiated in the
present study.
^
7 0 See Glendon Schubert, "Civilian Control and
Stare Decisis in the Warren Court," in Schubert, ed.,
Judicial Decision-Making (London: The Tree Press, 1963),
pp, 57-58.
21 John Sprague has found in his study of "federal-
ism" cases that scalogram analysis is useful only for
"cross-sectional," i.e., short term, data but not for
longitudinal studies. The reason, apparently, is that
"the voting behavior of justices changes as a result of
their experience on the Court and probably in the direc-
tion of an increased perception of case complexity."
Sprague, Voting Patterns in the United States Supreme
C ourt ( I ndianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill
,
1968)
,
p"! 1 50 . I n
a review of Sprague's conclusions, Joel Grossman suggests
that this finding reveals a major weakness of scaling.
Joel Grossman, Review of Sprague, American Political Sci-
ence Review
,
Vol. 63 (March 1969), p. 188. When this
hypothesis was examined for the data in the study at
hand, however, no evidence for such a phenomenon was
found. There appeared to be no difference in the
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From a master scale of criminal procedure cases,
subscales were constructed for each term and for the
entire period in each of four issue areas. 22 The scale
position for each member was determined by the point at
which there were the fewest possible inconsistent votes.
When this produced the same position for two members
with different numbers of positive and negative votes,
or when a member might have been given either of two
(or more) positions with the same number of inconsis-
tencies, he was assigned the score closest to the median
unless to do so tied him with another member who had
registered more positive or fewer negative votes. In
such a case he was given the higher position of those
under which the number of inconsistencies remained
constant
.
For each of the annual scales a Scale Score Index
(SSI) was computed for each justice. This index is
simply the ratio of the member's actual scale position
to the highest possible position, thus providing in
absolute terms a basis for longitudinal comparisons for
scalability of responses by junior members than by more
senior members, nor does the rate of inconsistency of
any member seem to increase over time.
22
S R e Appendix I; the case numbers correspond
with the numbering scheme used for the list of cases in
Appendix 1 1 .
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each member to every other member as well as to him-
23
self. The SSI's, in turn, were used for several other
measurements which will be described later.
Factor-bloc analysis
. In order to determine the
degree to which each justice was responsible for the
Court's collective behavior for each term and to further
illuminate attitude shifts from term to term, voting
bloc analysis was coupled with the Scale Score Indices
of the scalograms. By using a discrete index of voting
agreement and a basic factor analysis program, inter-
agreement blocs were constructed for each term of the
period. A technique was devised which provided three
possible levels of agreement for each pair of judges:
casting opposing votes; simply voting alike; and expli-
citly agreeing with one another. Thus, the bloc analysis
includes all cases decided by written opinion, including
both those decided unanimously and those decided per
curiam . This technique was developed to account for the
2 3Scale Score Indices were computed according to
the following formula: SSI = ~ , where p = the scale
position and n = the total number of cases in the scale.
Thus SSI's may range from .00 to 1.00. A similar index,
used by Schubert and others, is computed by the formula
S
= ^
- 1, thus ranging from -1.00 to +1.00. Schubert,
The Judicial Mind, p. 78.
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criticisms of traditional bloc analysis which argue
that the older methods, by examining only voting agree-
ment, often determine the existence of blocs whore voting
coincidence was merely fortuitous, 24 Moreover, it also
accommodates those critics who fear that bloc analysis
of necessity expunges large numbers of cases from consi-
deration—cases which, especially for the purposes of
studies such as this one, are particularly salient,
25
namely those unanimously decided.
From a matrix of dyadic agreement percentages, a
nine-by-nine correlation matrix was calculated providing
correlations of interagreement for each pair of judges.
This was done in order to avoid the matrix ordering
problem faced in traditional techniques which calculate
2 6
only dyadic agreement but imply transivity. Each corre-
lation matrix was factor analyzed at an eigenvalue of
24See Joel B. Grossman, "Dissenting Blocs on the
Warren Court: A Study in Judicial Role Behavior," 30
Journal of Politics 1068 (November, 1968).
25
For a full explanation of the method of dyadic
agreement determination, see Appendix III;
2 6
Sprague, p. 31. For example, to find that X
agrees with Y and that Y agrees with Z does not demon-
strate that X agrees with Z; yet traditional bloc analy-
sis would imply such agreement.
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0.5. From each factor, members with "significant"
loadings were extracted as blocs along with members
whose loadings suggested a tangential relationship to
the blocs. The significance of each bloc was deter-
mined by computation of the mean intercorrelation (ICI)
from the original correlation matrix. Blocs with an
ICI of 0.75 or greater were considered to be primary
blocs; those with an ICI less than 0.75 were considered
to be secondary
. This provides a measure not only of
the members' collective contribution to the factor but
also of their cohesiveness in total agreement. 29 Lastly,
The program employed utilized orthogonal rota-
tion of two normalized factors at a time.
2 8 For a full explanation of the bases used for
the extraction of blocs from the factor loadings see
A ppendix III.
79John Sprague is critical of determining the
existence of blocs--or in this case the "significance"
of pre-existing blocs--by considering only its level of
intra-agreement since this does not differentiate the
bloc from the rest of the Court. "Bloc analysis as
presently constituted fails to provide objective crit-
eria to identify blocs once the matrix is ordered."
Sprague, p. 29. Sprague's solution to this dilemma is
to require that two conditions be filled before the
identification of a bloc: 1) A> X; and 2) + x,
where A = average interagreement of the anticipated
bloc, X = the average interagreement of the Court, and
Y = the average interagreement of each contiguous pair
within the bloc. Sprague, pp. 53-54. But, although the
use of these criteria does improve upon the intuitive
90
the attitudinal disposition for each association was
computed by using the attitude differences established
in the Guttman scales. For every bloc and for the Court
as a whole, a mean SSI was computed. If the bloc's mean
SSI was 10% or more above that of the Court the bloc was
considered to be left } if the mean SSI was 10% or more
below that of the Court the bloc was right t if the mean
SSI fell within ± 0% of the Court’s mean the bloc was
approaches of Pritchett ( The Roosevelt Court ) and Schu-
bert ( Ojuant^itjatju^J^c^^ criticized
by Sprague, it has several weaknesses of its own. First,
comparing bloc and dyadic agreement to that of all the
members is to bias the results against largo associations.
The likelihood of differentiation between the interagree-
ment coefficient of a 2-membor bloc and the whole Court of
which they compose 2/9 is greater than the likelihood of
differentiation between the interagreement of a 5-member
bloc and the whole Court of which they compose 5/9. Thus,
it was felt more desirable to impose the arbitrary cutoff
point of .75 as the minimum significant correlation.
Second, if the Court is itself cohesive such that there is
no significant differentiation between it and some of its
members, then it makes some sense to consider the whole
Court as a voting bloc. This is particularly important
in longitudinal studies where C ourt interagreement varies
over time. Factor analysis helps to satisfy this problem
since if the Court is cohesive it will be apparent in the
factors. Third, there is a criticism of bloc analysis
generally that simply voting together does not indicate
"interaction." Grossman, "Dissenting Blocs on the Warren
Court." Sprague attempts to counter this by defining
blocs as a pattern of interrelationships in voting. It
was partially in response to this criticism that the
three-level index of agreement was used rather than the
traditional two-level method (cf. p. 88, fn.26), and that
the correlation matrix was used rather than calculation
of blocs based on indices of interagreement.
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30said to bo middle This procedure enables the analyst
to define the attitudinal relationships between blocs
systematically and objectively.^ 1
These measurement techniques, as well as more
standard ones, will bo applied to the cases described
above in order to examine fluctuations in Court and
individual behavior during the last seven terms of the
Warren Court.
Such attempts at determining the ideological
dispositions of blocs is not new. Pritchett, in the first
application of bloc analysis to judicial behavior, employ-
ed a subjective reading of opinions and papers to estab-
lish a liberal-conservative continuum ( The Roosevelt
C ourt ) . More objective methods, however, are desirable;
p. 30. Harold Spaeth has employed a two-dimensional
matrix to indicate attitudes toward particular sets of
legal issues; The Warren Court . David Danelski has used
a more elaborate and systematic form of content analysis
to identify the role of differentiated "ideals" in judi-
cial decision-making; "Values as Variables in Judicial
Decision-Making," 19 Vanderbilt Law Review 721 (1966).
Glendon Schubert has devised a very complex mathematical
model for the making of ideological judgments; T he
Judicial Mind . No attempt is made hero to replicate such
studies. Instead attitudes toward criminal procedures
are determined by the use of the cumulative scales. This
provides an objective, if limited, index of ideological
inclination toward certain kinds of cases.
"^Note, however, that the accuracy of the identi-
fication of bloc dispositions depends upon the extent to
which the scales approach perfect scalability.
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II. Overview of the Period
The Warren Court, as suggested, has not been
altogether one-sided when considering the rights of
criminal defendants. In some areas, particularly those
involving practices which so prejudice a case that the
establishment of guilt is in doubt, the Court has laid
down broad procedural limitations upon lower courts and
law enforcement officials. From the 1962 term through
the 1968 term, for example, 82% of all those cases invol-
ving coerced confessions were decided in favor of the
defendant; 78% of those involving the right to counsel
were similarly disposed, as were 70% involving self-
incrimination (see Table 1). On the other hand, in areas
involving the application of fair procedures to those who
were apparently— on the basis of hard evidence--guilt y
,
the Court has been more inclined to balance the societal
need for order against the defendant’s right to proced-
ural niceties. Of the search and seizure cases in which
incriminating evidence was discovered through question-
able means, only 52% were decided for the defendant.
^T he Warren Court has expressed particular criti-
cism of police and Court practices which adversely affect
"the integrity of the fact-finding process." L ink 1 e 1
1
e r
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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The distinction between Court settlement of search and
seizure cases and all others is reflected in the Chi
Square of Table 1. This difference will prove parti-
cularly instructive when individual attitudes toward
these subissues are considered.
TABLE 1
DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES BY THE
SUPREME COURT (1962-1968 TERMS)
Pro-
Defendant
Anti-
Defendant
Coerced Confession Cases 18 4
Right to Counsel Cases 20 6
Self-Incrimination Cases 16 7
Search and Seizure Cases 26 24
X
2
= 8.35 (p > .05)
Aggregate analysis also suggests the Warren Court’s
variability. As Figure 4a indicates, the percentage of
all criminal procedure cases decided in favor of the
defendant and against the government has fluctuated
greatly from term to term. In the period from 1953 to
1961 there are several notable cycles. The thrust of
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the decisions after the first term was significantly
and increasingly pro-defendant with two obvious fallings-
off in 1955 and 1958. The latter is perhaps a product
of the same judicial retreat suggested in Chapter I,
focusing on the period since 1962, the cyclical pattern
is more pronounced: 1963, 1965, and 1967 each indicate
significant increases in pro-defendant decisions from
the previous year: 1964 and 1968 show significant de-
creases. The important shifts seem to have occurred
particularly in 1963 and 1964 with a major but somewhat
less marked change in 1967. Figure 4b isolates those
cases involving illegal searches and seizures, coerced
confessions, self-incrimination, and the right to
counsel— the most highly publicized and most controver-
sial of all the criminal procedure decisions. Again,
1958 and 1959 represent the most impressive changes in
the first period. The cycles from 1962 to 1968 are
approximately the same as in Figure 4a except that the
shifts are greatly accentuated and the decline from 1965
to 1966 is absent.
As the regression line in Figure 4a clearly demon-
strates, the trend during the entire sixteen years of the
Warren Court has been decidedly positive, the average
increase in pro-defendant dispositions being + 1,4% per
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FIGURE 4a. TRENDS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CASE DECISION-MAKING, 1953-1968 TERMS
FIGURE 4b. TRENDS IN DECISION-MAKING CONCERNING
SELECTED SEARCH AND SEIZURE, SELF-INCRIMINATION,
COERCED CONFESSION, AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL CASES
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year. But when the two periods of the Court are con-
sidered separately the trend appears to bo somewhat
different. From 1953 to 1961 the average yearly in-
crease in pro-defendant dispositions is + 2.3$>? from 1962
to 1968, even though the average number of cases decided
for the defendant is higher than in the earlier period,
the slope of the regression line is only 0.6, less than
one-fourth that for the period 1953 to 1961. Further,
even in those terms in which a vast majority of decisions
favor the accused, very few may have constituted profound
procedural alterations or what might plausibly be descri-
33bed as "significant setbacks" for police activities.
Indeed, many decisions, lost in the pro-defendant statis-
*7 f
tics, have expanded police authority. It is thus a
mistake--one that is made by many contemporary observers-
to consider those individual cases extending procedural
safeguards to the accused as exemplary of all cases
decided or even as indicative of a marked trend in deci-
33 0f the 39 cases decided in the 1966 Term, 24
were favorable to the defendant? but only one of those,
Berger v. New York , 388 U.S. 41 (1967), affected police
practices directly and adversely. Crime and Justice in
America (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly
Service, 1967), p. 15.
34
Ibid .
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s i ons .
The changes in Court sympathy toward the accused
seem to have occurred primarily in federal cases, while
decisions involving state criminal cases have consisten-
tly been decided 4 to 1 or more for the defendant, fed-
eral cases were not similarly consistent. Since much of
TABLE 2. DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE CASES OF STATE AND FEDERAL ORIGIN (1962-1968)*
ORIGIN DECISION
*
Here "+" means a decision favoring the criminal pro-
cedural right asserted and thus against the government;
means a decision opposed to the asserted right and
therefore for the government.
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the publicity of pro-defendant decisions and much of
the feedback is focused upon those which affect state
and local law enforcement agencies, this fact may help
account for the disparity between the reality of court
dispositions and the public perception of that reality.
I his federal-state divergence will be particularly im-
portant in subsequent examination of the sources of
feedback
.
^
When attention is turned from the Court to its
individual members the differences noted in Figure 4a
are somewhat refined. It is probable, of course, that
for purposes of examining feedback generation the per-
centage of pro-defendant decis i ons --and especially
those on the state level--is most important. But for
responses by the members of the Court to that feedback
T C
This "anti-state" tendency is not peculiar to
the period from 1962 to 1968. Harold Spaeth has also
found an inclination on the part of the Supreme Court
to favor the government in federal criminal procedures
cases more than in state criminal cases. Of 19 federal
criminal procedure cases from 1960 to 1963, 58% were
decided for the government; of 63 state cases only 35/4
were decided in favor of the state. Moreover, this
federal bias is apparent in other civil liberties issues
as well. In the same four-year period Spaeth found that
of 81 federal civil liberties cases, 46/6 were favorable
to the government; of 115 state cases only 25% were so
disposed. Spaeth, The Warren Court , pp. 356-57.
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one must be cognizant of variations in percentages of
votes < Figure 5a, presenting yearly variations in pro-
defendant votes in all criminal cases, also suggests
that important shifts occurred in 1963 and 1964, but
indicates a further major shift in 1965 with no change
in 1967. For the "most controversial" cases 1965 appears
to show no shift from the low level of pro-defendant
votes recorded in 1964 whereas there does seem to be an
important increase in 1967 and a drop in 1968 comparable
to that of 1964 (see Figure 5b).
The yearly fluctuations in decisions and votes
shown in Figures 4 and 5 seem, at a glance, roughly to
coincide. Obviously if there were perfect coincidence
and if a change in the percentage of positive decisions
in a given year were the product of positive vote in-
creases by every member of the Court, relationships
between judicial behavior and outside pressures could be
easily defined. Unfortunately, few years reflect such
uniform movements. For the most part, while there are
perceptible trends for all or most of the Court in a
given year, the degree of change is differential. In
1963, for example, the percentage of positive votes of
each member rose, but Justice Harlan’s did so only 4%
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FIGURE 5a. TRENDS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CASE VOTING, 1953-196B TERMS,
FIGURE 5b. TRENDS IN VOTING CONCERNING
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while Justice Goldberg's rose 20%. The following year
Harlan's again increased 4% but Goldberg's declined 38%.
There is, then, a constant shifting of rank orders of
the members of the Court as for different individuals,
new attitudes, new kinds of issues, or new pressures
for particular decisions are attendant. These differen-
tial changes in attitudes toward criminal procedures are
another index of yearly changes by the Court and are
perhaps symptomatic of different kinds of inputs in the
decision-making process.
To examine such shifts, the justices were ranked
for each year according to their attitudinal Scale Score
Indices (SSI). Since SSI's provide for longitudinal
comparison it was possible to determine absolute as well
as simply rank changes. Correlations were determined
comparing each member's SSI each year to his SSI of the
previous year as well as to that of a base year, 1962.“^
The results of that comparison appear in Figure 6 as
^Although the SSI's for each year, insofar as
they could only be positive integers from 0 to 100, con-
stituted ordinal data, they did provide a far more
accurate interval measure than traditional rank-order
data. Accordingly, it was deemed desirable to treat the
data as interval and apply Pearson product-moment corre-
lation analysis rather than the more common but less
powerful Spearman rank-order correlation. For a similar
treatment of scale scores, see Spaeth, pp. 15-22; Schu-
bert, The Judicial Wind , pp. 97-157.
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increasing deviation from a perfect correlation of
1.00. These data again reveal remarkable changes both
from the base figure and from the previous year in both
FIGURE 6. CORRELATIONS OF SCALE SCORE INDIC1ES,
1962-1968: (a) FULL COURT; (b) SEVEN
MEMBERS UJHO SERVED FOR THE DURATION
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1967 and 1968; lesser but still noticeable changes in
1964 and 1965. Since the 1967 figures, and to a lesser
extent those of 1965, might merely reflect personnel
alterations which had occurred at those times, the
same analysis was done using only the seven members who
served on the Court throughout the period under examina-
tion. figure 6b reflects somewhat less dramatic shifts
but 1964, 1967, and 1968 remain years of considerable
change in attitude relationships. It is also worth
noting here that since in 1966 the correlation with the
base year was high and in 1968 it was low, the low
correlation between 1968 and 1967 does not signify simply
a rebound from a very liberal term.
The conclusions drawn from these data may now be
summarized. In terms of percentages of decisions and
individual votes favoring criminal defendants, particu-
larly in search and seizure, self-incrimination, and
right to counsel cases, 1963 and 1967 average as very
positive, 1964 as very negative, and 1968 as somewhat
negative. In terms of individual attitudes, again 1964,
1967, and 1968 represent major changes from previous
years and from the 1962 base. The abruptness of these
alterations, the suggestion of possible sudden changes
104
in attitudes by individual members, and the identi-
fiable instances of inconsistent voting behavior all
compel a more extensive examination of judicial behavior
during these years.
III. Dispositions of Cases By Term
Three separate measures provide the means --both
objective and substantive--for the examination of annual
behavior. First, careful scrutiny of factor blocs will
make possible more precise determination of annual
changes by the entire Court as well as the identifica-
tion of which individuals were responsible for the
fluctuations in aggregate statistics. Second, notation
of each judge's percentage of pro-defendant votes each
term (Table 3) will facilitate comparison of members'
behavior within each term as well as the examination of
longitudinal variations in the behavior of individual
members. Third, by examining the most visible decisions
for each term it will also be possible to see how shifts
in alliances affected important outcomes. Moreover, on
a more subjective level it is essential to note those
years which, regardless of aggregate data, generated
positive or negative feedback simply by the disposal of
one or two "major" cases. Information as to individual
behavior and case dispositions will then serve to refine
105
and enrigh the conclusions reached thus far and to aid
in identifying the sources and objects of feedback.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FAVORING THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS (ALL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DECISIONS
1962-1968 TERMS)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Douglas 92 100 92 95 97 92 85
Warren 80 93 67 82 85 69 77
Goldberg 80 100 62 -- -- -- --
F ortas -- -- — 88 91 80 70
Brennan 80 93 54 72 77 80 72
Black 80 87 62 72 59 45 54
White 48 60 46 61 50 44 53
Harlan 36 40 46 33 35 44 64
Stewart 40 47 46 56 44 67 49
Clark 28 40 38 61 59 -- --
Marshall -- 77 76
1962 Term . Since the 1962 Term represents the
base year for the period under examination, nothing can
be said of changes from previous alliances or blocs in
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relation to pro-defendant dispositions. Thus, the term
can merely be described as one of moderately pro-defen-
dant tendency—although less than the norm for the seven
years--produced by a standoff between reasonably stable
groups. Figure 7 indicates the existence of two fairly
cohesive agreement blocs, a primary one of five members
FIGURE 7. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1962 TERM)
F actor I
Warren .93
Brennan .93
Goldberg .91
B lack .86
Douglas .85
White -.19
Stewart -.65
Clark -.86
Harlan -.90
ICI = .87 ( primary)
SSI = .79 (left)
Factor II
White
Stewart
.96
.70
C lark .47
Harlan .40 1
Goldberg -.18
Black -.23
Brennan -.29
Warren -.32
Douglas -.50
I C I = .74 (secondary)
SSI = .42 (right)
(with Harlan and Clark
ICI = .81
SSI = .36)
Court SSI = 60
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and a secondary one of two regular and two tangential
members. The fact that those on the left have an SSI
of only 0.79 while the right bloc of four has an SSI of
0.36 may help explain why there was no great evidence of
positive support for criminal defendants during the 1962
Term. Moreover, the negative loadings of Clark and Har-
lan in Factor I and the absence of any comparable nega-
tive loadings in Factor II suggest that the effect of
the small right group was relatively greater than that
exerted by the larger left.
Although the total number of criminal procedure
cases decided by the Court in 1962 was large, only nine
were generally thought to be of great importance. As in
the aggregate statistics the Court's record in these
cases was mixed: in the relatively noncont roversial
areas of right to counsel and coerced confession the dis-
positions were very liberal; but in the areas of search
and seizure and wiretapping they were conservative.
But, lest this be misleading, it is important to note
that cases in the former areas served in later years as
the bases for some of the most far-reaching and contro-
versial decisions of the decade. Undoubtedly for that
reason several observers suggest that the right to coun-
sel cases were the most important of the Warren Court s
108
work in the entire area of criminal procedural rights. 37
G i d eon v . Wa i nwr i qht is often considered to be
the initiator of the "Warren Court Revolution." By a
unanimous vote the Court overruled Betts v. Brady 39
and guaranteed the right of counsel to the accused in
all state criminal cases. But important and publicized
as it was, it neither came as a surprise nor deviated
much from previous Court dispositions. 48 Moreover, the
Court had been increasingly sympathetic to the plight
of indigent defendants. 41 The intent of the Court in
Gideon and the significance of the decision were perhaps
42
more apparent six weeks later when in White v. Maryland
the Court extended the right to counsel to all "critical
37 Pye, p. 67.
38 372 U.S. 355 (1963)
.
39 316 U.S. 455 (1942)
40 |\lo denial of counsel in a criminal case invol-
ving a felony had been sustained since 1950. "The
Supreme Court, 1962 Term," 77 Harvard Law Rev . 62 (1963),
103.
41
See Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Smith v. Bennett , 365 U .T] 708 (1961)
.
42 373 U.S. 59 ( 1963)
.
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stages" of the trial, including preliminary hearings.
The same day that Gideon was announced the Court also
struck down state practices permitting appellate courts
to "go through" trial records to judge whether the appoin-
tment of counsel would have been an important factor. 4 ^
Again, this was consistent with prior cases. 44
Previous rulings against evidentiary use of coer-
ced confessions were also tightened. In Lynum v. Illin-
ois^ and Haynes v. Ulashinqt on 4 ^ convictions were vitiated
in spite of substantial independent evidence of guilt.
In the latter case the Court made its own determination
of voluntariness even though a state statute provided
that such judgments be made by the jury. This, as
Justice Clark argued in dissent, may be seen as a liber-
alization of previous tests of voluntariness. In
another coerced confession case, the Court remanded for
evidentiary hearing where it could not have been ascer-
tained by the District Court what standards of voluntari-
4 ^Pouqlas v. California , 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
44 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
46 373 U.S. 503 (1963)
.
47
I bid
. ,
521.
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A flness had been applied by the trial judge. In so doing
the Court also provided a liberal and specific bill of
circumstances under which evidentiary hearings must be
given to habeas corpus applications claiming deprivation
of constitutional rights.
In the area of Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, however,
the Court was a good deal less liberal. Electronic
eavesdropping--t he "ultimate invasion of privacy" --
was given judicial imprimatur in Lopez v. United States . 88
The majority relied on old notions of "intrusion" 81 and
unwitting "invitation" to uphold the use as evidence
of a tape recording taken by an undercover agent without
the knowledge of the defendant. Justice Black voted with
the majority, consistent with his long held position that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect against seizures of
intangibles. It is interesting, however, to note that
48 372 U.5. 293
A Q
E. B. Williams, "The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Defense Counsel's View," 44 Minnesota Law
Review 855 (I960), 866.
50 373 U.S . 427 (1963) .
8
^ 0 1ms t ead v • United States , 277 U.S. 438 (1923);
Goldman v. United States , 316 U.S, 319 (1942).
52s eG Q n Lee v. United States , 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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Chief Justice Warren also voted with the majority.
Of some significance to the area of wiretapping
the Court also held in Wong Sun v. United States 33 that
the "poisoned fruits" exclusionary rule extended to
verbal evidence, Wong Sun was a liberal decision also
in that it further restricted the basis for probable
cause showings in "John Doe" or dragnet arrests pursuant
to which warrantless searches may be made. The reason,
clearly, was to encourage police to seek search warrants,
with their demands for the specification of particulars
sought, rather than merely arrest warrants. Indeed, the
Court hinted broadly in Wong Sun that requirements for
after-the-fact demonstrations of probable cause f or
arrests should be more strict than those for arrest
warrants
.
34
But Wong Sun was also a strike against the de-
fendant. The Court admitted into evidence illegally
seized narcotics on the ground that the defendant did not
have a legitimate property interest in the invaded premi-
ses—thus maintaining the illiberal tradition of Jones
53 371 U.S. 471 ( 1963)
.
3
^ Ibid
. ,
47 9-80.
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55 c,a
v. United States and Chapman v. United States
.
Even more illiberal uias the decision in Ker v. Calif or-
57
nia that the requirement used in Wong Sun of announced
intention before entry was only statut orially mandated
and not within the "concept of ordered liberty."'3 ^
Ker stands as the first real application of Mapp v.
59Ohio and is an obvious retreat from fftapp's broad
exclusionary rule.^ There the Court had said that the
exclusionary rule was the same for states and the federal
government. In Ker
,
although eight members argued that
the same constitutional standard of reasonableness
applies to the state as to the federal government, the
court was evenly split on the issue of whether unannoun-
ced entry violated constitutional standards or merely
federal statutory standards. Justice Harlan, without
56 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
56
365 U.S. 610 (1961). See "The Supreme Court,
1962 Term," 117.
5?
374 U.S. 23 (1963)
.
58
Ibid., 37-43. This is a deviation as well from
miller v. U.S,, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), where the Court held
that police either with or without a warrant may not break
in for arrest or search unless refused admission.
59
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88
Lucius J. Barker & Twiley UJ • Barker Jr., F reedom
,
Courts, Politics i Studies in Civil Liberties (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 238.
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expressing even agreement with the principle that the
same Fourth Amendment limit of reasonableness applied
to both jurisdictions, simply voted to uphold convic-
tion. The importance of Justice Black's rather insecure
position as a member of the left bloc--an SSI of only
68--can best be seen in Ker
,
for it was he who provided
the vote for a bare majority.
1963 Term . In the 1963 Term, one of significant
change toward more positive support for criminal defen-
dants, several major shifts of behavior can be seen.
Every member of the Court increased his percentage of
positive votes over those of the previous year (Table 3).
Justices Ularren, Brennan, and Goldberg did so consider-
ably.
Both blocs of the 1962 Term were somewhat smaller
in 1963, although for the left the result was an in-
creased pro-defendant disposition. The largest bloc had
been reduced to only four members (See Fig. 8). But
this group was much more cohesive than it had been with
the addition of Black in 1962 and it had also moved much
further to the left as suggested by the increased pro-
portion of pro-criminal defendant votes by all the mem-
bers of the bloc (Table 3), and by the increased average
FIGURE 8. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1963 TERM)
1 1 4
Factor I
Brennan .91
Warren .89
Douglas .82
Goldberg .82
Black .30
White -.27
Stewart -.69
Harlan -.76
C lark -.71
ICI = .96 ( primar
SSI = .97 ( left)
Factor II
Black .90
Goldberg .45
Douglas .45
Warren .29
Brennan .29
Stewart -.09
Clark -.34
White -.34
Harlan -.67
ICI =
SSI = .87 (left)
(with Goldberg
and Douglas:
ICI = .82
SSI = .96)
F actor III
White
Stewart
.87
.63
Clark .49
Harlan .21
Brennan -.25
Warren -.27
B lack -.29
Douglas -.32
Goldberg -.33
ICI = .70 (secon-
dary)
SSI = .60 (right)
(with Clark:
ICI = .76
SSI = .53)
Court SSI = .74
SSI (Figure 8). In addition, Justice Black formed a
factor himself with an SSI of .87 showed a tangential
relationship to two members of the left. There was, on
the other hand, no such strength on the right. While
three members of that alliance showed substantial nega-
tive loadings in Factor I, only one showed a similar
loading in Factor II which is also left. Finally, of
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the four members of the right bloc, only two, White and
Stewart, showed a significant contribution to Factor III
with Clark a tangent; and this bloc was of only secondary
cohesion and, as a group, had moved considerably to the
left since 1962.
The important decisions of the 1963 Term also re-
flected the pronounced shift toward protection of the
rights of the accused. Of the ten cases judged to be
of greatest significance, all but one were decided favor-
ably to the defendant. Again, however, only a few of
these pro-defendant decisions represented notable
doctrinal alterations.
6
1
In Malloy v. Hogan the Court incorporated the
self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment
into the Fourteenth and held that federal standards
justifying its claim apply also to the states. On the
6 2
same day the Court reversed three prominent precedents
and held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
6 3Harbor that Malloy logically precludes the states from
61
378 U.S. 1 (1964) .
^ United States v. Murdock , 284 U.S. 141 (1931),
Knapp v. Schweitzer , 357 U.S. 371 (1958), and F eldman v.
United States
,
322 U.S. 487 (1944).
63 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
.
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compelling any testimony which might lead to any sub-
sequent criminal prosecution, federal or state.
In one of the most striking and! important shifts
r t.
of the Term, the Court in Jackson v. Denno ° struck down
the practices of 15 states and 6 federal circuits^
which provided for jury determination of the voluntari-
ness of a confession without the judge first having inde-
pendently accepted it. The majority, composed of the
left bloc plus White and Black, expressed concern with
showing the unfairness of the practice given the avail-
ability of better procedures. This may be taken as a
major change in attitude from finding a violation of
due process when a practice is contrary to the concept
of ordered liberty to finding a violation when a prac-
tice is less fair than an alternative.^^
As White v. Mary land had extended the Gideon hold-
ing to preliminary hearings in 1962, so Massiah v. United
7
States extended the right to counsel to post-indictment
64 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
.
65
The Supreme Court 1963 Term," 78 Harvard Law
Review 143 (1964), 212.
6 6 T i . ,
I bid .
67
377 U.S. 201 (1964)
.
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interrogation in 1963, This, however, was not a major
change since substantially the same result was reached
four years earlier, albeit with the Betts restriction
ft
of "special circumstances," Massiah may be seen as
inevitable given Gideon '
s
reversal of Betts
. But the
right to counsel decision in Escobedo v, I llinois 69 was
not inevitable. There, Gideon and Mass iah were extended
to preclude interrogation, even before indictment, in
the absence of an attorney if one had been requested.
The trial process, from accusation to trial to appeal was
seen as a whole. The 5-4 result produced a sharp devia-
7 Gtion from a similar case in 1958, a change which can
71
be attributed to Goldberg's replacement of Frankfurter,
The area of legitimate searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment also produced some very liberal con-
72
elusions, Fahy v. Connecticut for the first time gave
^®See S pano v. New York , 360 U.S, 315 (1959).
° 9 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7 ^Crooker v. Calif ornia , 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
7
1
Anthony Lewis, "Earl Warren," p. 24.
72 375 U.S. 85 (1963)
.
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definition to the notion of "harmless error" in cases
of evidence in violation of lYlapp v. Ohio
. The admission,
the Court held, cannot be said to be harmless where
"there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
7 ^
complained of might have contributed to the conviction."
Consistent with previous cases precluding unwarranted
searches of hotel rooms^ and boarding houses 73 the
7Court held in Stoner v, Calif ornia that evidence pro-
duced by similar searches of a transient domicile evon
at the request of the owner is inadmissible. And the
7 8
same day in Preston v. United States
,
in spite of a
forty-year-old precedent permitting warrantless searches
7 9
of automobiles not pursuant to an arrest, it was held
73
Ibid
. ,
86-87.
7 ^
J ohnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
^McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
76 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
77 See also 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
70 376 U.S . 364 (1964) .
7
^Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
1 1 9
that such searches are valid only if the car could have
been moved while the police secured a search warrant.
In two cases the Court attempted to establish
objective grounds for judging the existence of probable
cause for search when based upon the hearsay testimony
of an informant. In a decision that seems strikingly
illiberal in the light of the other cases disposed during
the 1963 Term, the Court in Ruqendorf v. United States 60
affirmed a 1960 decision that in the determination of
probable cause for arrest, a reliable informer's iden-
tity need not be revealed. The 5-4 outcome was deter-
mined by Justice Black whose negative votes in two cases
involving informants were the only negative criminal
o n
376 U.S. 528 (1964).
81
Jones v. U.S . 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The same is
not true, however, in testimony regarding matters of
guilt. See R ov iar
o
v. United States
.
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
The reason for the difference seems to be that the appli-
cation of strict standards for probable cause showing
might have served to free the obviously guilty. Thus,
the pressure on the Courts to accept statements of "relia-
ble" informers and relax standards of probable cause were
great. Edward L. Barrett Jr., "Personal Rights, Property
Rights, and the Fourth Amendment," Philip Kurland (ed.),
The Supreme Court Review 1960 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, I960)
, pp . 65-70
.
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procedure votes he cast in the Term. On the other hand
in Aguilar v. T exas standards for the acceptance of
such hearsay testimony were objectified and tightened.
Using the honored test of "reasonableness" 8 '"' the Court
hold that there must be some factual basis by which a
magistrate may judge the validity of an informant's
conclusions, and that police officers acting upon the
informant's tip must substantiate their claims as to
his reliability. Again Black voted against the defen-
dant but here, unlike Ruqendorf
,
Harlan and White deser-
ted the conservatives to produce the deciding votes.
While it was clearly a return to Mapp after the Ker
84
retreat the year before, Aguilar signaled no doctrinal
change itself since it was in fact simply a synthesis of
fl s
two earlier decisions. Nonetheless, the significance
82 37 8 U.S. 108 (1964)
.
Q *7
"Reasonableness," as Bernard Schwartz points
out, is the essence of the very subjective notion of
probable cause which is, in turn, the key to the Fourth
Amendment. Bernard Schwartz, Rights of the Person ,
2 V ols
.
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1968 ) , Mol, I, p. 50.
8
^Barker and Barker, p. 239.
85 372 U.S. 487 (1963) and 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
See Comment, "The Informer's Word as the Basis for
Probable Cause in Federal Courts," 53 California L aw
Review
,
840 (1965), 843.
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of its statement as a protection of the rights of the
accused should not be understated.
1964 T erm . The 1954 Term represents the most
striking change of the period. Only Harlan did not
decline in the percentage of votes cast in favor of the
rights of criminal defendants (see Table 3). Warren,
Brennan, and Goldberg, whose percentage had increased
markedly in 1963, decreased substantially, an average
drop of over 34% each. Justice Black declined 25%;
Justice White 14%. Neither the five-member bloc of
1962 nor the four-member bloc of 1963 were evident
(see Figure 9). Black and Douglas represent the only
positive loadings in Factor I; they are far to the left
of the Court but have little cohesion. Brennan and Gold-
berg constitute a tangential relationship with Factor II
on the right.
The absence of meaningful blocs where there had
been strong relationships before tends to support the
thesis that members of the Court were responding to
different stimuli in 1964 than in previous Terms. This
suspicion is also underscored in an examination of the
major cases of the term. Gnly three of eight decisions
favorable to the criminal defendant, and two of thesewere
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FIGURE 9. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1964 TERM)
Factor I
Douglas
Black
.90
.64
Warren -.05
Brennan -.18
Goldberg -.27
Clark -.35
White -.36
Stewart -.56
Harlan -.83
ICI = .70 (secondary)
SSI = .92 (left)
Court SSI = .57
Factor II
Clark .90
Brennan • Ci- CD
Goldberg .44
Harlan .35
White .14
Black .04
Warren .03
Stewart -.02
Douglas -.35
ICI =
SSI = .25 (right)
(with Brennan and
Goldberg
:
ICI = .69
SSI = .47)
Pointer v. T exas continuedreflected no major shift,
the process of incorporation of the bill of Rights by
applying the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
to the states. In Beck v. Ohio .
87 in accordance with the
86 380 U.S . 400 ( 1965)
.
87
379 U.S. 89 (1964)
.
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guidelines set forth in Aguilar the previous Term, the
Court vitiated a conviction based on evidence taken
pursuant to an arrest for which a post hoc showing of
probable cause was clearly insufficient. 88 Black again
voted negatively in informant cases, but Stewart, who
had dissented in Aguilar
.
here joined White and the
left bloc of the previous year to produce a majority
sympathetic to Aguilar *
s
broad protection.
But in the next use of the Aguilar test of hear-
say, United States v. Me ntresca 7 the liberal majority
vanished and the protection seemed chimerical. Applying
the test to the situation which gave it birth- -a prior
showing of probable cause in application for a warrant--
the Court uphold the use of testimony by an anonymous
informant who had not witnessed illegal acts but simply
suspicious deeds. As the dissenters pointed out, this
fact alone makes the claim of probable cause entirely
unsupported. But Goldberg, who deserted the liberal
position along with Brennan and Black, argued that the
Q Q
The arrest was made on the basis of identifica-
tion of photographs of the defendant who was known only
to have had a prior criminal record.
89 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
.
90
Ibid.
,
120.
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informant in this case passed the Aguilar test since
the police affidavit gave details of the events observed
and of the reliability of the witness. However, as if
to emphasize that the formerly liberal members of the
Ventresca majority were not motivated by a real commit-
ment to the negative conclusion of the case, Goldberg
went on to provide a prodefendant side as well, albeit
in obiter dicta
. He stated clearly what had been hinted
at in Beck : that searches and arrests pursuant to war-
rants would more easily pass judicial muster than those
91
without warrants. Furthermore, he suggested that he
wished to encourage such good faith efforts by the
92
police to conform to Fourth Amendment requirements.
Yet this is doubtful basis for a decision. And the
acceptance of an affidavit in a probable cause showing
which is conceded to be inadmissible in the guilt phase
of a trial is a clear deviation from previous decisions.
In the most illiberal and surprising decision of
93
the term the Court took the "unprecedented" action in
91
Ibid
. ,
106.
92 Ibid ., 111-12.
93 See Alpheus T. Mason and William M. Beany, T he
Supreme Court in a Free Society (New York: W. W. North
& Co., 1968), p. 330.“
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L inklett or v. Walker and held that Mapp v. Ohio would
apply only prospectively and to cases then on direct
appeal. Although retroactivity involves issues separable
from those of search and seizure it was undoubtedly
true, as the dissenters pointed out, that this is a
95great retreat from Mapp
.
The same day as Linklett er
.
the Court also refused to apply the exclusionary rule
to pre-Ma pp state cases in which seizure was made by
federal agents. Since seizures by agents of state
jurisdictions were outlawed in federal courts as early
as 1956 and since Mapp sought to apply the same exclu-
sionary rule to the states as applied to the federal
or
.
courts, this refusal represents another inconsistency
with the reasoning in Mapp .
99
In the case of Singer v. United States the
Court held that although the Sixth Amendment provides a
^See infra
, pp. 194-197.
95 381 U.S. 618, 653.
98 Anqelet v. Fay , 381 U.S. 654 (1965).
9
^See Rea v. U . S
.
,
350 U.S. 214 (1956).
98 See 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
.
993B0 U.S . 24 (1965)
.
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constitutional right to a trial by jury, there is no
such right to a non jury trial. On tho other hand, since
the Court recognized that the state has no real interest
opposed to a nonjury trial and that the defendant may
have substantial interests jeopardized by denying him
the right to waive jury trial, 1 ^ that conclusion seems
to deviate from the spirit of Jackson v. Denno where the
Court had found a violation of due process when a prac-
tice was less fair than an alternative.
In the area of self-incrimination, after one
illiberal decision the Court began to again show its
latent disposition to assure the rights of the accused.
In United States v. Gainey the Court upheld a federal
statute which permitted the inference of guilt from a
defendant's presence at tho scene of a crime unless he
satisfactorily explained his presence. Again Warren,
Brennan, and Goldberg voted against the defendant. But
in Griffin v. California the Court extended Malloy to
preclude in state cases comment by prosecutor and judge
100 See "The Supreme Court 1964 Term," 79 Harvard
Law Review 56 (1965), 212.
101 380 U.S. 63 (1965)
.
102 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
.
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upon a defendant's failure to take the stand in his
defense. Again the Court sought to apply the same
rule to the states as had applied to the federal courts.
But hero, as federal Judge Henry Friendly has pointed
out, the applicable federal case did not concern con-
stitutional rights but statutory protection, ^ ^ thus
casting doubt on this decision’s consistency with other
"incorporation" cases.
1965 Term
.
The 1965 Term shows a general, but
not spectacular, recovery from the anti-defendant posture
of the previous term. There was an overall increase both
in total positive decisions and in total positive votes
cast. Brennan and Warren, both of whom had dropped
See Twining
,
v. IM . J
.
,
211 U.S. 7B (1908) and
Adamson v. California
,
332 U.S. 46 (1947). This decision
does not necessarily deviate from Adamson
,
however. In
that case Frankfurter's vote with the majority was pre-
dicated on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not incorporate the Fifth. He actually agreed with
the four dissenters, thus making a majority, that per-
mitting comment imposes an unreasonable penalty on the
exorcise of a constitutional right.
I^See Bruno v. United States , 308 U.S. 287 (1939)
and Wilson v. United States , 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
I^See Henry J. Friendly, "The Bill of Rights as
a Code of Criminal Procedure," 53 California Law Review
929 (1965), 938-940.
considerably between 1963 and 1964 in individual percen-
tages, increased over 15% each in 1965. Goldberg, the
other member having moved to a considerably more anti-
defendant position, was replaced by Fortas, whose percen-
tage of pro-defendant votes was 26% higher than Goldberg's
in 1964. The most marked individual increase was exhibi-
ted by Clark who increased 23% to achieve a new high in
his pro-defendant votes. Of all the justices, Harlan
alone declined.
The movement of UJarren and Brennan as well as the
addition of Fortas had an obvious impact in the formation
of alliances. Fortas' immediate affinity to Douglas
proved to be a strong bond for the rest of the period.
Since Goldberg had secured such a tie to Douglas in only
one term and since Fortas maintained Goldberg's traditi-
onally close proximity to Warren and Brennan, Fortas may
well have provided an essential catalytic element to the
Court by drawing the left bloc together. The factor
analysis shows the shift (Figure 10). Although the four-
member left bloc is not sufficiently cohesive nor par-
ticularly far left to make 1965 a very pro-defendant
year, Black's appearance in Factor II with an SSI almost
the same as the left bloc, seems to provide the necessary
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FIGURE 10. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1965 TERM)
F actor I Factor 11
Warren .96 B lack T92 1
F ortas .94 Douglas
.30
Douglas .84 Warren
-.01
Brennan .83 F ortas -.06
C lark .25 Stewart -.21
Black .15 White
-.26
White -.06 Harlan -.30
Stewart -.20 Brennan -.34
Harlan -.85 Clark -.62
ICI = .73 ( secondary
)
ICI = -
SSI = .84 (left) SSI = .82 ( left
)
Court SSI = .67
tie to the left. On the other hand, there is no right
bloc at all.
There were only five major decisions during the
1965 Term, two of which were refusals to apply previous
rulings retroactively. But in spite of relative inac-
tivity and a somewhat ambivalent cumulative output,
the term produced the most controversial pro-defendant
decision since Mallory as well as a widely debated
decision as to the prospective applicability. In all
130
the cases, however, the Court seemed unusually concerned
with a more "functional” notion of due process than in
previous years, focusing upon the consequences of the
procedures for the defendant and for the political
106system
•
1 07In T ohan v. United States ex rel, Shott the
Court hold the Griffin decision of the year before to
be non-rot roact ive , The stated reason was that the
purpose of that holding was served by prospective appli-
cation whereas retrospective use would lead to a spate
of appeals and jeopardize the administration of justice
in the states.
1 0 fi
In Schmerbor v. California it ignored self-
incrimination arguments and uphold the use of involuntary
blood test evidence as it had in Broithaupt nine years
earlier. But since the self-incrimination provision
of the Fifth Amendment had come to be applied to the
states after Broithaupt , Brennan’s majority opinion in
Schmerbor argued that the Fifth Amendment did not apply
106 Seo "Supreme Court, 1965 Term,” BO Harvard Law
Review
,
91 (1966), 125.
1 07 382 U.S . 406 (1966) .
10B 384 U.S . 757 (1966)
.
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because blood is not communicative. In addition, he
said, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment
since to have waited for a warrant would have meant the
destruction of evidence.
Cn the other hand the Court also accomplished
a departure from the conservative leanings of 1964 and
provided the tightest possible protection against the
use of evidence given involuntarily during incommunicado
1 09interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona held that upon
being taken into custody prior to all questioning, a
suspect must be advised of his absolute right to legal
assistance and may not be questioned if he wishes to see
an attorney or to remain silent. The emphasis in inter-
rogation cases thus slides from the right to counsel,
as in Escobedo
,
to the right to silence. And in accom-
plishing that move the Court attempted to substitute
objective standards for the theretofore vague and sub-
jectivo ones surrounding the Fifth Amendment. While
the old test of voluntariness was predicated on the fear
of the untrustworthiness of coerced confessions, Miranda
109 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .
^^See "Consent Searches: A Reappraisal after
Miranda v. Ariz ona , " 67 Columbia Law Review , 130 (1967),
133 .
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seems to be a more positive assertion of individual
rights—
—thus emphasizing again the "functional approach"
suggested earlier. On the other hand, it has also
been argued that the majority was motivated by the
more principled desire to achieve the "egalitarian
society" which Philip Kurland suggests has directed the
efforts of the Warren Court throughout its tenure J ^
But as if admitting the truth of Clark's predic-
tions of adverse effects, the Court one week after
Miranda gave that decision as well as the one in Escobedo
the narrowest possible prospective application. Johnson
113
v. New Jersey proved to be even more restrictive than
111 On the other hand, if this was the Court's
purpose, it is apparent that it failed to accomplish it.
Edwin Driver notes that to the extent that Miranda does
not prohibit interrogations altogether even though social-
psychological literature points to inherent coercion, and
to the extent that Miranda can be circumvented simply by
the intonation of the warnings, it neither protects the
individual from psychological stress leading to involun-
tary confessions nor secures for him the dignity the
Miranda majority wished to secure. See Edwin D. Driver,
"Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion," 82
Harvard Law Review
,
42 (1968).
112
See also Cox, pp. 84-86; Kurland, "Equal in
Origin."
113 384 U.S . 719 ( 1966) .
1 33
L inklett or or Shott since the Miranda and Escobedo rules
were to apply only to cases begun after the announcement
of these decisions. Furthermore, in judging the desira-
bility of retroactivity the Court added to Linkletter
a balancing test to consider the availability of alterna-
tives and their burden on law enforcement, thus making
the outcome even more of a negative departure. The
same day, however, the Court ruled in Davis v. North
115Carolina that the old "totality of circumstances"
doctrine could still be used to judge voluntariness in
pre-Miranda and Escobedo cases. Even though the specific
rules of those cases were not required, it was said that
their absence might contribute to a general showing of
involuntariness. This decision served partially to soften
the blow of J ohnson .
Interestingly, in all of these cases Justice Black
voted with the liberal bloc while the conservatives bene-
fited in all three negative decisions by the vote of
Justice Brennan. Black, of course, while not a member
of the left bloc, did exhibit a sufficiently significant
"'"'^See "The Supreme Court 1965 Term," 136-37 .
1 1 5 384 U.S. 737 (1966)
.
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pro-defendant disposition to figure himself as a factor
on the left. On the other hand, Brennan with an SSI of
only .72 was clearly the most likely member of the left
to deviate. But when he did, it is unlikely that his
shifts were prompted by forces other than attitudes
toward the criminal procedural issues presented by the
cases
.
1966 Term
. If the 1965 Term represents little
significant alteration beyond what could have been
expected as a normal recovery from the previous term,
the 1966 Term shows little alteration at all. Half the
Court improved in individual pro-defendant percentages,
while half declined (see Table 3). Only Black's decline
from 72% positive to 59% positive is noteworthy. In
SSI's, too. Black's drop seems to int erest--the stabi-
lity of the other members' attitudes is reflected in very
high correlation to those of the previous year (see
F igure 6)
.
The voting blocs remained virtually unchanged
from 1965 to 1966 with the exception that Black was
not found to form oven a marginal bloc with Douglas.
The four-member left bloc stayed the same except for a
slight improvement in cohesion (see Figure 11). Again,
FIGURE 11. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1966 TERM)
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Factor I
F ortas .93
Warren .92
Brennan .83
Douglas .81
Black
-.13
Clark
-.19
White -.74
Stewart e'-en•i
Harlan -.94
ICI = .75 (primary)
SSI = .87 (left)
Court SSI a .65
Factor II
Clark
.93
White
.37
Brennan .35
Stewart .34
Harlan .28
Warren -.04
Black -.12
F ortas -.17
Douglas -.41
ICI —
SSI = .56 ( middl
there was no right bloc, although unlike 1965, three
members did form a fairly solid opposition to Factor I.
The only other factor to emerge was Clark, whose voting
now clearly met the criteria identifying middle blocs.
1966, then, appears to have been quite lackluster,
not only in its nondeviation from the previous year in
percentages of pro-defendant votes or decisions and in
the high correlations of its SSI's with those of both
1965 and 1962 (see Figure 6), but also in the movements
136
and alliances of the individual members of the Court.
The only real change was that of Justice Black--a move
which will be treated in greater detail later.
Yet 1966 was an unusually busy term for the Court,
both in the absolute number of criminal procedure decis-
ions rendered and in the number of major holdings. The
results of these latter cases were mixed, about 50/4 for
the defendant and 50$ against. One observer generously
suggests that the Court continued its liberalizing trend
but at a pace somewhat slower than it had in previous
years. 116 Others believe that most important cases
117
signified a clear reversal of previous liberalism. 1 '
These are what might be called the second generation of
criminal cases, the post-Miranda era involving fewer
innovative forays into the criminal law and more detailed
1
1
8
applications of the previously formulated rules.
1 1 9
In United States v. Wade , a case involving two
116Marvin M . Karpatkin, "The Supreme Court 1966
1967, Review of the Last Term and a View of the Next,"
Civil Liberties , September 1967, pp. 5-6.
1l7Crime and Justice in America, p. 15.
118
Ibid.
1 1
9
388 U.S . 218 ( 1967)
.
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separable issues, the Court rejected by one vote a
claim that police line-up procedures violate the right
against self-incrimination. Justice Brennan, having
again deserted the loft bloc of which he was the
least liberal member, relied on the Schmerber notion
that the Fifth Amendment protects only communicative acts
of incrimination which are compelled directly from the
defendant. On the other hand, the Court also held
6-3 that since such a line-up is a critical stage of
the prosecution, defendants must be provided with
counsel if they wish it. This, of course, follows Whit
e
v, Mary land and subsequent decisions. As in prior right
to counsel cases the reason for the holding was the in-
herent unfairness of such procedures for the unrepresen-
ted defendant. In the companion case of Gilbert v, Cali-
fornia
,
1 2D the Court declared, by the same majority,
that following W a de "... only a per se exclusionary
rule . . . can be an effective sanction to secure that
law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to counsel at the critical line-
up. Vet also consistent with Wade , the Court rejec-
1 20 388 U.S . 263 ( 1967) .
121 Ibid.
,
273.
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ted the contention that handwriting samples violate
the right against self-incrimination. However, since
the self-incrimination aspect of Ulade was based on
Schmerber * s rule of noncommunicat i ve evidence, it
seems doubtful that handwriting samples can be treated
similarly. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan again, this
time joined by Warren, cast the necessary negative
votes for the majority.
The same day as the Wade and Gilbert extensions
of the right to counsel, the Court refused to apply
them retroactively in spite of the fact that the right
to counsel was considered in those cases to be essential
to fair process for the accused. Thus, St ova 1
1
v.
19 ?Denno deviates markedly from the L inkletter test of
retroactivity as well as from the retroactive applica-
tions of Gideon . Speaking again for the majority,
Brennan argued, contrary to his own statements in Wade
and Gilbert , that the absence of counsel involved injus-
tice to the defendant in fewer cases than the reverse.
But the underlying motive seems clearly to have been
the number of cases which would be reversed if Wade and
Gilbert were given retroactivity.
122 388 U.S . 293 (1967) .
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In a less sensational right to counsel case, but
one whose impact in some jurisdictions was bound to be
great, the Court in Anders v. California struck down
the practice of permitting Court appointed counsel to
advise the appellate court when an appeal had no merit.
This, said the Court, lessens the effect of the right
to counsel and is, therefore, a matter for the court of
appeals to decide, Ulhite and Clark voted with the
majority, the latter writing the opinion. Surprisingly
Black dissented, his first negative vote in a Sixth
Amendment case in the entire period under examination.
Two decisions significantly tightened the imple-
mentation of Griffin v, California and the right against
124
self-incrimination. In Chapman v, California
.
pur-
suant to Griff in and F ahy v. Connecticut , the Court
reversed a state court finding that prosecutorial comment
on the failure of a defendant to take the stand was
"harmless error." The F ahy test of harmlessness, the
Court held, was to be applied by the appellate, not the
123 386 U.S , 738 (1967) .
124 386 U.S, 18 (1967).
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trial court. And in G ' Connor v. Ohio
,
1 25 it said that
tho failure to object to such prosecutorial comment in
trials antecedent to Griffin could not be used by the
state courts to deny defendant relief on remand in
light of that ruling.
Tho absorption of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment was continued in two Sixth Amend-
A O CL
ment cases. In K lopf or v. North Carolina and in
1 27Ulashingt on v . T exas tho rights to a speedy trial and
to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses were
applied against the states. But in a v/ery unsettling
interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment due process, the
Court upheld a Texas recividist statute permitting the
injection in an indictment of prior convictions if the
jury had been charged not to take such matters into
account when considering guilt or innocence in the
instant case. The decision, 5 pencer v. T exas clearly
125385 U.S. 92 (1966) .
126 386 U.S. 313 (1967) .
127 388 U.S. 14 (1967) .
128 385 U.S. 554 (1967) .
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• 129deviates from Jackson v. Denno and from other cases
where the due process clause was used to strike down
prejudicial state procedures."130
The 1966 Term might well be called the "search
and seizure term." Almost as many Fourth Amendment
cases were decided this term as there had been in the
.
1
3
*i
preceding ten. And here the shift toward the police
and away from the defendant is most notable. The con-
tinuation of the "functional approach" is apparent in
rulings which sought to eliminate as artificial such
concepts as "mere evidence" to look instead at the
1 32
reasons behind warrantless search.
1 33
In Lewis v. United States the Court permitted
the submission as evidence of an agent's testimony
^"See T umey v. Ohio , 273 U.5, 510 (1927); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ; and Sheppard v. Maxwell t
384 U.S. 333 (1966)
.
130
"The Supreme Court, 1966 Term," 81 Harvard Law
Review 69 (1967), 210-213.
13l Ibid
. ,
112.
132 Ibid
. ,
122.
133 385 U.S . 206 (1966)
.
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regarding conversations held in the defendant’s home
during the commission of a felony. Although the home is
generally thought to be secure from such invasion, the
majority felt that this security is sacrificed when
the home is converted into a commercial center for
illegal business. The decision was a major departure
from G o u 1 e
d
v. United States
.
~ 4
where evidence taken
by an undercover agent from a business office was held
inadmissible, and from Wong Sun which had held that
"verbal evidence" also came under the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
But the fundamental basis of the Gouled precedent,
one which had been widely effective in recent criminal
cases, was a proscription of the seizure of "more evi-
dence" pursuant to a valid arrest as distinct from the
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime. That proscrip-
135tion was specifically overruled in Warden v. Hayden ,
a significant departure from previous limitations on
police searches. The effect of the decision was, of
course, to make it more rewarding to search incident to
an arrest, when items seized need not have been previously
134 255 U.S . 298 (1921) .
135 387 U.S . 294 (1967)
.
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specified or even known to the police, than to secure
a search warrant. This, as has already boon demonstra-
ted, violates the spirit of Wong Sun
.
Beck v. Ohio
.
and
Justice Goldberg's dicta in V ent resca
. The same effect
was produced in Coo per v. California 36 Contrary to
the previous decision in Preston
,
three years before,
the Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile
which had been impounded by the police. Unlike Preston
.
the Court found that the search was simply an acceptable
administrative measurejthe fruits of which were fortui-
tous rather than intended. Again the Court undermined
its stated desire to encourage search warrants by making
probable cause more difficult to demonstrate in post hoc
showings than in antecedent appeals for warrants.
The Court's intention of employing stricter
criteria for showing probable cause for arrest warrants
than for search warrants so that police would seek the
latter whenever possible, was also diluted in McCray v.
Illinois . There the Court sustained a search incident
to a warrantless arrest when an unidentified informant,
136 306 U.S. 58 (1967).
137 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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to uihoso roliability the police attested, gave testimony
supported by facts showing probable cause for arrest.
This deviated from the Aguilar tost of hearsay evidence
and from the previous preference for warranted arrests
over warrantless. Douglas' dissent was particularly
damaging to the Court's claim of consistency. Ho argued
that the decision encouraged arrest without warrant, and
at that only on suspicion rather than upon a showing of
probable cause, thus making the police the judges of tho
1 3 9
reasonableness of an arrest rather than a magistrate.
Since the informant's word alone isn't enough to secure
a search warrant it should not be sufficient to justify
1 40
a warrantless arrest and then a search incident to it.
In at least one area, however, the Court did
expand the rights of tho criminal defendant and sharply
limited tho actions of the police. While it is unclear
in Berger v. N ew York whether the Court intended to bring
1
^®"The Supremo Court, 1966 Term," 197-98. See
362 U.S. 257 (I960)
.
^^Douglas, dissenting, 386 U.S. 300, 316.
140See Douglas’ dissent in 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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all electronic eavesdropping under the Fourth Amend-
.141 .
ment it certainly meant to curtail the ease with
which such surveillance could be carried out. Electro-
nic devices, said the majority, by nature involve in-
trusion even though there may be no trespass;^ 2 the
Fourth Amendment does apply to conversations; thus,
the Fourth Amendment requires in electronic eavesdrop-
ping notice of the particulars sought as well as a
precise limitation of the circumstances in which the
search may occur. In so doing the majority struck down
a state statute permitting county court judges to issue
ex parte orders for eavesdropping simply upon the affir-
mation of the police that there is reason to believe
that evidence of a crime may be thus obtained. Thus the
Court reasserted in eavesdrop cases what it had elimin-
141 Confusion was reflected in the news accounts
of the decision; see Sidney Zion, "Another Short Circuit
for the Art of Bugging," New York T imes . June IB, 1967,
p . 6E .
142
See Silverman v. United States . 365 U.S. 505
( 1961)
.
143
(1963)
See Ulonq Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471
146
a ted for other searches in Wade : a roaming search for
more evidence." Since, as in nearly all eavesdrop
cases. Justice Black voted against the defendant, the
Berger decision uias made by the shifts to the left of
Clark and Stewart. In Osborn v. United States
.
144
on
the other hand, an eavesdrop was not thought to be such
a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it was
employed within "precise and discriminate circumstances"
and was authorized by a judge pursuant to an affidavit
detailing the offense. This, the Court held, meets the
Lopez requirement of particularity.
It is one thing to circumscribe the use of eaves-
dropping in cases where evidence is submitted from such
techniques; it is another to limit it in cases whore no
evidence is submitted. In two cases the Court discovered
that it is often very difficult to know that illegal
eavesdrops have boon employed, or, even in cases when
they actually have been admitted, whether the evidence
taken illegally was used as a lead to admissible evidence.
In Black v. United States neither the judge nor the
144 385 U.S. 323 (1966)
.
145 385 U.S. 26 (1966) .
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defense had known that federal agents had monitored
conversations between petitioner and counsel. Conse-
quently a new trial was required so that the petitioner
could protect himself against inadmissible evidence.
Likewise in the second Hof fa case, 146 when the Solicitor
General revealed the existence of an eavesdrop for
twelve months but claimed that none of the evidence was
ever used even as an investigative lead, the Court
remanded the case for further hearings to judge whether
there was a taint to the conviction.
Although the cases decided in the 1966 Term are
more indicative of a negative turn for the Court, that
fact is perhaps offset by the fact that many were de-
cided by only one vote. There were more 5-4 decisions
in 1966, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage
of the total, than in any other term of the period
studied. It is interesting that Justice Black seems to
have been primarily responsible for the ambivalence of
the outcome. It was he who provided the critical vote
in all of the difficult 5-4 decisions against the defen
dant and in all but one of the 5-4 decisions for the
1 47defendant
.
1 46 Hof f
a
v. United States , 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
147Crime and Justice in America, p. 15.
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1967 Term
. As illustrated in Figures 3 and 5,
the 1967 Term was one of rather extreme shift. The
attitudes of Court members, reflected in Scale Score
Indices, did not correlate significantly with attitudes
of the previous year and correlated loss with those of
the base year of 1962 than at any other time in the
period (see Figure 6).
In terms of performance, the Court's percentage
of pro-defendant decisions was high and the percentage
of positive votes in search and seizure, self-incrimina-
tion, and right to counsel cases was very high. Yet in
most individual performances these percentages showed
a slight decline: Douglas, Fortas, and Uiarren wore
each somewhat lower; Black reached his lowest positive
percentage of the entire seven terms (see Table 3).
Two factors accomplish the high Court averages for the
term: Marshall's replacement of Clark improved that
positive vote by 18% and Stewart improved his 1966
positive vote average by 23%.
The voting blocs suggested in Figure 12 further
illuminate the shift from the 1966 to 1967 Term. 1 he
factor analysis finds Douglas absent from his 1966 posi*
tion in Factor I and a general movement of that group
from a "far left" to a "middle left" disposition.
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FIGURE 12. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1967 TERM)
Factor I Factor II Factor 111
Marshall .98 White .90 Harlan .96
Brennan .93 Black .27 Stewart .21
Warren .90 Harlan .15 White -.05
F ortas .88 Marshall -.12 Brennan -.09
Stewart .83 Warren -.28 Marshall -.13
Douglas .37 Brennan -.32 F ortas -.14
Harlan .14 Stewart -.32 Warren -.14
White .24 F ortas -.38 Douglas -.26
Black .72 Douglas -.77 Black -.72
ICI = .88 (primary) ICI = - ICI = — - —
SSI = .79
Court SSI
(middle- SSI = .
loft)
= .69
57 (right) SSI — .46 (right
)
Marshall and Stewart joined Brennan, Warren, and F ortas
for a five-member total which was extremely cohesive
—
the mean ICI is .88 compared to .75 the previous year.
Factors II and III, on the contrary, while both of "right"
disposition, have only one member each with high positive
loadings
.
Thus, the major liberal upheaval of 1967 does not
seem to be the product of great liberalization since for
the left bloc of 1965 the opposite is true. I nstead
,
the change seems to be accounted for by Stewart's signi-
ficant movement from right to left, by Marshall's repla-
cement of Clark, by the high level of cohesion in the
"middle left" majority, and by the corresponding dis-
ruption of cohesion on the right.
The 1967 Term was clearly a liberal one for the
rights of the accused in the major decisions as well as
in the aggregate statistics. Making new doctrine, the
Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
to the states and explored the relationship between jury
composition and sentencing behavior. Repeating its
pattern of the past, the first of these decisions were
bold and creative followed by others which refined and
restricted them. In filling the interstices of past
holdings in the area of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure the results were ambiguous with one very signifi-
cant defeat for the defendant’s rights. The Court greatly
expanded the constitutional guarantees afforded the accu-
sed, however, in the areas of Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and
particularly in Fourth Amendment protection against
electronic eavesdropping.
1 51
148In Duncan v. Louisiana the right to a jury
trial was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
when the Court struck down a state statute permitting
jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or
imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed. Juries,
said the majority, must be provided on request in all
but potty cases to be determined by the severity of the
possible sentence. This was extended to cases of crimi-
1 49
nal contempt the same day in Bloom v. I llinois . But
in subsequent cases the Court held that Duncan and Bloom
1 50
would not be applied retroactively and that Bloom
did not extend to cases of "petty” contempt, a factor to
be determined not by the possible but by the actual
151
sentence
.
Reflecting a growing opposition to the death pen-
1 52
a 1 1 y , the Court held in Witherspoon v. Illinois that
juries in capital cases from which eligible veniremen
148 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
.
149391 U.S. 194 (1968)
^ ^
DeS t ef ano v. Ui ood s , 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
151 391 U.S. 216 (1968)
.
152 391 U.S. 51G (1968)
152
who express objections to capital punishment have been
1 S3excluded may not impose the death sentence. On the
other hand, in Bumper v. North Carolina it refused
to extend that decision to hold that such "hanging jur-
ies" may not convict in capital cases. Although it is
obviously an anti-defendant decision, unlike its prede-
cessor, and regardless of the merits of Douglas’ dissen-
ting opinion that "hanging juries" are also conviction-
prone, Bumper should not be regarded as a deviation from
W it herspoon
.
There, Stewart's majority opinion had
specifically separated the issue of jury determination
of guilt, in which the exclusion of death penalty skep-
tics did not produce partiality, from jury determination
of sentence, where such partiality is "self evident."
In a final case examining the role of the jury in imposing
the death sentence, the Court struck down that section of
the Federal Kidnapping Act which made kidnapping puhish-
able by death if the victim is harmed and the jury so
recommends. This, said the Court, makes a "risk of death
the price for the exercise of the right to a jury trial
^^Held to be prospective only.
154 391 U.S. 543 (1958)
.
153
and the right against self-incrimination.^ 0
Although the defendant in the Bumper case might
ha\/e been legitimately convicted by a "hanging jury,"
that conviction was overturned due to a violation of
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Even though there had been con-
sent for the search by the defendant's mother, it was
held that evidence taken in a warrantless search not
pursuant to an arrest is inadmissible. In another
search and seizure decision the Court again deviated
frcm Preston v. United States and utilized on the federal
level the "administrative search" precedent which had
been employed in Cooper v. California the previous year
to uphold the search of an impounded automobile. But
in the second part of Dyke v. Taylor Implement Company
the Court distinguished Cooper and prohibited the use
of evidence taken from a car on the street after the
defendant had been arrested in the adjacent house. Such
a search was considered not to be administrative and was
too remote to be incident to arrest.
155 United States v. Jackson
,
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
^
^Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
154
Cases of "hot pursuit" have generally been thought
to constitute prima facie demonstrations of probable
1 57cause for warrantless arrests. In 1967, however,
the Court greatly broadened the field of cases in which
searches might bo had without warrant or even probable
1 5 B
cause for arrest. In Terry v. Ohio " an eight member
majority uphold "stop and frisk" practices enabling
police to stop and search an individual on suspicion
alone without probable cause for arrest. Refusing to
rule on the "facial constitutionality" of such practices,
the Court said that the tost in each case must be whether
a policeman reasonably believed that the observed activi-
ty is criminal and that the suspect may be armed. Thus,
the criteria for a valid search are greatly enlarged and
the purpose of interposing a neutral magistrate between
1 59
policeman and citizen is undermined. ' The conclusion
deviated greatly from precedents demanding a probable
cause showing and reversed the Warren Court trend of
1 6t
protecting suspects from "ovorzealous" police tactics.
157 See Justice Fortas concurring, 387 U.S. 294
( 1967)
.
1 58 392 U.S . 1 ( 1968)
.
159See 335 U.S. 451 (1948)
.
^^Barker and Barker, p. 240.
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The reason, apparently, was the fact that such tactics
are impossible to control since they seldom result in
criminal cases which courts can review; such "arrests
for investigation," therefore, clearly illegal, seldom
1 6 2
come before a magistrate. Coupled with the Warden
decision permitting the seizure of mere evidence, Terry
provided great leeway to the police.
On the other hand it has also been argued that
to the extent that a) searches without warrants are
accepted more and more by the Court, and b) the Terry
decision does limit searches to the reasonableness of
the circumstances demanding them, it may be seen as a
limitation on the police. This is perhaps clearer
in the companion cases to Terry . In Sibron v. New
York
1^ the Court refused to admit evidence when there
was doubt as to the reasonableness of the policeman's
suspicion of a crime and doubt that the suspect might
1b1 392 U.S. 1, 13-14.
^ b
^Bernard Schwartz, p. 44.
163 |\lote, "Searches of the Person," 69 Columbia
Law Review
,
866 (1969).
164 389 U.S. 950 (1968) .
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bo armed. On the othor hand, in Peters v. Now York 1 ^
i-ho third companion case, tho Court found reasonable nass
for arrost and soarch in a caso of "hot pursuit" whore
there was oven adequate basis for a post hoc showing of
probable cause.
Pour self-incrimination decisions added signifi-
cantly to tho protection offered in the Fifth Amendment.
In Simmons v. United 5tat.es in order to assure that
one constitutional right not have to be surrendered in
order to assort another, tho Court found that when a
defendant testifies regarding his ownership of evidence
so that it may bo protected from illegal soarch, his
testimony may not then bo used as evidence in court
against him on tho issue of guilt. Striking at a long
familiar Congressional rogulatory tax, the Court in
167
Marchotti v. United States overturned a federal gamb-
ling tax requirement since it forced a choice between tho
constitutional right against self-incrimination and
punishment for refusal to comply. Tho same was held for
165 Ibid .
166 390 U.S. 377 (I960)
.
167 390 U.S. 39 (I960)
.
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the National Firearms Act which required registration
of arms which were themselves illegal. 168 Again further-
ing the Griff in holding, the Court clarified Chapman v.
California by saying that a conviction is vitiated unless
the state carries the burden of proving the harmlessness
of the error of admitting prosecutorial comment on a
defendant not taking the stand, 16y
Consistent with the Gideon and Whit
e
decisions
170the Court in Mom pa v, Rhay found that the requirement
of counsel applied to every stage of the proceedings in
which the accused's right might be affected, including
state proceedings for the revocation of probation and
the imposition of a deferred sentence. In burqet
t
v.
171
T exas it softened the blow of 5 pencer v. T exas by
denying the introduction in habitual offender trials
records of prior convictions when such convictions wore
had without the benefit of counsel.
Continuing the Pointer v. T exas decision, the Court
168 390 U.S . 05 ( 1968) .
1
6
^
F onta in v. California , 390 U.S. 593 (1968).
1
7
°389 U.S. 128 (1967) .
1 7
1
389 U.S. 109 (1967) .
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held in Barber v, Page that a state must make a valid
effort to produce witnesses for cross examination whose
incriminating testimony was used at a preliminary hear-
ing. In Brut on v. United States it overruled an
, . 174
earlier precedent and found that the admission of a
defendant’s extra-judicial confession implicating a co-
defendant violated the latter's right to confront wit-
nesses. The so-called Bruton rule was subsequently
applied to the states and given retroactive applicabil-
.. 175it y
.
The area of greatest liberalization in the 1967
Term, however, was that of electronic eavesdropping.
Two decisions involving such eavesdrop evidence and one
non-eavesdrop case which grew out of them severly restric-
ted the practices of state and federal law enforcement
176
officials. Speaking for the majority in Lee v. Florida
172 390 U.S. 719 (1968) .
173 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
l74 Delli Paoli v. United States , 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
^ 7
^
R obert s v . Russell , 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
176 392 U.S. 378 (1958)
.
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Stewart, again siding with the liberals, overruled
177Schwartz v. T exas and held that as in Mapp only a
mandatory exclusionary rule would compel respect for
federal laws against illegal eavesdropping--in this
case the Federal Communications Act, but by implication
the Fourteenth Amendment as well, 178 In Katz v. United
179States
, the most important and far-reaching pro-
defendant decision of the term, the Court did formally
what Berger had seemed to do the year before— to over-
rule the Qlmstead-Goldman "trespass" doctrine. Again
177 344 U.S. 199 (1952) .
1 7 8This decision seems to have been aimed at the
Justice Department's limited interpretation of benat
i
v.
United States
.
355 U.S. 96 (1957), which interpreted the
FCC Act of 1934, making it a crime to intercept and div-
ulge any communication without the authority of the
sender. The Justice Department saw this as a prohibition
only of both interception and divulgence, and at that,
divulgence only to individuals outside the government.
Thus, wiretap evidence might legally be taken and used
as leads to admissible evidence which would not thereby
be "poisoned." Livingston Hall and Yale Kamisar, eds.,
Modern Criminal Procedure , 2nd. ed., (St, Paul, Minn.:
Ulest Publishing Co., 1966(, p. 50.
179 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
.
160
See 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and 316 U.S. 319
(1942), which had held that surveillance without tres-
pass or seizure of any material object fell outside the
control of the Constitution.
160
relying on the Berger notion that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not property, the opinion specifically
required: prior judicial authorization when it is
possible to get it, an estimate of probable cause, an
estimate of the evidence sought, the observance of strict
limits as to time and place, and the submission of all
evidence to the court for determination as to what is
directly or indirectly incriminating. The Court thus
seemed to take the broad view of "constitutionally pro-
tected area," i.e., that the Fourth Amendment applies any
1 fl 1time a person "reasonably relies on his privacy." Yet
the issue is not clear, leaving room for speculation that
the opinion was "intentionally ambiguous, pointing the
way to a new scope for the Fourth Amendment while leaving
the Court room to retreat." 102 A further indication of
this assertion of privacy which again seems intentionally
unclear, came in Klancus
i
v. PeF ort e . Although not an
eavesdropping case the Court relied on Katz to deny the
^ 81 389 U.S. 347 pp. 350-51.
182
Edmond W . Kitch, "Katz v. U.S.: The Limits of
the Fourth Amendment," Philip Kurland, ed . , The Supreme
Court Review. 1968 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968), p. 138.
1 B3 3g2 y #s t 364 ( 1968) .
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admissibility of evidence seized from an office without
a warrant even though the owner of the matter taken did
not have title to the premises invaded.
Ulith the addition to the Court of Justice Marshall
the liberal outcome of the term was not unexpected. The
significance of his membership is indicated in his 90%
positive record in those non-unanimous cases in which he
participated compared to Clark's 42% the previous year.
But Marshall’s prior service as Solicitor General re-
quired his withdrawal in almost one-quarter of the term's
cases. In addition, since Justice Black was clearly
unassociated with the left bloc, it was primarily Justice
Stewart's replacement of Black on the left 164 and, on
several occasions, the shifts of members of the right
that permitted significant pro-defendant majorities in
cases which otherwise would have been decided by one
vote or perhaps lost to the conservatives. 105 For the
rest of the members of the Court there seems to have
104Stewart cast positive votes in 56% of all non-
unanimous decisions compared to 28% in 1966.
100
In Simmons and Jackson , for example, the posi-
tive votes of Stewart and Harlan prevented 4-4 dead-
locks; see also Witherspoon and the search and seizure
sections of Bumper , F ontain , Mancusi and Burgett .
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been little change from 1966. V R t these relatively
minor shifts produced a term of major pro-defendant
decisions
.
1966 Term
. The 1968 Term was, perhaps, the most
anomalous. In the percentages of pro-defendant decisions
there was a substantial decrease from 1967 but in the
percentages of pro- defendant votes there was no decline
at all--until one examines the most visible decisions
involving searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and
right to counsel where the positive vote percentage
dropped to as low a point as it did in 1964 (see Fig. 5b).
In addition there also seems to have been a major shift
in attitudes relationships: the SSI correlations wore
nearly as low as they were in 1967 (see Fig. 6). These
changes are accounted for primarily by the altered posi-
tions of Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Black, and the
resignation from the Court of Justice Fortas. The be-
havior of these members helps explain why, in spite of
great fluctuations, the overall percentages of positive
decisions and votes wore not significantly low. Justice
Fortas, a major figure in the loft bloc, participated in
only two-thirds of the term’s decisions, and in only
slightly more than one-half of those decided non-unani-
163
mously, thereby increasing the likelihood of anti-
defendant dispositions. On the other hand, Justice
Stewart’s return to the right was offset by Justice
Harlan's move to the center. Whereas Stewart’s percen-
tage of positive votes dropped 18% Harlan's increased
by 20% as did Black’s by 9%.
Harlan cast positive votes in seven cases in
which Stewart voted negatively; Stewart, in turn, cast
a positive vote only once where Harlan did not. In
addition, since Black’s record is consistently anti-
defendant in search and seizure cases, and since that
category comprised one-fourth of all 1968 cases and
one-half of those "most visible," it is reasonable to
conclude that whatever shift black made in overall
positive percentage would be more effective in offsetting
Stewart's rightward shift in the totality of cases than
in the "most visible" category.
The voting correlations mirror these fluctuations
as well. After occupying a solitary position in 1967,
Douglas is found again with the loft bloc in 1968;
Stewart, also unlike 1967, is found no longer to be
associated with any bloc (see Fig. 13) . Stewart's
shift was partially offset by Harlan’s new middle posi-
FIGURE 13. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1968 TERM)
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F actor I F actor II Factor III
Marshall .93 Harlan .99 Stewart .98
Brennan .92 Warren .28 Brennan .22
F ortas .91 Marshall .11 Marshall .19
Warren .88 F ortas .09 Warren .16
Douqlas .84 Stewart .06 White .08
White .20 Brennan -.08 Harlan .06
Stewart .11 White -.09 F ortas .02
Harlan .03 Douglas -.26 Douglas -.16
B lack -.62 B lack -.43 B lack -.42
ICI = .78 (primary) ICI = ICI = — --
SSI = .79
Court SSI
(left) SSI = .62
= .68
(middle) SSI = .44 (right
)
tionj but in spite of that move and in spite of the fact
that there was a numerical majority on the left, Stew-
art's shift away from the left bloc seems to have been
critical. The five members with the highest positive
loadings on Factor I were sufficiently cohesive to
constitute a primary grouping as in 1967, but actual
cohesion was considerably less than in the preceding year.
One might speculate that, just as Fortas' addition in 1966
165
provided a catalyst for the left bloc, his resignation
1 B6in 1968 had the opposite effect. Moreover, in addi-
tion to the lower degree of cohesion in 1968, Fortas’
absence made what appears at first to be a primary five-
member bloc similar to the one in 1967 actually only a
f our-and-a-half member bloc, enhancing the effect of
Stewart's apparent rightward shift even more.
Finally, it is clear from the marginal level of
scale reproducibility that the 1966 Term was one of
important attitude and behavior alteration even though
this was not fully reflected in the overall percentages.
It is interesting, however, that while Black was no more
erratic in his voting patterns than in previous terms
since 1962, Harlan, who is normally quite consistent,
was equally erratic; Stewart, who from 1967 to 1968
shifted in scale positions from sixth to ninth, demon-
strated a remarkably consistent voting behavior in this
final term.
1B6See supra , p.128. Or, as will be seen later,
it may have been the generally unsettling effect of the
events which led to the resignation. This more refined
hypothesis is perhaps more likely in light of the cohes-
ion of the left bloc before and after Fortas' official
departure. Prior to his resignation on May 15, 1969 the
left bloc was unanimous in 11 of 15non~unanimous cases;
after May 15 it was unanimous in 5 of 6.
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The major decisions of the 1968 Term wore mixed
but certainly not as anti-defendant as the statistical
indices might seem to suggest. One reason for this,
as in 1966, was undoubtedly the large number of important
cases decided by only five-member majorities.
In the area of electronic eavesdropping several
decisions served to back away from the sweeping holdings
of 1967. L ee and Katz were each declared to be non-retro-
0 7 0 0active and in Alderman v. United States the tenta-
tive shift in Fourth Amendment cases from protected
property to protected privacy which had been seen in 1967
shifted back. In Alderman a majority of six held that a
person has standing to object to the introduction of
illegally obtained eavesdrop evidence if he was a party
to the conversation or if the conversation occurred on
his premises, even though he was not a party to it, but
he could not protest if he were neither party nor owned
the promises even if he had been a co-conspirator and
the evidence served to incriminate him. This return to
Wong Sun
,
Jones
,
and Chapman provoked partial dissents
^ ^ Fuller v. Alaska , 393 U.S. 80 (1968); Desist
v. United States , 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
1 88 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
.
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from Fortas and Harlan who argued against the standing
of someone simply on the basis of property ownership;
conversational privacy, they argued, is a personal, not
1 fl 9
a property right.
But if Alderman was a retreat from the Kat z-Beroer
notion of privacy it was also a great liberal advance in
the procedural matter of the use of illegal eavesdrop
evidence. A unanimous Court agreed that if one has
standing he must be given full records of the illegally
gained material so that he may determine its relevance
to the prosecution’s case against him; moreover, an
adversary proceeding must be given for that determina-
tion. If, in that proceeding, the court decides that it
is relevant it may not be used. All but Harlan and For-
tas went so far as to require this production by the
government even in national security cases.
Yet again the Court left the matter ambiguous so
that there was adequate room to retreat, especially from
the last of these points which was a particularly contes
1 90
ted issue. In two subsequent cases the Court made
189
Justice Harlan, dissenting, 394 U.S. 165, 188-
97; Justice Fortas, dissenting, 394 U.S. 165, 206-09.
1 90
See infra, p. 324.
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scope of A Iderman more specific. In the first place, it
said, Alderman was not meant to require full disclosure
of all evidence seized but only that part affecting the
1 91defendant. Thus, a District Court is free to hold
in camera examinations of the evidence before giving to
the defendant that part which may directly or indirectly
affect him. In the second place, the Court held, not
every transcript taken by governmental eavesdropping
need be given to the defendant even if it directly affects
his case. All that Alderman required the government to
submit was that which had been illegally taken. Such a
determination was left to the District Court although
it could be appealed. Moreover, the Court expressly
declined to specify to the District Courts any particular
procedure for judging the legality of such eavesdrops,
thus leaving the option of ex parte in camera proceed-
1 92ings. Finally, the Court restricted its earlier ex-
tension of A Iderman to all national security wiretapping.
This time the Court appeared willing to accept the prac-
tice of what it called "foreign intelligence" surveil-
1 ^
T aolianett
i
v. United States , 394 U.S. 316
(1969) .
^
^Giordano v. United States
,
394 U.S. 310 (1969),
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lance. It thus seemed in A lderman to have explored
a sensitive area yet provided an avenue of retreat; then
finding the area too sensitive it took the retreat, all
the while chiding its audience for misreading the first
• 1 94opinion
.
The Court finally realized the promise of the
Aguilar test of hearsay evidence as a basis for probable
cause after having retreated in McCray
. In Recznik v.
1 95
City of Lorain it found that unless there is indepen-
dent substantiation of reliability and of the instant
information there can be no probable cause to issue a
search warrant; furthermore, this is particularly impor-
tant in post hoc showings of probable cause for arrest
pursuant to which evidence had been taken. Finally, in
1 96Spinelli v. United States the Court further clarified
Aguilar after the interlude in \1 »nt resca . It held that
even though a demonstrably reliable informant's testi-
mony might under some circumstances be accepted without
substantiation, it is always to be considered less trust
1 93
Stewart, concurring, 394 U.S. 310, 314.
1 94
' ibid ., 315.
195
393 U.S. 166 (1968).
196 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
.
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worthy than one which is so substantiated. Harlan’s
positive vote preserved a bare majority for the left
bloc in spite of an unexpected desertion by Fortas.
The thrust of these cases was a return to the Aguilar
principle that there must be grounds upon which the
magistrate can objectively assess the police officer's
judgment
,
The extent to which the Court had adopted the
1 97
"due process" model of the judicial system over the
objections of Justice Black, was indicated in Davis v.
198Mississippi . There the Court extended Wong Sun's
insistence upon strict probable cause for arrest in
order to preclude dragnet arrests and searches. Any
evidence, no matter how trustworthy, taken incident to
an illegal arrest, was ruled inadmissible as evidence.
This, of course, was a significant restriction upon law
199
enforcement officials. But in C h i m e
1
v. Calif ornia
the limitation of police search techniques was even more
direct and confining. There the Court affirmed the notion
that a search without a warrant, even incident to a
197 Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction .
1 98
394 U.S . 721 (1969) .
1 99 395 U.S . 752 (1969) .
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warranted arrsst
,
places upon the police the burden to
show justification for it beyond the simple fact of
arrest. Moreover, by overruling the old Harris-Rabino-
witz rule which had extended the permissible area of
search incident to arrest to all the arrestee's posses-
sion, the Court made a new rule: police may search only
for weapons or destructible contraband within the arres-
tee's reach unless a search warrant is secured. This,
in its practical effect, was perhaps the most signifi-
cant Fourth Amendment decision since Ma pp . It served to
extend further the notion of privacy as a personal rather
than as a property matter. Most important, perhaps,
Chimel greatly mitigated the holding in Warden v. Hayden
and the abuses to which it was obviously heir. Indeed,
it was police abuse of Harris -Rabin owitz by making arrests
in the home rather than elsewhere in order to search the
house incident to the arrest, which prompted the Court
to go as far as it did. In very explicit terms, then,
the Court gave an obvious rebuff to the police.
In symbolic content, Bent on v. Mary land
^
^
provided
a cap to the Warren era by applying the Fifth Amendment's
protection against double jeopardy to the states. Thus,
200 395 U.S . 784 ( 1969)
.
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Palko v. Connecticut
. with its strict denial that the
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" any of the Bill of
Rights except as they are incidentally implicit in the
notion of due process of law, was overruled, Palko had
increasingly little basis in fact from 1961 on as the
Court adopted the Black incorporation thesis, albeit a
201
slice at the time. It was this implicit denial of
Palko now made explicit which provided the Court with
202the weapon to secure the victory of its revolution.
In Bent on the Court held that having been convicted on
only one of two charges, a defendant cannot, consistent
with the Fifth Amendment, be tried again on both charges
when his first conviction is reversed and remanded on
oq3
appeal. Although in North Carolina v. Pearce the
double jeopardy protection was held not to preclude a
state from imposing a more severe sentence upon recon-
viction for the same crime, the Court did find that due
process of law requires that such action may not be used
to deter appeals. Thus, when a harsher sentence is
imposed the judge must provide reasons, based on objective
2
^Cox, p. 72.
202 rCox
,
p, 73
.
203 395 U.S. 711 (1969)
.
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information of events subsequent to the first convic-
tion, for having done so. In addition it held that
since the Fifth Amendment protects against multiple
punishment for one offense, the state practice of not
crediting a prisoner for time served under a first
sentence when sentenced again on retrial is a denial of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a notable cause celebro the Court followed its
Marchotti precedent of the previous term by striking down
a federal statute requiring the payment of a transfer tax
upon imported marijuana. 211 ^ This, a unanimous Court hold,
is a forced choice between breaking the law and incrimi-
nating oneself.
Two decisions dealt with the applicability of
Miranda v. Arizona '
s
provisions of the right to counsel.
Orozco v. Texas 20 1 made clear that Miranda was to provide
protective coverage to all "in custody" interrogations,
in the home as well as in the station house. On the other
9 n
hand, in Jenkins v. Delaware the Court gave an even
^^Loary v. United States , 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
20b 394 U.S. 324 ( 1969)
.
206 395 U.S. 213 (1969)
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more restrictive scope of prospective application to
M i randa than had been given in Johnson v. New Jersey .
In that case Miranda and Escobedo were said to apply
only to cases begun after the announcement of those
decisions. Now, in Jenkins
,
the majority deviated not
only from the Linkletter-Tehan guidelines, but from
J ohns on as well, finding that Miranda is inapplicable
to the retrial of a defendant whose first trial was
begun before that decision. u ' In addition, Jenkins was
a significant retreat from the holding the same year in
Smith v. Yeager 208 that a retrial is to be distinguished
209from the original.
Two additional right to counsel decisions extended
the applicability of cases decided the previous term. In
McConnell v. Rhay , 210 Mempa v. Rhay was given retroactive
211
application. And in F ost er v. California the Court
said that although Stovall v. Denno had held the Wade
and Gilbert decisions to be prospective only, the absence
207 See Justice Harlan dissenting, ibid . , p. 223.
208 393 U.S . 122 (1968)
.
209jhery T owns end v. 5a ine was thought to apply
because it was decided before Smith's second appeal.
210 393 U.S . 2 ( 1968)
.
21
1
394 U.S. 440 ( 1969)
.
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of counsel at a police line-up may serve as one of a
"totality of circumstances" to vitiate pre-Wade convic-
tions based on such identifications. This ruling, in
line with the Davis v. North Carolina holding in pre-
Miranda cases, evoked a dissent from Justice Black remi-
niscent of that in Davis . Continuing his opposition to
the exclusion of evidence simply on the ground that it
was illegally taken, he argued that the Court does not
have the authority to deny the use of evidence on its
own determination that it is unreliable or had been im-
properly obtained.
Another Sixth Amendment decision, however, seemed
to turn back from what appeared in Davis to be the
emergence of a "rule of automatic reversal." In Harr-
213inqt on v. California the Court held that the Chapman-
Fahy harmless error test is met when evidence is so
overwhelming that it is inconceivable for a jury to have
voted for conviction primarily because of statements of
unproduced witnesses. Yet there seems ample ground for
the three dissenters to argue that this decision goes
far beyond the strictures of Chapman which precluded any
21
2
Ibid
. ,
p. 449.
213 395 U.S. 250 (1969)
.
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illegal testimony which might conceivably have been
214harmful. In doing so the majority jeopardized the
deterrent effect of many of its most important decisions:
Mapp
,
Griffin
,
Miranda
. Wade
.
etc. Astonishingly, in
spite of his pro-defendant position in all those cases
as well as in C hapman and Fahy
,
Douglas provided the swing
vote and wrote the majority opinion. On the other hand,
in another case involving the right to confront witnes-
ses, the Court held Barber v. Page to be retroactive. 2^
In a significantly illiberal application of right
to jury trial precedents, the Court upheld the Bloom
denial of the right to a jury in cases of "petty" crimi-
nal contempt. A majority of six in F rank v. United
States held that, consistent with Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Company
,
the seriousness of a contempt is
determined by the severity of the penalty imposed. But
here the Court declared that cont empts punished by less
than six months imprisonment or by probation are petty.
This was a negative expansion of a negative precedent
and as the Chief Justice argued in dissent, it makes it
214 386 U.S. 18, p. 24.
^ ^ Berger v. California , 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
21 6 395 U.S. 147 (1969) .
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possible for a judge to use his powers of injunction,
non jury trial, and defining terms of probation to re-
strict severely the activities of members of unpopular
groups for years.
Finally, in two decisions which will surely have
the greatest impact on the judicial process and which
may herald judicial concern for an area of the criminal
process which has long been a source of pervasive abuse
of individual rights, the Court restricted the process
by which judges accept pleas of guilty. In McCart hy v.
217
United States it construed Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to mean that a federal judge
is required to determine personally from a defendant
whether his guilty plea was voluntary, whether it was
made with full understanding of the charge and possible
sentence, and if there is any factual basis for the plea.
Although the decision was later held to be only of pros-
pective applicability, ' in Boykin v . A labama the
McCarthy rule was also applied to the states. This,
21
7
394 U .S . 459 ( 1969)
.
21
8
Ha 1 liday v. United States , 394 U.S. 831 (1969).
219 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
.
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argued the majority is simply a logical conclusion
from the Court's holding in Jackson v. Denno that the
admission of a confession must be based on a reliable
determination of voluntariness and its ruling in Carnley
v. C ochran ' that waivers of counsel may not be pre-
sumed from a silent record. Thus the Court sought to
protect rights secured in other pro-defendant cases
which would have been lost following pleas of guilty:
the right to counsel, the right to jury trial, the
right to confront witnesses, the right against self-
incrimination, and so on.
The major decisions of the last term of the UJar-
ren era indicate a far less negative attitude than the
aggregate statistics seem to indicate. Although the
F rank
,
Harrington
,
and Jenkins decisions make it clear
that the year was not a continuation of the bold liberal-
ism of 1967, others such as McCarthy , Pearce , Chimel ,
and A lderman preclude an otherwise easy judgment that
the Court had retreated altogether.
IV. SPECIAL CASES
Several conclusions might be drawn from the
220 369 U.S. 506 (1962) .
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foregoing analysis. In the first place, the general
tendency of the Warren Court from 1962 through 1968 was
a disposition to favor the accused in most criminal pro-
cedure cases. Yet the overall trend of these seven
years was quite stable, the percentage of cases favoring
criminal defendants remaining relatively constant. This
is particularly significant since the preceding nine
years showed an increasingly pro-defendant disposition
and since 1962 marked the advent of a clear liberal
majority on the Court. A more conservative trend by a
more liberal group of justices seems anomalous if con-
sidered only in terms of the rights of the accused.
Thus, one might expect that other considerations had
moved the Court. In addition, the predictability of
judicial attitudes toward the rights of the accused
diminished in the Warren Court's last seven years, fur-
ther indicating the presence in the Court's deliberations
of factors other than those pertaining to defendant's
rights
.
Secondly, the attitudes of individual Court mem-
bers, reflected in Scale Score Indices as well as in
percentages of pro-defendant votes, varied considerably
from year to year. In 1963 and 1967 the Court, was
1 BO
particularly prone to extending procedural guarantees
to criminal defendants; in 1964 and to a lesser extent
in 1968 the Court retreated from such activism.
Some judges, of course, contributed more to these
various changes than others, in particular Justice Black
from 1966 on. Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and Chief
Justice Warren were also instrumental in affecting the
decline in pro-defendant votes in 1964; Justice Clark
voted more "liberally" in 1965 and 1966; and Justice
Stewart's voting posture in 1967 aided in the pro-defen-
dant cast of that year whereas his return to his former
position helped to secure the change to a more anti-
defendant posture for the Court in 196B.
I ssues . In addition to such yearly alterations
in pro-defendant inclinations there were also indications
of different dispositions towards the separate issues in
the field of criminal procedures. As mentioned at the
outset of Part II, the attitudes of Court members in
search and seizure cases were generally unlike those in
other areas. This difference seems to stem in part
from the fact that there is a greater likelihood of
physical abuse in cases involving absence of counsel or
the use of third degree tactics by the police than in
^^See supra
,
p. 92.
222cases of illegal search, and in part from the relia-
bility of convictions in the latter in spite of police
indifference to constitutional guarantees. Thus, some
justices seem to accept the popular position that if
evidence demonstrates a man's guilt, the courts should
consider the manner in which the evidence was obtained
as one, but certainly not the only, factor in judging
the fairness of procedures by which he was convicted.
Black, for example, suggests that the only criterion for
the admissibility of evidence ought to be its "relevance
and first hand knowledge." Views such as Black's have
not been uncommon on the Court and the record of the
Warren period, as indicated, is least libertarian in
the area of the Fourth Amendment. In his dissenting
opinion in Bumper v. North Carolina Black argued against
automatic reversal in search and seizure cases because
it would vitiate convictions of the "obviously guilty."
Yet Black wrote the Chapman "harmless error" rule which
222This argument is made by Bernard D. Meltzer,
"Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibi-
lity between Judge and Jury," 21 University of Chicago
Law Review 317 (1954). On the other hand, see Yale
Kamisar, "Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts," 43 Minnesota Law
Review 1083 (1959).
223See Justice Black, dissenting, 388 U.S. 41,
71-72.
virtually required reversal in cases of prosecutorial
comment on failure to testify in spite of independent
evidence of guilt.
Table 4 shows attitude differences in inter-
correlations of Scale Score Indices for right to coun-
sel, self-incrimination, coerced confession, and search
and seizure cases. 224 The high level of intercorrela-
tion among the first three of those areas contrasts
sharply with the low degree to which each of them corre-
lates with search and seizure attitudes. Such an appar-
ent difference among these four areas suggests the
presence in search and seizure cases of a unique atti-
tudinal factor such as the one described above, which is
not present in the three other areas. It may be, for
example, that the probable guilt of a defendant makes
it possible for some members of the Court to consider
more carefully the demands of the police and other
administrators of justice. If so, search and seizure
cases serve for those members as a significant basis
through which to respond to feedback from such sources.
When the separate categories of cases are examined
224 N = 9, rather than 11, because on three of the
scales Marshall and Goldberg had not participated in
enough cases to be fairly ranked. See Appendix I.
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TABLE 4
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG SSI’S IN FOUR ISSUE
AREAS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES (1962 - 1960 TERMS)
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for each justice the significance of the issue differ-
ence is even more apparent. Table 5 shows the Scale
Score Indices of each member of the Court in all criminal
procedure cases and in each of the four sub -areas men-
tioned. Several individuals stand outs although Jus-
tice Clark had a low level of tolerance for defendants
in search and seizure and coerced confession cases, he
is much more favorably disposed in cases involving the
right to counsol i Justice White was also low in search
and seizure and coerced confession cases but high in
those involving self-incrimination; and the most striking
issue differentiation of all is that of Justice Black in
TABLE 5
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SCALE SCORE INDICES OE EACH JUSTICE FOR FOUR ISSUE
AREAS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CASES (1962 - 1968 TERMS)
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These three members, along with
Justice Marshall, are the only ones whose SSI's for search
185
and seizure cases are lower than their SSI's for all the
cases combined by ten points or more over the Court's
mean. Thus, if there are members of the Court who are
more likely to respond to feedback through search and
seizure dispositions, it would seem to be these.
These factors have an obvious impact upon the
general findings of change and may prove to be important
in terms of feedback response. Since these areas pre-
occupied the Court's attention differently in different
years (see Table 6), the significance of the Court's move
ment depended in part upon the individual members' respon
ses to the presence or absence of certain kinds of cases.
Justice Clark's improvement in 1965 and 1966, for exam-
ple, may be a reflection of the increase in right to
counsel cases in both years with a decrease in search
and seizure cases in 1965 and a decrease in coerced
confession cases in 1966. On the other hand, the data
seem to indicate that Justice Stewart's more liberal
voting behavior in 1967 was not merely a reflection of
the kinds of cases considered by the Court since those
to which he is most favorable, self-incrimination, de-
clined that year; his return to a more conservative
pattern in 1968 may have been a product of the increased
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGES OF CASES IN FOUR ISSUE AREAS DECIDED BY
THE SUPREME COURT (1962 - 1968 TERMS)
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1965
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1 968
16 12 8 16
33 13 13 13
33 0 17 8
18 18 18 18
26 26 21 6
30 5 14 19
36 18 5 8
percentage of search and seizure and a decrease in
self-incrimination cases. The desertion of the left
bloc by Warren, Brennan, and Goldberg in 1964 also
seems not to have been the product of the predominant
area since the percentage of search and seizure cases
remained unchanged from the preceding year.
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The most interesting case of all is that of
Justice Black, previously shown to be the most erratic
member of the Court, Black's overall position, it will
be recalled, was quite favorable to the rights of crimi-
nal defendants during the period 1953 to 1963 but de-
clined considerably from 1964 to 1968 (see Fig. 14).
It seems clear that one important reason for that de-
cline was an increase in the number of search and seizure
cases in 1966, 1967 and 1968. It is in that area that
Black was most conservative. Of his 61 negative votes
225
cast since 1962, 35 involved search and seizure cases,
rfloroover, there were only 45 search and seizure cases
decided. On the other hand, Black's anti-search and
seizure behavior does not seem to parallel that of the
Court as one might expect (see Fig. 15). In 1967, as
the Court's vote on Fourth Amendment cases went up,
Black's went down; in 1968 as the Court's went down,
Black's went up. In addition, his sudden decline in pro-
defendant votes in 1964 does not correspond to his high
SSI for that year, nor was there a sudden increase in the
percentage of the Court's attention to search and seizure
225Compare this with only 6 negative votes in 26
right to counsel cases and 4 each in 23 self-incrimina-
tion and 22 coerced confession cases. See Appendix I.
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FIGURE 14. JUSTICE BLACK; VOTING TRENDS IN
CRIIYIINAL PROCEDURE CASES, 1953-1968 TERMS
cases. In 1966, although the percentage of cases de-
cided in favor of the defendant increased, the per-
centage of pro-defendant votes went down. Black’s
fall-off was an obvious factor in the apparent discre-
pancy since search and seizure cases comprised almost
one-fourth of tne total number of cases. This, of
Percentage
of
Votes
Cast
for
Defendant
FIGURE 15. JUSTICE BLACK: V/GTING TRENDS IN
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES, 1962-1968 TERMS
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course, makes the 1967 increase in pro-defendant votes
even more significant than it appeared to be in the
previous discussion. Since Black cast negative votes
in all search and seizure cases while the Court cast
negative votes in only 40% of them, and since search
190
and seizure accounted for over one-fourth of the total
cases, one must conclude the existence of a counter-
balance which does not appear in the aggregate percen-
tages of Figure 4. The decrease in votes favorable to
criminal defendants in 1968 is, for the same reason,
more impressive than previously indicated since Black’s
pro-defendant voting in Fourth Amendment cases improved
that year.
On the other hand, in spite of the anticipated
effect of search and seizure cases upon the aggregate
pro-defendant statistics, it must also be recognized
that Justice Black's posture in non-search and seizure
cases became progressively more negative after 1963 as
well, promoting an overall change from pro-defendant to
anti-defendant (see Table 7). As a percentage of the
total votes cast, Black’s positive votes in cases other
than search and seizure remained high even in 1964, again
enhancing the significance of the Court's decline; it
then decreased dramatically , reaching its lowest point in
1967, enhancing the Court’s rise. This would suggest a
general phenomenon of an increasing anti-defendant posture
either as a response to specific stimuli in the area of
criminal procedure or as an even more pervasive conser-
191
TABLE 7
PERCENT POSITIVE OF NON-SEARCH AND SEIZURE VOTES
CAST BY JUSTICE BLACK IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES CASES
(1962 to 1968 TERMS)
Number of
Cases
Percent Votes
Positive
1962 21 92
1963 10 100
1964 8 75
1965 14 79
1966 25 76
1967 29 59
1968 25 68
vativ/e turn in all civil liberties cases. Although
many scholars have argued the latter position as opposed
to the former, 226 the two are not incompatible. Whether
the decline in support for criminal defendants was rela-
ted to the overall decline in support for civil liber-
ties or not i and even if the decline in civil liberties
support constituted only the fruition of a trend apparent
226Schubert hypothesizes that the change is both
absolute and relational, a product of cultural obsoles-
cence and biological senescence. Constitutional P olity,
p. 126. Ulmer, on the other hand, offers evidence that
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even while that support was increasing, 227 it must still
be indicated which factors were responsible for the de-
cline or for the trend’s new direction. Although more
will be said of the plausibility of that influence
having been provided by such factors as feedback after
their existence has been established, it should be
noted here that a recent study of Justice Black has
found reason to suspect such influence. 22 ®
Ret roact ivit
y
. Special attention must also be
given to a subset of decisions which seems, at a
glance, to be unlike any other within the compass of
the shift in the late fifties and early sixties was not
a shift in the trend of decisions but merely a continu-
ation. S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Longitudinal Behavior of
Hugo Lafayette Blacki Parabolic Support for Civil Liber-
ties, 1937-1967," unpublished paper presented at the
1970 meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, pp. 15-17*
^^Ulmer, "The Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo
Lafayette Black," p. 22.
99 fl
Ulmer has ruled out the possibility that the
nature of the cases or the mix of the cases might be
responsible for Black's shift and suggests instead that
there may be an identifiable correspondence between
judicial behavior and such environmental factors as
public attitudes. Ibid . , pp. 17-22.
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criminal procedure. This subset is composed of those
fifteen instances in which the Court was asked to con-
sider whether newly formulated constitutional rules
would be applied to cases which had occurred before
the new rule was announced.
Prior to the 1964 Term the Court had always given
new constitutional doctrine full retroactive applicabi-
lity. Thus, when the first announcement of non-retro-
activity was made it was considered "capricious," "shock-
229ing," and "unequal." But in Linkletter v. Walker
(1965) the Court argued that the issues involved are
often not the same as cases in which the rules were
formulated. Consequently, it decided that such cases
were to be judged by criteria different from those which
apply to cases of first instance. The adequacy of these
conclusions will be examined shortly. Regardless of
the merit of its rationale, however, it is apparent
that the Court in 1965 and in all subsequent retroacti-
vity cases considered these criminal procedure issues
differently from others.
229Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress
,
p. 54.
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It has been previously suggested that the dis-
positions of retroactivity cases were often significant
departures from others of the same term. Whereas 72%
of all the 179 decisions handed down by the Court be-
tween 1962 and 1966 were favorable to the defendants,
only 40% of the retroactivity cases were so disposed.
Figure 16 is a scalogram of these decisions showing
SSI’s both for these cases and for the entire universe.
The apparent divergence of attitudes between these two
sets of SSI’s is borne out by a correlation of less than
0.5. It is remarkable, then that unlike other criminal
procedure cases, attitudes toward retroactivity were
almost perfectly consistent. In fact consistency is
even greater than is indicated by the CR and CS, since
the only inconsistent votes are Harlan's, and both came
after an acknowledged reversal of his position. ^30
The effect of these distinct and consistent attitudes
upon the universe is fundamental. While retroactivity
cases constituted only 8% of all the cases, they accoun*
ted for more than 14% of all the inconsistencies (see
Scale #1, Appendix I). Thus, it must be asked whether
^^See Harlan dissenting, 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
p. 258
FIGURE 16. GUTTMAN SCALE GF RETROACTIVITY
DECISIONS (1962-1968 TERMS)
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retroactivity is a subject so divergent from those of
the cases in which the new rules were formulated that
it ought to be excluded from a study of criminal pro-
cedure, But even if it were a separate issue, retro-
activity cases do determine the applicability of criminal
procedures, do involve the same factual situations as the
rule cases, and do delineate nuances between different
protections for the accused. Thus they cannot be ex-
cluded, if only for the sake of logical consistency.
Moreover, it is possible to consider retroactivity as
only another sub-issue--like search and seizure or the
right to counsel--albeit one that is clearly different
from the rest in the extent of negative attitudes and
in the rank ordering of the judges on the attitude dimen-
sion. Thus, there may be something basic about these
decisions which accounts for the apparent difference,
yet shows it to be one of degree rather than one of kind.
It will be argued here that, in addition to involving
separable issues, those retroactivity cases which were
decided against the defendant have been used by the Court
as a means of softening the blows of reform. It has been
seen time and again that the Court's approach to a new
constitutional area is often one of a bold now stroke
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for the extension of personal rights followed by a
series of limiting retreats. It is submitted that
retroactivity cases have often served as a means of
effectuating these retreats; thus they are prime
examples of responses to feedback.
This hypothesis obviously cannot be applied even-
ly to every member of the Court. Justices Douglas and
Black, for example, exhibited perfect pro-defendant
attitudes in retroactivity cases; Justices Harlan and
Stewart had retroactivity SSI's almost identical with
theirs for all criminal procedure decisions. These
men, then, cannot be thought to have used retroactivity
cases in order to appease the Court's critics. Other
members, however, had SSI's which were neither pro-
defendant nor consistent with attitudes in other areas.
For example, while the average deviation in retroactivity
SSI's from SSI's for all criminal procedure decisions was
-.16, the retroactivity SSI's of four members of the Lourt
exceeded this average by more than 10 points: Warshall
(-.44), Warren (-.39), Brennan (-.36), and Fortas (-.26).
If the issue of retroactivity did serve for some as a
political buffer it is most likely that it did so for
these individuals. When they were combined with White
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and Harlan, whose SSI's were the lowest on the Court,
a majority against the application of retroactivity was
not difficult to muster.
If this hypothesis is correct and retroactivity
cases have served as the logical and consistent bases
for retreat, it seems that the Court came upon the notion
suddenly and perhaps unexpectedly in Linkletter
. No
hint of limits upon the application of new constitutional
rules had theretofore been given. Gideon v. Wainwr Iqht
had been granted full retroactivity; 231 Griffin v. Cali-
232
f ornia had been given at least partial retroactivityi
and in Fahy v . C onnect icut the Court had already indica-
ted a willingness to give retroactive application to
Mapp . 233 Since the Linkletter decision initially seems
to deviate from these it is appropriate to examine it
carefully. Unlike the previous cases, the public reac-
tion toward the extension of Mapp to cases long since
23l Pickelseimer v. Wainwriqht , 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
232 382 U.S. 286.
233There
,
in a pre-Mapp case, by considering
whether the error of admitting illegally seized evidence
was "harmless" the Court admitted that it was error
under the fOapp exclusionary rule.
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closed uias undoubtedly anticipated to be negative and
severly critical. Linkletter may thus be considered to
have been either a response to feedback from Mapp
. or a
"feedforward"— the anticipatory disposition of a case
in view of expected responses to a different disposition.
Moreover, although the issue was not a new one when
raised in Linkletter it was different in that the bene-
ficiary of retroactivity would have been a man clearly
guilty of a serious offense. It may bo that the dis-
tinction between cases where guilt is clear and those
where it is not, or where the crime is serious and where
it is not, was a secondary variable which permitted some
members of the Court to decide against retroactive appli-
cation. It was, for whatever reason, a difference which
the Court seized upon and restated again and again.
Prior to Linkletter , while the Court had applied
decisions retroactively in all constitutional cases, it
235
had never addressed itself to the issues involved.
Ulhen it finally did, a number of choices were presented,
234
Linkletter had been convicted of burglary,
Fahy of defacing private property; Linkletter was proved
guilty, Gideon's guilt was in doubt.
235William Van Alstyne, "In Gideon's Wake: Har-
sher Penalties and the 'Successful' Criminal Appellant,"
74 Yale Law Journal 606 (1965), 607, fn. 8.
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each with a degree of difficulty. For the sake of
consistency and for reasons of "practical administra-
tion" always attendant to retroactivity questions, 236
it could have opted to give all decisions purely pro-
spective applicability. This position, taken by such
scholars as Alexander Bickel, would deny the fruits of
the new constitutional doctrine even to the litigants
in the instant case. 2 ^7 But pure prospectivity is not
without serious problems. In the first place the Court
is aware, as is Bickel, that such a stand would serious-
ly stem the flow of challenges to old and potentially
unconstitutional procedures since the benefit of victory
would not be present to serve as incentive. 238 In the
second place, the Court has also acknowledged that
Article III, requiring that decisions bo made only in
concrete cases, precludes pure prospectivity since new
236
Paul Freund, The Supreme Court of the United
States* Its Business. Purposes, and Performance (Cleve-
land
,
Ohio i Meridan, 1961;
,
p. 185.
237Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress
.
p. 57.
238388 U.S. 293, 301 i Bickel, p. 108. See Paul
J. Mishkin, "The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law," 60-61.
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principles could be made only obiter dicta
.
23
^ Finally,
the denial of retroactive application of a rule of con-
stitutional law is soon by many critics to be itself a
violation of constitutional principle. Herman Schwartz,
for example, argues that although the procedures may bo
new insofar as the Court is willing to apply them broadly
or effectively, the constitutional rights they are made
to enforce are not new but are inherent in tradition and
in the basic philosophic principles of the Constitution. 24 ^
The Court has tacitly accepted this argument by basing
241
new rules on historical and philosophical roots, and
by clinging to the notion that there are principles which,
although only recently recognized, are of the "essence
242
of a scheme of ordered liberty."
239388 U.S. 293, 301. See Note, "Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts," 71 Yale Law Journal 907 (1962), 930-33.
240Herman Schwartz, "Retroactivity, Reliability,
and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin," 33
University of Chicaoo Law Review 719 (1966), 749.
241 Ibid ., 750.
242
I bid . , 749.
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Thus, Schwartz would hold all constitutional
decisions to be fully retroactive to the instant liti-
gants, to those whose cases were on appeal at the time,
and to those who chose to attack the validity of their
convictions by writs of habeas corpus. Justices
Black and Douglas were the only members of the Court to
agree with this conclusion, although in the last year
of the Ularren era Justice Fortas moved closer to that
position. On the other hand, it must be said immed-
iately that such a position, appealing though it might
be on grounds of logic and morality, is heir to precisely
the problems Bickel sought to avoid by pure prospectivi-
ty, particularly to the strains retroactivity places
on the legal system. Foremost, perhaps, is the strain
such rulings would have simply by virtue of the number
245
of potential retrials they would necessitate. More-
over, many of those who would be freed without the
o A 3
Herman Schwartz, p. 750.
244
F ortas, dissenting in Desist , would deny retro-
activity only in extreme cases. 394 U • S • 244, 273.
245See Note, "Prospective Overruling," p. 950.
In Gideon, for example, Florida’s brief asked that if
Betts be overruled it be done only prospectively so as
to avoid releasing over 5,000 convicts many of whom could
not be retried without great difficulty. \l an Alstyne,
p. 607.
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likelihood of retrial have been proved guilty by means
other than those now held to be unconstitutional.
Retroactivity would thus have the effect of protecting
the guilty. ^ In the second place, lower courts, prose-
cutors, and police have in most cases placed "good faith”
reliance on decisions now overruled and practices now
defunct. Thus, cases in argument or cases long since
won by prosecutors would be lost simply on the basis
047
of surprise.
Considering the impossibility of pure prospec-
tivity and the problems of full retroactivity some
commentators suggest that the Court play it both ways.
Paul Mishkin, in a subtle and enlightening analysis,
has argued that the Court not consider retroactivity
in cases of first instance and when the issue is raised
In addition, the availability of retrial might
have had an inequitable effect upon those recently con-
victed and those whose convictions were too old to retry.
\l an Alstyne notes that the initial impact of Gideon * s
retroactivity seemed to be most severe to those who could
be retried since they risked greater penalty if reconvic-
ted. Van Alstyne, p. 608. This, of course, is no longer
a problem since North Carolina v. Pearce makes such longer
sentences depend solely upon the individual’s conduct
since the original conviction.
047
Note, "Prospective Overruling," pp. 944-50.
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subsequently to treat it simply as a matter of habeas
corpus discretion* Thus, if a case is heard on direct
appeal it should always be given the benefit of newly
OAQ
announced rules of procedure. On the other hand,
if a case has become final in the sense of having ex-
hausted the means of direct appeal, the question is
really only one of the availability of collateral attack
— particularly of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus relief,
in turn, is discretionary and should be given only in
those instances where there is doubt as to the certainty
of guilt because of the procedures being attacked or
whore federal standards of human dignity and integrity
have been denied by a state. Thus, if the purpose of
the newly announced rule is to assure the integrity of
the guilt-determining process, the writ should be granted
and the litigants should be given retroactive benefit!
but if the purpose of the rule is the assurance of future
observance of individual dignity, a purpose not furthered
by application of the now rule to the litigant, the writ
should be denied.
249 Thus, the matter can theoretically
^ 4 ®T his is so because of fflishkin's belief that
retroactivity is to be preferred if possible. See Wish
kin, pp. 56-72.
249 Ibid., pp. 77-92.
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bo disposed by consistent and objective criteria pro-
tecting the principles of Schwartz and avoiding the
problems envisioned by Bickel. Justice Harlan has shown
250some sympathy for this approach.
The Supreme Court also chose, at least initially,
to adopt a middle position. In Linkletter . the majority
held that Mapp would apply only to cases which were on
direct review at the time the new exclusionary rule was
announced but not to cases which were at that time "final."
The bases for this position were partly those given by
Mishkin, partly those attendant upon full retroactive
application, and partly those resulting from a sudden
concern for the protection of the interests of local
law enforcement communities.
Intending to project specific criteria for the
application of constitutional rulings, the Linkletter
majority rejected a rule of automatic retroactivity on
substantially the grounds already enumerated: the
reliance placed by authorities in the old rule; the ill
effects retroactivity would have upon the administration
of justice; and most importantly, the purpose of the
^^Har lan dissenting in 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
260-69 .
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original ruling and whether that purpose would be
promoted by retroactive application. 251 In the instant
case the Court found reliance on Ulolf to be substantial,
although that finding is open to serious question. 252
Furthermore, the majority yielded to protests that
the effect of retroactive application would bo the flood-
ing of lower courts with appeals of convicts already
shown to be guilty yet many of whom could not be success-
251
381 U.S. 618, 636. These criteria were fully
anticipated by the Yale Law Journal three years before
they were announced. See Note, "Prospective Overruling,"
pp. 942-43.
Oco
°*While the reliance test may well be applied in
non-constitutional cases it is of doubtful value in those
involving constitutional guarantees. Since the state
cannot be said to have an interest in the punishment of
the innocent, reliance on a law which may have that effect
is of little import. The state does have a legitimate
interest in punishment of the guilty. Thus the approp-
riate test is whether the rule promotes the determination
of guilt, not whether the state has relied on a previous
ruling. Michael Chanin, "Comment* Constitutional Rules
of Criminal Procedure and the Application of Linkletter,"
16 Journal of Public Law 193 (1967), pp. 203-04, More-
over, it may well be questioned whether reliance upon a
decision in order to engage in what is clearly illegal
official action deserves such tender treatments as the
Court accords. Herman Schwartz, p. 754,
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fully retried. 253 Finally, the Court argued that the
purpose of fflapp—the deterrence of future illegal police
act ion--would not be furthered by retroactive applica-
tion. This final reason requires further examination.
Adopting the distinction between rules fashioned
to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process and
those which sought to ensure individual dignity, the
Court argued plausibly that the former would benefit
from retroactivity whereas the latter would not. Thus it
381 U.S. 618 (1964), 637-38. It has been argued
that the impact test is also of little utility. In Link-
letter the Court argued that if the impact of retroacti-
vity were severe and yet the rule did not bear on guilt
determination it should not be given retroactive applica-
tion. Ibid . Yet in that instance impact is of little
consequence since the absence of proper purpose is suffi-
cient grounds for the denial of retroactivity. On the
other hand, what if impact is severe and the rule does
bear on guilt as in Gideon? In this case Linkletter would
suggest automatic retroactivity. Again the impact test
is of no use. Chanin, p. 206. On the other hand, in
T ehan
.
the Court suggested a balancing test which achieved
fruition in Johnson . This test would consider the degree
to which the rule bears on guilt determination, and con-
sequently the probable injustice committed under it--
against the impact on the lower courts. Still, the
primary force is the test of purpose, not impact.
254381 U.S. 618 (1964), 636-37.
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created an important, but also an extremely arbitrary,
rule for retroactivity judgments. The Court’s ouin use
of the distinction between guilt determination and human
dignity had not been entirely unambiguous. In Reck v.
Pate
. for example, the Court gave recent confession
standards retroactive application to a case in which
the confession had been "voluntary" by the standards
prevailing at the time it was made, and subsequently was
shown to be reliable. The Gideon rule also was given
retroactive effect in cases where guilt had been proved
beyond doubt. Moreover, the purpose of a Court de-
cision is not always clear. In Griffin v. California
.
for example, Justice Douglas saw the practice of prose-
OC7
cutiorial comment as fatally prejudicial to the accused. J
Mishkin, applying the Court’s Linklett er criteria, agreed
that the basic purpose of Griffin was to protect the
reliability of guilt determination. 2 ®® Yet in T ehan v.
Shott
.
the second use of the Li nkletter test, the majority
255 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
256See Thomas S. Currier, "Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law* Prospective Overruling," 51 Virginia
Law Review 201 (1965), 271.
257 380 U.S. 609 (1965), p. 615
258Mishkin, p. 92.
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found otherwise and refused retroactivity. 259 The
reason, apparently, was that the Court had applied the
test of purpose with somewhat different emphasis in
T ehan than in Linkletter
. In the latter the majority
had been concerned with the purpose of the rule announ-
ced in Mapp i in the former it had looked not to the
purpose of the Griffin rule but to the purpose of the
source from which it came, finding that the Fifth Amend-
ment sought to protect human dignity. 250 Thus, the
subjectivity of the purpose-test was compounded even
further
.
Another problem with the guilt-dignity dichotomy
has been the fact that the Court has often dealt with
both in the same decision. In Cscobedo
,
for example,
although the Court considered in some detail the issue
of coerced confessions, it finally rested the case on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right already
held retroactive in Pickelseimer . But in Johnson v.
New Jersey the Court said that the primary purpose of
259382 U.S. 406 (1966), 419.
25
°I bid
. ,
415.
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Escobedo was not the right to an attorney during inter-
rogation but the protection against self-incrimination,
a purpose not aimed at ensuring guilt determination and
hence not furthered by retroactivity, 261 This weighing
of purposes was a great refinement of Linkletter
. and
narrowed the test considerably. Moreover, since the
majority in Escobedo had expressed great doubt as to
the voluntary-involuntary test of confessions, it may
well be argued that it was indeed concerned with the
263
"fairness of the trial." To the extent that the
Court had sought to preclude the taking of confessions
by coercion it also was casting doubt on the reliability
of convictions taken on the basis of confessions the
264
voluntariness of which could not be truly known.
Indeed, rules against the use of coerced confessions had
specifically been considered to bo automatically retro-
261 384 U.S. 719 (1966), pp. 729-30.
262Furthor refinements include* the balancing
test; the serious flaw tost in Stovall * etc. --all depar-
tures from Linkletter .
263
J. Allen Galbraith, "Comment: Linkletter ,
Shott
.
and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo ," 64
Michigan Law Review 832 (1966), 844-47,
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active in both Linkletter and Tehan
.
265
It would seem,
then, that Johnson was at odds with the basic premises
of Escobedo
. V 0t some critics believe that the Johnson
argument, to the extent that its reliance upon the Fifth
rather than the Sixth Amendment diminished previous
emphasis on the importance of counsel during interro-
gation, was on sounder ground than Escobedo
. They see
Johnson as having drawn a necessary distinction between
the value of counsel for the determination of guilt in
the courtroom and in the stat ionhouse
.
266
But if these
critics are correct, then the Court is in a position
of either having said that interrogation is not as
critical a stage of the criminal process as trial, there-
by contradicting its holding in White v, Maryland , or
having been inconsistent with the application of retro-
265
Ibid .. 834.
266
Enker and Elsen, for example, suggest that
while the presence of an attorney at the trial is essen-
tial to avoid a miscarriage of justice, the presence
of an attorney in the interrogation room may have the
opposite effect. That is, his presence may actually
hinder the discovery of truth more often than not by
inducing guilty defendants who would otherwise volun-
tarily confess to say nothing. S©e Arnold N. Enker and
Sheldon H. Elsen, "Counsel for the Suspect* Massiah
v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois , " 49 Minnesota
Law Review 47 (1964), 65-66.
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267 26 B
activity to Whit
e
and to Gideon
.
In Johnson the Court also refused retroactive
applicability to Miranda v. Arizona because its prime
purpose, like Escobedo * s
.
had been the protection of
individual dignity through the privilege against self-
269incrimination. But the Court had said in Miranda
that the presence of counsel during interrogation "obvi-
ously enhances the integrity of the fact-finding process
270in court." And although the majority had been empha-
tic in saying that there are other safeguards available
to ensure the reliability of confessions, it had been
equally emphatic in saying that these safeguards, with-
out adequate warning of rights to counsel and silence,
271
are merely "empty formalities."
How, then, is the Court to make a subjective
evaluation of "purpose"— or the even more difficult
^^Arsenault v. Massachusetts , 393 U.S* 5 (1968).
2
^®See Herman Schwartz, pp. 734-40; see also
Galbraith, pp. 848-49.
269384 U.S. 719 (1966), 729-30.
270 384 U.S. 436 (1966), p. 466.
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evaluation of "prime purpose"—and still maintain con-
sistency? Why, moreover, should it refuse retroactivity
simply because a decision’s prime purpose is not aimed
at the reliability of guilt determination if a secondary
272purpose does so aim? Finally, if the Court is anxious
to serve the interest of the administration of justice,
why does it compound difficulties with such narrow and
subjective tests?^^^ Hard cases, Holmes pointed out,
make bad—and in this case arbit rary— law
.
These difficulties could hardly have escaped the
notice of the justices, and yet the Court adhered to
the purpose distinction throughout all of its remaining
terms, moving from inconsistency to inconsistency, blur-
27 a
ring the distinctions it had previously made. What
actually seems to have been underlying the distinction,
then, was not the furtherance of the purpose of the new
rule but the fact that the majority—and the public-
entertained doubts about guilt in one instance and not
in another. It is difficult to find a more sensible
explanation for the differentiation made between the non-
^^Herman Schwartz, pp. 761-62.
273
I bid .
.
p. 738.
274
Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress
.
p. 55.
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retroactivity of Miranda
. Escobedo
. Wade and Gilbert
on the one hand, and the retroactivity of Gideon and
ulhj
- tG on thc other. How else can one explain the ruling
io ^ a Hiday v. United States , which denied retroactivity
to McCarthy although the Court had been at pains to
point out the unreliability of guilty pleas and the
subsequent loss of all procedural safe-guards, including
those previously applied retroactively? These inconsis-
tencies were particularly apparent in Desist
. a turning
point for Justices Harlan and Fortas. There, in the
denial of retroactivity to the Katz exclusionary rule,
the capriciousness of the post Linkletter rules was
clear: the basis of Katz
,
which was a belief in the
unsoundness of Qlmst ead and Goldman
.
had long been accepted
by many members of the Court; Katz did not come as a
275
surprise; thus, it was in no sense "new law."
In addition to denying retroactivity to cases not
seeking to perfect the process of guilt determination,
the Court opted in Linkletter to apply Mapp to cases not
yet final but not to those heard on collateral attack.
In so doing it may again be criticized for having created
275
See Justices Harlan and Fortas dissenting,
394 U.S. 244 (1969)
.
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an arbitrary distinction since, given the increasing
availability and use of habeas corpus appeals, "final-
ity" is not at all a self-defining concept. 276 Indeed,
the Court had itself denied any significance to that
277distinction in Fay v. Noia where it had recommended
to the defense that it forego certiorari and apply
278immediately for a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover,
it is also true that the distinction creates a serious
inequity in the fate of defendants merely because the
Court had not made its original decisions concerning the
one until after the conviction of the other had become
279final. According to this argument, limiting retro-
activity because of "finality" is a violation of con-
stitutional principle in just the same way as making a
distinction between the purposes of various rules: it
is a violation of the precept that no one ought to have
fewer constitutional rights than another solely because
276 See Bickel, p. 55.
277 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
278
Herman Schwartz, p. 731.
279 Ibid., p. 733
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his crime uias committed at a different time. 280
On the other hand, it can be argued that this
partial application of retroactivity to cases still
on appeal was consistent with legal precedent, parti-
cularly in civil law. But, although this is the
distinction the Court made with respect to Linkletter
.
it was not one for use in all cases. Reasoning from
the precedent that nonconstitutional cases heard on
collateral attack are not subject to any specific "prin-
ciple of absolute retroactive invalidity" but are to be
judged according to the purpose and effects of the
2 82
statute applied; and from the assumption that there
is no impediment to the use of this rule in constitu-
O Q 'l
tional cases; the majority concluded that in cases
of collateral attack retroactive application is discre-
tionary. Even if the underlying assumption were correct
280Chanin, p. 212. This is very similar to the
arguments presented by Black and Douglas throughout the
retroactivity cases. See dissenting opinions, 381 U.S.
610 (1965).
281 Mishkin, p. 77.
2B2381 U.S. 618 (1964), 627.
283
Ibid.
,
628.
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and the conclusion thus sound, the Linkletter argument
can only justify denial of relief to cases whose con-
victions were final at the time of the constitutional
decision. The disposition of Johnson v. New Jersey
one year later, however, gives lie to the Court’s de-
fense and provides further evidence that it considered
all retroactivity questions to be discretionary. There
it held that Miranda and Escobedo would apply only to
those cases whose trials had commenced after the announce-
ment of the constitutional rules. It is apparent then
that the Court had in fact found no real difference
between direct and collateral attack for purposes of
deciding retroactivity. If that decision is fully dis-
cretionary then one might well ask why it provided for
any retroactivity in Linkletter . To say that Article
III commands it is somewhat shallow in view of the fact
that in some cases the Court has announced non-retro-
activity simultaneously with the announcement of a new
o Q A
rule. The only reason, then, seems to be the F ahy
precedent. Perhaps the Court had wished to restrict
retroactivity as severely in Linkletter and T ehan as it
later did in Johnson but was precluded from doing so
by its own prior action in Fahy and 0 * C onnor . Thus,
284See 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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it might well be asked again why it provided retro-
activity in F ahy and not in Linkletter i or in Mapp and
not in Linkletter
. Ulhat prompted the use of discretion
to reach one conclusion and then to reach another
inconsistent with the first? It may be that Fahy and
Mapp were decided when issues of "practical administra-
tion" were not as pressing as during the 1964 Term. It
may be that some members of the Court changed their minds
in response to the arguments of their brethren. Or it
may be that the severity of the response to Escobedo and
Miranda was so great as to induce the change from Link-
letter . In any event it is clear that Johnson deviated
285
sharply from Linkletter and was far less defensible.
The "arbitrariness-inconsistency” argument is
strengthened with the decision of Jenkins v. Delaware ,
two years after Johnson . There the Court held that
retrials begun after Miranda was announced would not be
covered by that decision if the original trial had
occurred before Miranda
.
As Harlan pointed out in dis-
285
See "The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,"141. See
also Bickel
,
p. 56. It is ironic that the trial cutoff
is more appropriate for T ehan where official misconduct
occurred at the trial, and the "finality of appeal
cutoff more appropriate for Miranda and Escobedo where
the official misconduct occurred before the trial.
Herman Schwartz, p. 767.
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sent, not only uias this inconsistent with Linkletter
since the appeal had not been final, it was also incon-
sistent with Johnson to the extent that a retrial is
no more an ongoing part of a trial than is an appeal. 207
The most apparent inconsistency, however, came in Stovall
v. Denno (1967) where the Court refused to apply the
Wade-Gilbert rule to any previous case. Recognizing no
distinction between convictions then "final" and convic-
tions on review or even still at trial, the Court fash-
ioned a rule of complete prospectivity with the exception
of the instant cases. This conclusion bears no relation
to the Linkletter defense nor to the criteria of any
other case} subject to all the criticisms raised, the
Stovall disposition appears to have been almost whimsical
In sum, then, the Court has never given adequate
explanation of the difference between "final" cases and
"cases on appeal" as the basis for a distinction of retro
activity; nor particularly between "cases on appeal" and
the immediate rule-making case. The use of the distinc-
tion without any theoretical underpinning is thus arbi-
trary and has produced gross inconsistencies. In addi-
288 Justice Harlan dissenting, 395 U.S. 213, 222.
287
See Smith v. Yeager. 393 U.S. 122 (1968).
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tion, that distinction has further compounded the
judgmental difficulties of the lower courts beyond even
the grave problems of differentiating between the pur-
poses of a case. Again, this is at odds with a stated
concern for the administration of justice. Finally, the
distinction between rules promoting the integrity of the
fact-finding process and those promoting individual
dignity have been found to be often artificial, are
extremely difficult to determine, and have produced con-
sequent inconsistencies. In fact, the decision of
whether or not to grant retroactivity cannot be said to
have ever depended upon concern for the integrity of the
288fact-finding process.
Yet, despite the fact that retroactivity cases
have been arbitrarily decided, are doctrinally incon-
sistent with one another, and att itudinally inconsistent
with other criminal procedure cases, there is still a
remarkable attitudinal consistency among them. The
factor arbitrarily selected and responsible for this
seeming anomaly was stated by the Court in Stovall and
may provide a common thread for all the retroactivity
cases! a concern for the burdens of the administration
288Bickel, p. 56.
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of justice. During an era uihen the Court’s bold
decisions have rolled back the limits of the Bill of
Rights in spite of difficulties, anxieties, and hos-
tilities created thereby for lower courts and law
enforcers, it is surprising that the Court would now
permit such considerations to prompt such a deviant con-
clusion.
Even if the Court were taken at its word that the
L inkletter-T ehan test was an effort to apply retroactiv-
ely only those rules whose purpose would be furthered by
retroactive application; even if it were accepted that
the distinction between rules assuring the integrity
of guilt determination and rules assuring human dignity
could be made; and even if the subsequent application
of the Linkletter distinction between "final" and "direct
appeal" cases were consistent; it would still seem to be
more than coincidence that the rules also specifically
served to apply retroactively only those decisions which
had not met with great disapproval. Indeed, each of the
instances in which retroactivity was refused involved
extremely controversial decisions, while none of those
permitting retroactivity did. All but three of the
289388 U.S. 293 (1967), 299-300.
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cases in which retroactivity was denied concerned pre-
vious decisions imposing restrictions on police prac-
, . 290ticesj on the other hand, none of those in which
retroactivity was granted involved such restrictions. 291
It has been suggested by one observer that the reason
for the differentiation of retroactivity may be the
extremity of the effects of the rule-making case. 292
Thus, one reason for the granting of retroactivity to
G ideon and recent confession cases, regardless of whether
290Tehan, denying retroactivity to the Griffin
rule proscribing prosecutorial comment about the failure
of a defendant to take the witness stand; DeStefano
.
denying retroactivity to Duncan and Bloom which had
demanded jury trials in cases of serious criminal con-
tempt; and Halliday which denied retroactivity to the
McCarthy rule restricting the judge’s discretion in the
acceptance of "guilty pleas."
291
Although three did involve prior restrictions
on prosecuting attorneys: Beroer and Roberts applied
retroactively the decisions in Barber v. Paqe and Bruton
v. United States which had restricted prosecutors from
using the testimony of unproduced witnesses; A rsenault
v. Massachusetts applied Whit
e
v. Maryland retroactively,
a decision guaranteeing the right to counsel at prelimi-
nary hearings.
292
Galbraith, fn. 38 and accompaning text.
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guilt had bean verified or whether the subsequent cases
were heard on direct or collateral attack, was that
these decisions were neither sudden nor unexpected nor
controversial. Thus, in Reck and Pickelseimer the Court
gave retroactive application without discussing effects.
On the other hand, when faced with cases like Mapp and
Griffin where the suddenness of the rule produced sur-
prise and controversy, the Court sought to fashion a
rationale for decision on the basis of public reaction.
Also of significance is the fact that public
hostility had been least in those areas involving the
equal application of constitutional guarantees to indi-
gents and the proscription of practices which may have
included third degree tactics. In spite of assurances
by the Court that retroactivity does not depend upon the
particular right at issue, it is instructive that all
of the cases in which retroactivity was granted were
purely Sixth Amendment cases, while the same is true of
294
only one of those in which retroactivity was denied.
Indication of political bases for the refusal to
grant retroactivity can also be found in the decisions
293
384 U.S. 719 (1966), 728.
294
392 U.S. 631 (1968)
.
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themselves
. Noting the likely impact of retroactive
application of an originally unpopular decision, Wish-
kin believes that Linkletter may have been written to
obviate strong opposition to Mapp and other recent de-
cisions favoring criminal defendants. To support this
thesis he points out that in oral argument the Court
had solicited from the National District Attorney's
Association, amicus curiae
,
statistics of the large
number of New York prisoners who would have been able
to seek retrial under a retroactive application of
295Ma pp , Presumably, if the number were large and the
decision were made retroactive the Court would be vul-
nerable to the popular charge that it was releasing
criminals on legal technicalities. Many critics have
suggested that Johnson was also the product of such an
ulterior motive: a desire not to frighten the public
with the spectre of emptying the jails of convicted
murderers and rapists. The validity of such a sugges
tion is enhanced by the rather disingenuous reliance the
majority opinion placed upon the number of guilty priso-
295Mishkin, p. 71, fn. 51.
296 See Anthony Lewis, "Earl Warren," p. 25;
Sheldon, Politicians in Robes , p. 33.
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ners who might be freed under a retroactive holding, 297
There is, moreover, ample precedent for such a
political use of judicial discretion. Mishkin and
Morris have found, for example, that state court hold-
ings of prospectivity in certain tort immunity cases
could best be explained in such terms. Thus, once hav-
ing announced a new rule of immunity, the courts sought
to reduce public and legislative opposition by limiting
998the extent of its applicability. This example of
anticipatory feedback is suggestive of a similar use
of discretionary authority by the Supreme Court to avoid
antagonizing the administrators of criminal justice. It
is also true, of course, that when the Court denies ret-
roactivity in one area because of its potentially severe
impact on lower courts, it encourages those courts to
refuse retroactivity in still other areas. Thus, one of
the reasons for the Johnson decision was the fact that
297 384 U.S. 719 (1966), 731j see Herman Schwartz,
pp. 767-68.
290Mishkin, fn. 50; see Paul J. Mishkin and
Clarence Morris, On Law in Courts* An Introduction to
Judicial Development of Case and Statute Study (Mineola
,
N .
Y
,
i
Foundation Press, 1966) , pp. 315-17.
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most state and federal judges had anticipated it by
denying retroactivity to Escobedo
. This was obviously
feedback in the sense that the potential hostility of
a decision overturning these dispositions was indi-
299
catedj but it was feedback of a self-generating
nature since the Linkletter and T ehan cases had served
to encourage such lower court action.
On the other hand, Mishkin points out that such
an obvious use of discretionary power as a means of
responding to feedback and of generating feedback which
cculd bo responded to, serves to undermine the Black-
stonian myth of impartiality and objectivity so impor-
tant to the preservation of public acceptance of Court
decisions. This is the case in Linkletter and Sch-
wartz makes the same point with reference to the even
302
more apposite example of J ohns on . But Mishkin also
allows that the recently diminished power of such Black-
2
^Charnin, p. 851.
300
Ibid
.
.
p. 842, fn. 68.
301
Mishkin, p. 69.
302Herman Schwartz, pp. 767-68.
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stonian symbolism and a growing cynicism toward the
Court as an institution is partially a product of spe-
cific Court decisions. This being the case, the
utilization of Linklett or and Johnson as strategic
retreats from the effects of Mapp
,
Escobedo
.
and Miranda
may have aided in building confidence which in turn may
have permitted a return to such symbols. Although he
is quite opposed to a general rule of prospectivity,
Mishkin himself recognized the potential of a rule of
prospectivity on public attitudes when he turned his
attention to the "functional effects'* of such a rule.^ 4
Since, as Cohen has noted, the existence of a law pro-
motes a normative commitment to it, overruling a law
is always generative of opposition for those seeking to
preserve the status quo . Giving a new rule retroactive
305
effect compounds that opposition.
30
^Mishkin, p. 68.
304
Ibid., pp. 70-72.
305
Ibid.
,
p. 71.
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\l. CONCLUSIONS
Overt changes in Court behavior from a posture
favorable to defendants to one favorable to the govern-
ment and vice versa are not perfectly apparent, before
concluding that an alteration in aggregate statistics
from one year to the next reflects conscious choices
by individual members, one must consider a number of
extrinsic factors: additions of personnel, changes in
the nature of the cases being appealed to the Court,
and--perhaps most important--the extension of some
procedural rights to their logical limits. Each of these
factors may make suspicions of yearly shifts less empiri-
cally verifiable. Yet, however imprecise such indica-
tors may be, the existence of change can be determined
and when found makes pertinent the examination of the
potential causes of the change. On the basis of the
foregoing analysis of the Supreme Court's decisional
behavior in the area of criminal procedure for the seven
terms from 1962 to 1968 and for particular kinds of cases
within those terms, several conclusions have been reached
as to the nature of the changes and several hypotheses
made as to the reasons for them.
Examination of gross dispositional and voting data
229
found a rough cyclical pattern over the period studied.
Upon closer investigation, these cycles uiere found to
bo most pronounced in four terms: 1963 and 1964, 1967
and 1968, It uias in these terms that attitude changes
were most apparent and that alterations in voting align-
ments were most severe. Given the systems model and its
corresponding assumptions, hypothesis #1 may be refined
in light of those findings to suggest that the Court's
shifts in 1964 and 1968 were responses to high levels
of negative feedback, and in 1963 and 1967 were responses
to positive feedback or at least the absence of negative
feedback. Individual members of the Court have apparent-
ly responded to such feedback in different ways. While
some such as Douglas maintained highly stable positions
throughout, others like Warren and Brennan fluctuated
widely? still others remained stable for a time and then
deviated suddenly, as did Stewart in 1967, often being
primarily accountable for the Court's overall movement.
It has also been shown that in addition to yearly
retreats, some individual cases probably have served as
the means for redressing political imbalances. If, in
a year of generally pro-defendant decisions the Court
held in one case that the permissible area of action
230
open to the police or prosecutors or lower courts ought
to be expanded in a significant way, that single finding
may have adequately assuaged the critics of the remain-
der of the decisions. While such cases can be found in
any area of concern to the Court, there are two sub-areas
in particular in which single-case retreats are most
likely to be found* search and seizure, and retroactiv-
ity, Although they comprise only 36^ of the total number
of cases in the universe studied, they account for 66%
of those decided against the defendant. In addition to
their unusually negative character, these areas have
been found to have several significant commonalities.
In both search and seizure cases and in those retro-
activity cases not involving purely the right to counsel,
the guilt of the defendant was usually not in dispute.
This fact alone may have given a majority of the Court
sufficient rationalization to be persuaded by attitudes
different from those expressed in other kinds of cases.
Certainly the Court has relied on that difference in
both areas to justify its conclusions. lYloreover, since
these cases have preponderantly involved restrictions
on police methods which have aided in the demonstration
of guilt—albeit at the expense of human dignity—they
231
are the most likely ones to have been the subjects of
negative feedback from those sources which have the
greatest effect, namely law enforcement officials and
legislatures. Thus, two further hypotheses may be
stated: In order to placate particularly hostile and
influential publics and thus to protect institutional
hegemony some members of the Court have made political
usage (l) of search and seizure cases, others (2) of
retroactivity determination cases. In the former,
these members have responded to feedback not only against
other search and seizure cases but to overlapping feed-
back in other areas as well; in the latter, they have
responded to feedback against the rule-making cases, to
overlapping feedback, and to anticipated feedback against
the alternative positive retroactive dispositions. Most
public criticism of the criminal procedure cases during
the Warren ora has centered, as we shall see, around two
complaints: that the Court had been "handcuffing the
police" and that it had been emptying the jails of
guilty convicts. It is submitted that in a more or less
conscious way, members of the Court used search and
seizure decisions to satisfy the proponents of the first,
and retroactivity decisions to reassure those of the
second
.
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Clearly the foundations of these hypotheses are
not altogether clear. They are speculations based upon
an examination of the Court’s record from 1962 to 1968,
a record which is itself at times ambiguous. Supporting
evidence is to be found for the hypotheses in the opin-
ions themselves, in the relationships and inconsisten-
cies among different dispositions and in the relation-
ships of individual attitudes and individual behavior.
More will be said of this evidence later. First, however,
we shall examine the feedback to which the Court is be-
lieved to have responded.
PART THREE
FEEDBACK TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURES DECISIONS
Feedback to the Ularren Court's criminal proce-
dures decisions seems neither to have been immediate
nor initially negative. Opposition did, however, in-
crease rapidly during the last years of Warren's tenure
to a point where there was serious doubt as to whether
the bulk of the Court’s decisions— or, indeed, even its
appellate jurisdict ion--could survive intact. Even be-
fore the attack had reached its zenith two eminent
students of the Supreme Court found the storm so severe
as to compare it to the broils of the later Marshall
>1
period
.
The crisis between the Court and its publics was
prompted by several factors* traditions of ''vigilant ism,
suspicions of "legal technicalities," tensions of feder-
alism. 2 The justices clearly had adopted a preference,
A
See Alpheus Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft
to Warren, pp. 243-44; Fred Rodell, "It is the Earl Warren
Court." New York Times Magazine (March 13, 1966), p. 3C.
2Leo Pfoffer , "Justice for the Accused," The Nat-
ion
.
Vol. 203, No. 11 (October 10, 1966), p. 353.
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far ahead of the national consensus, that the protection
of human dignity and the insurance of equality under the
law were goals preferable even to the punishment of the
guilty, When the rights being asserted were those to
basic legal representation, to equal protection for the
poor, or against physical coercion in the taking of
evidence, such lofty ideals often found a sympathetic
audience; when they began to protect the admittedly
guilty from the use of sound evidence, both the degree
of sympathy and the size of the audience waned consider-
ably, And just as there is a "breakage effect" in public
electoral behavior, so there seems to have been a cumula-
tive tendency to join the bandwagon of Court-baiters in
identifying the villain responsible for perceived crime
rates.
The revolution in criminal procedure did not, of
course, occur as an isolated aberration of civil liber-
tarian sentiment. In fact, in nearly all cases of indi-
vidual rights the Court was foregoing new constitutional
protections. From the 1962 to the 1966 Term an average
of 76% of all civil liberties cases were decided in favor
^ I bid . , p. 354
,
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of the individual
, 4% more than in criminal procedures.
Robert McCloskey suggests a correspondence between this
protective "will-t o-govern" and a growing sense of judi-
cial self-confidence.^ Assuming McCloskey is correct
and assuming the validity of the hypothesis concerning
cumulative negative feedback, the question for the stu-
dent of judicial politics is whether that confidence was
grounded in an unrealistic appraisal of public attitudes,
whether the Court was gambling that its publics would
g
eventually accept its new directions, or whether it
had simply turned a deaf ear to even its most vocal
critics. The question may become easier to answer after
the dimensions of feedback are more clearly elucidated.
I. Sources of Feedback, 1962-1968
The types, sources, and degrees of feedback to
the Warren Court’s pro-defendant decisions run the entire
gamut suggested in Part One. Of initial interest are
^Schubert, Constitutional Polity , p. 50.
5Robert McCloskey, "Reflections on the Warren
Court," in Herbert Jacob, ed., Law, Politics, and the
Federal Courts (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1967),
p. 176.
6 Pfeffer, p. 354.
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those "internal" sources closest to the Court--the legal
fraternity
.
Perhaps more than any other area of litigation,
in criminal cases lower courts have extremely wide lati-
tude to reinterpret, evade, and generally refuse full
compliance with Supreme Court directives. This became
apparent with the first major controversial decision
the Warren Court made in the area. Paul Sanders found,
for example, that of 58 lower federal court citations
of Mallory
.
23 distinguished it while only three held
it as controlling. In his examination of the initial
impact of Mapp v. Ohio
.
David Manwaring similarly dis-
covered several state courts refusing to recognize it as
a constitutional mandate, attempting to distinguish it,
or stretching the loophole perceived in Ker to propor-
Q
tions altogether inconsistent with Mapp . Pennsylvania
courts attempted to avoid the impact of Gideon v. Wain-
wriqht by accepting as valid very doubtful waivers of
^Paul H. Sanders, "The Warren Court and the Lower
Federal Courts," in John Schmidhauser , ed . , Constitu-
tional Law in the Political Process (Skokie, 111.: Rand
McNally
,
1963 ) , p"I 430
.
8David Manwaring, "The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio ,"
in Everson, The Supreme Court as Policy Maker , pp. 8-10.
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counsel. Nor wore such evasions the only vehicles of
primary internal feedback. Opinions of lower court
judges in cases subsequently appealed to the Supremo
Court were often used as moans of information. Thus,
Judge Gibson of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit announced in an opinion subsequently
appealed to the Supreme Court his dissatisfaction with
"technical" Supreme Court decisions which "chip away"
1 0
at police efficiency and make life easy for the criminal.
Secondary internal feedback has also boon manifest
in the period under examination. Such professional asso-
ciations as the Conference of Chief Justices, the National
Association of Attorneys General, and the National Asso-
ciation of District Attorneys gave increasing attention
to criminal procedures decisions during the 1960's. The
role of such groups in providing criticism of Supreme
Court rulings and the Court's obligation to pay them heed
has long been recognized by the justices. Other, loss
g
"The Supremo Court, 1963 Term," 78 Harvard Law
Review 143 (November, 1964), 187.
10Quoted in Justice Black's dissenting opinion,
Spinell
i
v. United States , 393 U.S, 410, 433.
^Justice Brennan provided the state Chief Jus
ticos with such assurances at their annual mooting in
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formal interest groups, such as Fred Inbau's "Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement” organized in 1967, have
been generated by the Court’s decisions, 12 Well-placed
individuals within the legal fraternity may also provide
feedback as, for example, former NADA President Garrett
Byrne’s declaration that the Supreme Court’s criminal
1 3decisions were "destroying the nation,"
External feedback to the criminal procedures deci-
sions was even more varied and intense than internal.
The response of law enforcement officials in implementing
the announced protections for suspects was most often
predictably poor. Since there is probably greater dis-
cretion at the hands of the police than any other public
servant of comparable bureaucratic level, the effects
of such negative responses are of even greater signifi-
cance to the success of Court directives than are lower
1964. See William Brennan, "Some Aspects of Federalism,
Proceedings: 16th Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Chief Justices. 1946 (Chicago! Council of State Govern-
ments
,
1965)
,
pp. 6"2-63
,
^Wasby, p. 78.
l3Yale Kamisar, "When the Cops Were Not 'Hand-
cuffed,'" New York Times Magazine . November 7, 1965,
p. 34.
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1 4
court practices. Rising rates of crime and declining
rates of clearance are, to the policeman, points of
great frustration which are, in turn, manifested by
negativ/e attitudes toward the courts. There has been
a noticeable tendency in police circles to blame court-
sanctioned restrictions on police investigative discre-
tion for the subsequently perceived legal protection
of the criminal. 16
Although it is difficult to trace the impact of
Court decisions on police conduct, there is some evidence
available from well-placed observers and from scattered
empirical investigations. 16 Implementation of Mapp v.
1 4
James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.
36-38, 48-50 j Fred Graham, "The Court May Propose but
the Police Dispose," New York T imes , editorial, Decem-
ber 1, 1968, p. 9E
.
1 5
Crime and Justice in America , p. 18.
1
6
Beaney and Beiser found the "well-placed obser-
ver" method one of the few suitable for pursuing enforce-
ment of school prayer decisions. Beaney and Beiser,
"Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engle and Schempp
on the Political Process," p. 21.
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Ohio
,
for example, has been found to be quite poor.
Although New York Police Commissioner Michael Murphy
assured the public of a "good-faith effort to conform
to this new interpretation of the Constitution," 17 there
seemed little change in police habits. In San Francisco
only seventeen search warrants were issued in 1966 al-
though almost thirty thousand serious crimes were report-
1 8
ed ; until Chimel police commonly evaded Mapp by arrest-
ing suspects in the area where search was desired and
then searching it incident to arrest. 13 Recent studies
have found that police attitudes toward Miranda were
20
overwhelmingly negative and that its specific require-
ments have been evaded with some regularity. Yet, in
l7Michael J. Murphey, "Problems of Compliance by
the Police," in Jahnige and Goldman, p. 354.
10 Graham, New York Times . December 1, 1968, p. 9E
.
19395 U.S. 752, 767.
^ 0Neal Milner, "Comparative Analysis of Patterns
of Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions* 'Miranda'
and the Police in Four Communities," 5 Law and Society
Review 119 (1970), 126.
21
Michael S. UJald, et al., "Interrogations in
New Haven* The Impact of Miranda ." in Becker pp. 154-
57.
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spite of the obvious frustration to Supreme Court inten-
tions which such police actions pose, it may be argued
that this "slippage" has been a blessing in disguise.
Not only does the failure of enforcement inform the
Court as to the attitudes of law enforcement officials
but it has also served to forestall major confrontation
between the police and the Court. This, of course, is
essentially the "systems" argument upon which the feed-
back model is ultimately based: feedback, including
noncompliance, is a normal product of decisions and an
essential factor in facilitating the persistence of the
system
.
Another source of external feedback--less dis-
cernible for the Court but perhaps even more important
than police compliance— is public opinion. Not only is
diffuse support critical in prompting compliance with
23decisions in the absence of specific support, or use-
ful in fostering specific support where there would not
otherwise be a basis for it, 24 it is also an essential
22Graham, Self Inflicted Wound , p. 151.
23
Robert H. Birkby, "The Supreme Court and the
Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the •Schempp' Deci-
sion," in Becker, p. 114.
24Kenneth Dolbeare, "The Supreme Court and the
States: From Abstract Doctrine to Local Behavioral
Conformity," ibid . , p. 207.
242
element in the law enforcement process described above.
Klonoski and Mendelsohn, considering the breadth and
complexity of local political subsystems, have found it
useful to adopt the notion of "community satisfaction"
in regarding the effective enforcement of Supreme Court
25decisions. For example, since the exclusionary rule
is effective to the extent that litigation is finalized
by the Court, the goal of insuring fair practices in
searches can be achieved by its application. But if to
do so offends the community such that its demands upon
the police encourage noncompliance with other decisions
there may be a net loss for the Court. Public opinion
can thus bo an important variable in the totality of
law enforcement compliance.
The assessment of "community satisfaction" is,
on the other hand, a very difficult task and one which
the Supreme Court cannot perform directly. Instead, the
justices must rely on such indicators of public sentiment
as newspaper opinions, reported rates of compliance, and
perhaps even Congressional statements of constituency
attitudes. Occasionally, a national poll is available
^Klonoski and Mendelsohn, "The Allocation of
Justice: A Political Approach," p. 336.
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as a more accurate measure of support. Such polls show
that general public dissatisfaction with the Court’s
criminal procedure decisions occurred quite late. Even
after Mapp and Escobedo
.
Kenneth Dolbeare concluded that
such criminal decisions were too far removed from the
public to create much disfavor. Yet Gallup polls
indicate that while there was substantial support for
pro-defendant decisions even as late as the Spring of
1965, support was quickly and steadily eroded over the
next four years (see Table 8). The sudden increase of
20% in the differential between "not enough" and "about
right" responses from April to August of 1965 probably
reflects a delayed response to the 1963 Term. The 1964
Term, as noted earlier, was generally much less pro-defen-
dant than the norm for the seven-year period. Thus it
seems unlikely that changes in public attitudes would
result from that Term's decisions. It is more plausible
that attitude changes were stimulated by gradual reali-
zation of the paths the Court had cut the Term before,
particularly in such cases as Malloy . Jackson , Aguilar ,
and Escobedo. The 18% differential increase between
26
Kenneth Dolbeare, "The Public Views the Supreme
Court,” in Jacob, Law, Politics, and the Federal C ourts
,
p. 211.
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February 1968 and February 1969 might have been a case-
specific response to such 1967 Term decisions as Katz*
Marchett i
. or Wit hersooon » an issue-specific response
to the Term as a whole? or even a delayed response to
Miranda
.
The most visible and potentially powerful source
of external feedback is surely Congress. The resources
of a displeased legislature to coerce or persuade the
Court to alter its direction are considerable. Negative
feedback by way of legislation or proposed legislation,
confirmation struggles, even public statements of key
legislators, is of great salience to the Court. In addi-
tion, close examination of Congressional reaction to the
Court may provide a better view of constituency attitudes
and consequently of public opinion. On the other hand,
measures of Congressional attitudes are rough and often
misleading. The one used here, for example—the per-
centage anti-Court of all legislation introduced— does
not suggest the actual size of anti-Court factions in
Congress, the intensity of their opposition, nor often
even the precise object of their displeasure. Thus,
conclusions drawn from relative number of bills intro-
|
duced in Congress can only be tentative and must bo
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TABLE 8
GALLUP OPINION POLLS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DECISIONS
Question t "Do you
enough
think that courts
with criminals?"
deal too harshly
Responses T oo
Harshly
Not Harshly
Enough
About
Right
No
Opinion
A pr
. ,
1965 2% 48% 34% 16%
Aug
. ,
1965 2% 60% 26% 12%
Feb., 1968 2% 63% 19% 16%
Feb., 1969 2% 75% 13% 10%
Source: Gallup Opinion Index (Princeton, New Jersey),
September 1965, Report #4, p, 22; March 1969, Report
#45, p. 12.
supplemented by less quantitative, loss "objective"
information
.
Nearly every Supreme Court decision of major
import produces legislative proposals from some quarter
27
in Congress designed to overrule or alter it. The
first such general attack during the Warren era in the
27
Wasby, p* 5.
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criminal procedures area was produced by Mallory and
took the form of a bill which simply would have altered
the statute upon which the decision rested. While
such case-specific legislation is not unusual, much
Congressional feedback is less clearly defined. Figure
17 shows trends in proposed anti-Court legislation which
could be classified as either issue-specif ic--i ,e
.
,
attacks specifically upon criminal procedure decisions—
or diffuse. The latter typically included qualifications
for appointment, limitations upon judicial review, Con-
gressional vetoes over the Court, with no reference to
the cases which prompted them (see Appendix IV).
Generally, the percentage of negative issue-
specific legislation introduced remained fairly constant
until after 1966, with no apparent relationship either
to antecedent or to subsequent Court action. Congress
does not seem to have responded to the Court--as indica-
ted by the rise in proposed legislation in 1963 follow-
ing a rather benign 1962 Term— nor does the Court appear
to have responded to Congress--the 1963 Term was quite
28
See James E . Hogan and Joseph M. Snee, "The
McNabb-Mallory Rules Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 Georgetown Law Journal 1 (1958).
Percentage
Anti-Court
of
Total
Bills
Proposed
247
FIGURE 17. TRENDS IN ANTI-CUURT
LEGISLATION, 1962-1969*
Nt
issue m 22 21 24 43 60
actively pro-defendant in spite of an increase in anti-
criminal procedure decision sentiment. On the other
hand, there does seem to bo a relationship between the
actions of Congress and the Court after 1966. Following
the Court's most liberal term, Congress responded in
Note in 1962 issue-specific proposals are less than 0% of
total. This is due to the absense of anti-Court measures
and the presence of one bill offering positive support.
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1968 with a high level of negative feedback; following
that reaction the Court retreated in its 1968 Term,
prompting a leveling-off in the amount of issue-specific
legislation. Two conclusions seem plausible: first,
issue-specific feedback appears to have been cumulative
in nature throughout the period under examination; second,
if this is true, there seems to be some support for the
hypothesized relationship between negative feedback and
subsequent Court decisions once feedback was sufficiently
great to have posed a threat.
In the case of diffuse negative feedback shifts
are more easily discerned and the model fares even bet-
ter. As the Court's 1963 Term became highly pro-defen-
dant, Congress in 1964 took a more anti-Court posture;
the Court retreated in its 1964 Term and the number of
anti-Court bills subsided in 1965; pro-defendant dispo-
sitions remained sufficiently low in the 1965 and 1966
Terms to maintain relative Congressional neutrality in
1966 and 1967; perhaps as a response to that security
the Court produced its most pro-defendant term in 1967
which was succeeded by an equally dramatic upsurge in
diffuse negative feedback; in the face of such a reaction
the Court once again retreated, followed by a marked
249
decline in anti-Court legislation in 1969. The only
notable exception to close adherence to the model seems
to have occurred in the Court's 1963 Term which increas-
ed in liberal activity after Congress had increased
its level of both diffuse and issue-specific negative
feedback. An explanation might be found in the salience
of criminal procedure decisions relative to other cases
of which the Court was disposing. In 1963 Congress had
given a far more hostile reception to the dispositions
of school prayer and reapportionment cases than to those
involving the rights of criminal defendants. It is
possible that the Court was simply misled as to the
strength of opposition to the criminal procedures deci-
sions
.
One outstanding impediment to drawing conclusions
of support for the model is the problem of relating pro-
posed legislation to Court decisions in immediate circum-
stances. Although the Court does seem to have responded
to Congressional action, it might be argued that such
action may not properly be labeled feedback, since one
cannot be certain that legislat ion--part icularly diffuse
legislation—has been a response to specific Court de-
cisions. Support for such a position may be found in
the fact that the bulk of Court decisions comes late in
250
the Spring of its term, while most legislation is pro-
posed between January and Mayj thus what appears to be
legislative feedback may be generated before the Court
has acted. Two points might serve to counter such an
argument. In the first place, as discovered by Beaney
and Beiser, Congressional hostility to a decision is a
product not only of antecedent action but also of what
the Court is expected to do in the future. 29 This is
the "feedforward" phenomenon described earlier. Second-
ly, just as the Court seems to respond not to specific
bills but to a general sense of Congressional attitude,
so Congress may be responding to a general posture of
the Court rather than to specific decisions. Nonethe-
less, it must be conceded that whatever conclusions are
drawn from these data remain speculative. Thus in exam-
ining yearly feedback substantial attention will be given
to the concerns and apparent attitudes of Congress as
suggested in public statements and in legislative efforts.
A final form of external feedback which will re-
ceive somewhat perfunctory treatment is executive-based
response. The bills just considered were in many cases
29
Beaney and Beiser, p. 23.
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initiated by the Executive, in some instances for pur-
poses which wore specifically anti-Court. It is thus
interesting to note that the years of greatest negative
feedback from Congress are years of Presidential elec-
tions. On both occasions the Court’s criminal cases
were a major campaign issue. Perhaps of greatest feed-
back significance is the degree of executive willingness
to give official support to the Court or its specific
opinions, such as President Kennedy's response to the
first School Prayer decision. As shall be seen, the
Warren Court suffered from an absence of such support
in the cases under examination here, and was, in fact,
given overt negative support by the executive in the
final year of its tenure. As Tanenhaus has argued,
although the Court might maintain an unpopular position
when political power is fact ionalized , when the execu-
tive and legislative branches coalesce in opposition
as in 1968-1969 it is unlikely that the Court can con-
30
tinue its course and emerge unscathed.
Tfi
Joseph Tanenhaus, "Judicial Process: Juci-
cial Review," International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences
,
Vol. 8, 303j 305-06.
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II. Yearly Feedback
1962
. The origin of the modern revolution in
criminal procedures can be marked perhaps as early as
1932 with Powell v. Alabama 31 or as late as 1961 with
Wapp v. Ohio
. It must certainly be recognized that the
Court had initiated major protections for criminal
defendants prior to the 1962 Term, most notably in the
32
rights of indigents to adequate representation, and
33the use of coerced confessions. Thus, the actions of
the Court's critics in 1962 were based upon antecedent
decisions as well as upon an informed prophecy as to
what could be expected in the future.
The most visible decision which provoked response,
perhaps because of its immediacy, perhaps because of
its import, was Mapp . It might plausibly be asserted
that as a single disposition, Mapp constituted a greater
limitation upon the police and a greater threat to the
31 287 U.S. 45, (1932)
.
32Qriffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956) j Copp-
edqe v. U . 5 . , 369 U .ITT 438 ("1962).
33
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); F ikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 ( 1957 ) ; Mai lory v. U .
5
. ,
354 U.S.
449 (1957 ) j 5 pano v. New York , 360 U.S. 315 (1959)} R oqers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 ( 1961)
.
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law enforcement community than any other criminal pro-
•7 L
cedure decision before or since. Yet the actual feed-
back from that internal source seems not to hav/e been
particularly negative. Stuart Nagel, in a questionnaire
submitted to police chiefs, judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and ACLU officials, found no substantial neg-
ative attitudes concerning the decision. Most respon-
dents felt that federal and state rules governing the
permissibility of searches should be identical and that
the exclusion of even reliable evidence produced by
35illegal means was socially desirable. Such attitudes
were extant before and after Mapp . suggesting that, at
least in immediate effect, the decision had caused no
great public outcry. This general absence of internal
negative feedback is supported by a generally positive
37
response to Mapp by the State Attorneys General. Some
34See Michael J. Murphey, "Problems of Compliance
by the Police," p. 354.
35
Stuart Nagel, "Testing the Effects of Excluding
Illegally Seized Evidence," 1965 University of Wisconsin
Law Review 283 (1965), 298.
36 Ibid .
37 Proceedino of the Conference of the National
Association of Attorneys General. 1962: 56th Annual
Meeting, April 22-25, pp. 117-137.
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state courts, on the other hand, resisted implementation.
Pennsylvania courts were found to have deferred whenever
possible to police determinations of the reasonableness
of a search. California courts serve as a paradigm of
noncompliance showing no impact of Mapp until 1963 and
no state conviction actually reversed due to federal
39
search law until 1964.
Congressional response to Mapp and other pre-1962
criminal decisions seems to have been quite encouraging
to the Court’s libertarians No anti-Court legislation
was passed, only four diffuse anti-Court bills were even
introduced, and none was directed against criminal pro-
cedures rulings. In fact two bills introduced were
quite to the contrary. On September 27 a resolution was
proposed in the Senate to express Congressional senti-
ment in support of compliance with the Supreme Court
decisions. 41 One week later, the Senate passed S 2900
designed to protect the rights of indigent defendants
^®Arlen Spoctor, "Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora’s Prob-
lems for the Prosecutor," 111 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review (1962), p. 4.
^fflanwaring, "The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio," p. 14.
40 Ibid., pp. 15-22.
41 S. Cong. Res. 96, September 27, 1962.
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in federal courts* In its deliberations upon the measure
the Senate expressed confidence in recent Supreme Court
decisions in the area, thus providing positive incen-
tive for a pro-defendant ruling in the then-pending case
of Gideon v. Wainwriciht
. decided less than six months
later
.
Similar positive anticipatory feedback for Gideon
was provided by the states. Even in Florida the state
Supreme Court in 1962 adopted a rule that state prisoners
tried in the absence of counsel could move for a vacated
sentence in the trial court on the grounds of deprivation
of rights secured under both state and federal constitu-
42
tions. The Florida legislature, also in anticipation
of Gideon
,
had voted to adopt a state public defender
. 43
system
.
In sum, then, there does not appear to have been
generated any noticeable impediment to activism in the
criminal procedures area in 1962* Indeed, there was
positive encouragement for Gideon * Yet it should also
be noted that, in spite of the absence of feedback in
criminal procedures cases, over of all bills introduced
^Ulasby, p. 150.
43 Ibid.
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in Congress in 1962 were designed to reverse the school
prayer and roapport ionment decisions. It may be that,
aside from Gideon
, Lynum
.
and Haynes
. the Court offered
L°P S2 anc^ l<Br to escape the possible overlapping threat
represented by that spate of proposals.
1963. The positive feedback which characterized
1962 also accompanied the Court’s efforts in the Winter
and Spring of 1963, President Kennedy’s State of the
Union Address paid attention to the issue of crime only
to the extent that it promised representation for indig-
ent defendants in federal courts.^ Pursuant to that
promise, on March 8 the President sent to Congress an
ABA-endorsed proposal for a federal Public Defender
45System. The bill, S1057, accompanied by favorable
citation of the Gideon decision,^ unanimously passed
the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 10, and the whole
A r7
Senate on August 6,
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . January
18, 1963, pp. 58-62.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . March
22, 1963, p. 432.
A r
Congressional Quarterly Weakly Report . July 19,
1963, p. 1157.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
9, 1963, p. 1396.
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Although S1057 failed in the House, 48 the reason
was clearly a difference with the Senate and not the
Court, The House Judiciary Committee had already passed
a bill underwriting the concept of indigent representa-
tion, while the whole House endorsed the 1956 decision
of Griffin v. I llinois by authorizing federal coverage
of transcript fees for indigent defendants. The states
also responded positively to Gideon by enacting public
systems for indigent representation. Within two years
of the decision 23 states had passed measures to improve
methods for the assignment of counsel.^ 8 As a response
to Douglas v. Calif ornia some state Courts began to
appoint counsel for appeals even in cases of guilty
pleas .^
It is not unreasonable to conjecture that such
49 Ibid.
50 G. Theodore Mitau, Decade of Decision: The
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Revolution, 1954-
1964 (New Yorkt Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), p. Tbl
.
Wasby, p. 150.
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actions by Congress, the states, and the legal frater-
nity might have prompted from the Court the very liberal
1963 Term, including particularly the "right to counsel"
rulings in Massiah and Escobedo
. The latter decision
was specifically encouraged as well by the New York Court
of Appeals decision in People v. Donovan 52 upon which the
Supreme Court relied heavily. 53 In addition, the 1963
Conference of Chief Justices heard Arthur E. Sutherland
approvingly anticipate Escobedo as a logical extension
of Mapp
, Gideon . Lynum . and White
.
54 On the other hand,
such applause was not unchallenged. At the same con-
ference Fred Inbau attacked such decisions as Haynes and
the possible extension of Mallory to the states, 55
Inbau was not alone in his criticism of the
Court’s pro-defendant attitude. The House on August 12
52 13 NY 2d 148 (1963).
u See James Vorenberg, "Police Detention and In-
terrogation: The Supreme Court and the States," Pro-
ceedings: 16th Annual Meetinq of the Conference of Chief
Justices. 1964
, pp. 28-37.
54
Arthur E. Sutherland, "Detention, Interrogation
and the Right to Counsel," ibid .
.
pp. 60-65.
55 Fred E. Inbau, "The Arrestee and Legal Counsel,"
ibid
.
,
pp. 57-59.
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pa.ssed HR 7525, a District of Columbia Omnibus Crime
Bill which sought to nullify Pfla 1 lor
v
by preventing courts
from excluding confessions solely because of delays in
arraignments and permitting up to six hours detention
whore there was "reasonable ground" to suspect. 56 Al-
though the bill was passed by a voice vote, a measure of
its support was reflected in a recommittal motion which
lost 2 to 1 .
^
In reporting the bill in July the Dis-
trict of Columbia Committee had made manifest the basis
for the bill’s supports Supreme Court decisions which
were handcuffing the police and were thus largely respon-
5 8
sible for the rising rate of crime in the District.
Overlapping feedback was also an important pheno-
menon in 1963. As in 1962 almost of all legislation
introduced in Congress sought to reverse the school
prayer decisions. Early in 1963 the General Assembly
of the States, a group consisting mostly of state legis-
^Conaressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
16, 1963, pp. 1439-40.
5?
I bid .
5Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , July 25,
1963, p. 1365.
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lators
,
endorsed throe Constitutional Amendments oppo-
sing reapportionment: the formation of a Court of the
Union which would represent the state courts and have
veto power over the Supreme Court; withdrawal of Supreme
Court jurisdiction over apportionment questions; and
facilitation of the amendment process. By mid-April
four states had approved the Court of the Union, eleven
the jurisdictional limitation, and nine the easing of
the amendment procedure.^ It is not surprising that
such actions would have been reflected in Court actions
at the close of the 1962 Term. However, by the beginning
of the 1963 Term substantial opposition to this attack
had been manifested. The ABA voted 136 to 74 against
the jurisdiction amendment and by voice vote rejected
6
1
the other two. During the summer, the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General had resolved that while it
recognized the right to criticize the Court, it disagreed
with attempts to defame it or "to make radical changes in
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , February
8, 1963, p. 142.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , April
26, 1963, p. 663.
^ Congressional Quarterly Uleeklv Report , August
23, 1963, p. 1472.
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the organic structure of the federal court system." 62
Thus, whatever effect overlapping negative feedback had
during the Spring of 1963 might easily have been felt to
ease by the Fall.
J^964> . Congressional attitude during the early
months of 1964—the active months of the 1953 Term con-
tinued the supportive role prevalent in 1963 for the
Court's indigent defendant decisions. On January 15 the
House passed an amended form of S1057 which provided for
representation at every stage of federal criminal pro-
63
ceedings. Seven months later, a conference report
was accepted by both houses and the Criminal Justice Act
was signed into law, 64 a clear endorsement of the Gideon
and Douqlas decisions the previous term.
Internal feedback was also initially positive.
The Conference of Chief Justices meeting before the start
Proceedings of the Conference of the National
Association of Attorneys General. 1963: 57th Annual
Meeting
, p, 191.
6 3Congressional Quarterly Uleekly Report
.
January
17, 1964, p. 112.
64ConQressional Quarterly Uleekly Report . August
14, 1964, p. 1743.
262
of the Term resolved support and encouragement for
Court decisions protecting the right to counsel. 65
But by the end of the 1963 Term, prompted largely by
Escobedo
, internal feedback began to turn. Garrett
Byrne compared the destructive effect of Escobedo's
majority upon law enforcement to that of five men trying
to destroy the country. 63 Los Angeles Police Chief
William Parker claimed that the "judicial takeover" of
the process of criminal justice was seriously interfering
with police capacity to combat crime. Even Mapp began
to tarnish, suggesting again the cumulative nature of
feedback. In June the National Association of Attorneys
General expressed fears about pending prosecution diffi-
6 8
culties under Mapp
,
and general opposition to the habeas
f\ Q
corpus trilogy of F ay
.
T ownsend
,
and Sanders. A voice
65Proceedinqs : 16th Annual Meeting of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices , 1964, p. 103.
66Lytel, p. 81.
67Kamisar, p. 34.
66 Proceedinos of the Conference of the National
Association of Attorneys General, 1964: 58th Annual Meet-
ing
.
pp. 88-100.
6
9
Ibid
, , pp. 35-67.
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of even more threatening criticism was raised by James
Vorenberg, reporter for the American Law Institute and
recently appointed to develop an ALI model pro—arraign—
ment code. Vorenberg, while recognizing both the logic
of the G ideon
,
Whi t
e
, Massiah . E gcobodo progression and
the desirable equity of its fruition, also stressed the
burdens it had placed on the solution of crime. 70 Fur-
thermore, anticipating an extension of Escobedo
. Vorenberg
counselled that the Court leave the precise definition
of rules governing confessions in post-arrest interro-
71gations to the states.
Thus, the permissive attitude of the legal frater-
nity which helped promote the 1963 Term turned to one of
strict criticism in its wake. That all of this internal
feedback made its mark on at least one of the members of
the Court is also clear. Justice Brennan found it advi-
sable to appear before the Conference of Chief Justices
to defend specific rulings, including those involving
the rights of criminal defendants, and to plead for
informed
,
construct ive , and respectful professional cri-
ticism. 72 It is, he said, the profession’s responsibility
7 nVorenberg, pp. 35-36.
'
^
Ibid
. ,
p. 36
.
72
Ulilliam J. Brennan, "Some Aspects of Federalism,”
p . 63
.
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to "deter unwarranted attacks" on the Court. 73 It is
thus perhaps easier to understand not only the general
decline in pro-defendant decisions during the 1964 Term
but also Brennan’s conservative shift which helped pro-
duce the decline.
Fall of 1964 was also a busy one for the enemies
of the Court. By mid-September 160 resolutions had been
introduced in both Houses by 115 Representatives and 14
Senators to reverse the School Prayer decisions. 74 On
August 21 the House passed the Tuck Bill denying the
Court appellate jurisdiction in state reapportionment
75
cases. In the Senate only a liberal filibuster defeated
a bill to delay a court-ordered reapportionment until
1966, 76 and by six votes a compromise was accepted
urging federal courts to provide states with six months’
77grace
.
73 Ibld
.
, pp. 67-68.
74Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report , October
23, 1964, pp. 2535-36.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
21, 1964, p. 1896.
^Congressional Quarterly Uleekly Report , September
18, 1964, p. 2161.
^Congressional Quarterly Uleekly Report , September
25, 1964, p. 2207.
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Of perhaps greatest impact upon the Court was
neither the concern of the legal fraternity nor the
overlapping feedback in Congress, but rather the Presi-
dential election campaign of 1964, Constitutional issues
--involving school prayers, reapportionment, and crimi-
nal law--were central to the campaign, and the Court
was of greater concern to the candidates than at any
time since 1936, 76
Beginning September 15, Senator Goldwater stressed
that a major issue in the campaign was "a breakdown of
law and order" due in part to Supreme Court rulings. 7 "
To swing the Court from such an "obsessive concern" for
defendants* rights, Goldwater proposed changes in the
types of appointees to the Court, amendments to reverse
specific decisions, and Congressional legislation to
change rules of judicial procedure. Even more signi-
ficant than these attacks was the fact that President
'^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , October
23, 1964, p, 2525.
7
^Uialter F « Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public
Opinion and Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign," 32
Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1968), 32-33.
^Congressional Quarterly meekly Report , October
23, 1964, p. 2539,
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Johnson neither explicitly defended the Court from them
nor specifically rebuked Goldwater for such misuse of
8
1
the Court. Moreover
,
although Murphy and Tanenhaus
found that Goldwater's criticism had no visible impact
upon public opinion, the Court could not know that at
the time. Being thus the object of a presidential cam-
paign could not help but contribute to the Court's 1964
retreat
.
1965
.
The challenge to the Court continued in
the early months of 1965 but began to abate as the returns
of the 1964 Term became known. The level of negative
feedback was correspondingly high until summer and then
abruptly ended.
Acknowledging his concern for the rapidly increas-
ing rate of crime, President Johnson announced in March
the formation of a Presidential Commission on Law Enforce-
83
ment and the Administration of Justice. Although it
was not initiated as a counter to the Court, Court critics
Murphy and Tanenhaus, "The Goldwater Campaign,"
p. 34
.
R?
Ibid
.
,
p. 47.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , March 12,
1965, pp. 394-97.
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were well represented in its membership. 84 The Commis-
sion also provided a visible forum for other foes. At
its first meeting the Commission heard FBI Director
Hoover state that Supreme Court decisions of recent years
had "too often shackled the police officer." 85
At the same time, in a move that was described by
Representative Charles Johnson as "an act of vengeance"
for recent decisions, the Senate reduced House-approved
pay increases for Supreme Court Justices by $5000 while
C
maintaining those for Congress at their original level, DU
Less than a week later the House again voted a District
of Columbia crime bill designed to nullify Mallory . The
bill appeared in the same form as had HR 7525 in 1963 and
it again was approved by a vote of nearly 2 to 1. The
Senate passed a slightly amended form of the bill on
August 31 after first rejecting an amendment to delete
the modification of the Mallory Rule by 26-67. 88
84Kamisar, "When the Cops Were Not ’ Handcuff ed
"
p. 110.
85
I bid .
86
PL 88-426, 1964. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report , March 12, 1965, p. 408.
87
Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report , March 26,
1965, p. 570.
88Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Sept. 3,
1965, p. 1773.
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As in the previous year the Court indicated its
sensitivity to these attacks. Perhaps in recognition
of the level of negative feedback to Escobedo
. Aguilar
.
and also to Beck
,
the Chief Justice announced in March
the formation of a committee of judges, lawyers, and
legal scholars to design uniform rules for the admission
of evidence and the competency of eyewitnesses in fed-
eral trials, " It is significant that only a week ear-
lier the Court had departed from Aouilar in Vent resca v.
United States ,
^
By summer the Court’s retreat seemed to have
accomplished its presumed intent. In spite of contin-
ued fears of administrative difficulties under the
habeas corpus decisions and under Escobedo , the National
Association of Attorneys General in June gave warm endor-
sement of the Court’s retroactivity holding in Linklet-
91
ter . In Congress, although the anti-Mallory momentum
^Congressional Quarterly Uleekly Report . March
12, 1965, p. 379.
90See Supra
.
p. 123
.
91
Proceedings of the Conference of the National
Association of Attorneys General, 1965: 59th Annual
Meeting
, p. 126,
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carried the District of Columbia Crime Bill through to
passage, little anti-crime enthusiasm remained by Fall.
In September the editors of Congressional Quarterly felt
it safe to predict that little anti—crime legislation
was likely to pass in the remaining months of 1965, 92
As it embarked on its 1965 Term, then, the Court appeared
to have averted the first wave of attack on its pro-
defendant decisions primarily by restricting their fre-
quency .
1966
.
The Court's 1965 Term reflected much the
same caution which had characterized that of 1964, In
January, for example, the Griffin decision was restricted
so as to apply only prospectively. 9 -^ On the other hand,
the Court clearly did not reflect the fear which had
been evident in 1964, and overall pro-defendant disposi-
tions increased somewhat.
Perhaps reflecting this moderation, feedback in
early 1966 also maintained the benign proportions of
late 1965. President Johnson’s State of the Union mess-
age spent very little time on the issue of crime and
^Congressional Quarterly meekly Report , Septem-
ber 17, 1965, p, 1881
,
^^Tehan v. Shot t , 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
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then only in reference to his plan to assist law enforce-
94
ment training. Similarly, the Republican response gave
absolutely no attention to crime or the Court. 95 The
executive-proposed Crime Control Act which was sent to
Congress March 9 made no mention of Court decisions and
emphasized the decline in the crime rate from 1964 to
1965. 96 Pursuant to that proposal Congress in June passed
the Bail Reform Act of 1966 providing pre-trial release
in non-capital federal cases for indigents who could be
expected to appear for trial, 97
Perhaps the quiet of these first months of 1966
helps explain the Court’s moderate redress of the 1964
Term, For the moment, at least, the retreat seemed to
have mollified the critics. But the respite was short-
lived, By the end of the 1965 Term the pace of negative
94Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . January
14, 1966, p. 48.
95Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . January
21, 1966, pp. 252-254.
95Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , March
11, 1966, p. 552.
97
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . June 17
,
1966, pp. 1271-1272.
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feedback quickened and by the Fall the attack on the
Court was open and extreme, as reflected in the final
passage of the 1966 District of Columbia Crime Bill.
There appear to be two reasons for the sudden shift in
attitude, the second much more important than the first.
In August 1965, the Watts riot exposed the vulnerability
of urban—and by easy extension, suburban—centers to
violence and sudden destruction. The Chicago and Cleve-
land riots during the Summer of 1966 aggravated a grow-
ing fear that Watts was not an aberration but a harbin-
ger. It was not difficult for many people, or for their
congressmen, to see an insidious relationship between
riots and the "rise in crime, and consequently between
riots and the Supreme Court's pro-defendant decisions.
The second, and in this latter sense related, reason for
the upsurge in ant i-crime-ant i-Court feeling was the
Court's own self-inflicted wound, Miranda v. Arizona .
Perhaps more than any other single event in history the
Court's political relationships from 1962 to 1968, Miranda
was a watershed. The earlier conflicts had come and gone
^^See Nicholas Katzenbach's introduction to Rich-
ard Harris, The Fear of Crime , pp. 7-11. The year 1966
saw the introduction of twenty-two proposals for riot
control legislation.
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easily, the results often uncomfortable but never of
the magnitude of the later contest. Miranda was a turn-
ing-point
.
Initially, feedback to Miranda was only normally
and predictably negative, perhaps because most officials
99
anticipated it. The American Law Institute had a year
earlier put to work a committee to draft a model code
for pre-arraignment procedure which would strike a
balance between the Court's apparent willingness to for-
bid the use of confessions generally and the equally
objectionable alternative of complete police discretion
.
1 ^
The proposal, providing for up to four hours of uncoun-
selled interrogation, had already received ABA support
and was to have been voted on by the ALI in the Spring
of 1966. It did not because the Court--and Chief Jus-
tice Warren in part icular--pre-empted the issue and
forced a postponement in the ALI's vote by hearing argu-
ment in Miranda . and then decided the case quite contrary
to the expected model. The fact that the Court had
99
Wasby, p. 155.
10
°See Paul M. Bator, reporter for the ALI, speak-
ing before the Conference of Chief Justices, Proceedings:
17th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices,
1965
, pp. 6-14.
75
.
101 5ee Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound , pp. 173
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acted in such haste and had completely disregarded what
was thought to be the best advice of the legal frater-
nity was the central theme of Chief Justice Edward
Lumbard's very critical address to the 1967 Conference
of Chief Justices. 102
Other internal feedback was even more critical and
direct. Although there were occasional members of the
fraternity who defended the decisions from such out-
bursts, they were few in number and primarily those in
1 03academic circles. The state bench was outraged.
Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court proposed at the 1966 meeting of the state chief
justices a resolution recommending that the Fifth Amend-
ment be amended so as to nullify Miranda
.
1 04 Such a
resolution was also submitted by Chief Justice John C. Bell
1^Proceedings? 19th Annual Meeting of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices. 1967
. p, 55.
10
^See Yale Kamisar, "Some Comments on the 'New*
Fifth Amendment," Proceedings? 18th Annual Meeting of
the Conference of Chief Justices. 1966
, pp. 35-48.
^^Proceedings? 18th Annual Meeting of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices. 1966 , pp. 101-03.
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of Pennsylvania with the approval of the Resolutions
Committee Chairman and was only narrowly defeated.^ 88
Feedback from law enforcement officials was of
four general types: cautions willingness to wait for
further clarification; ideological dissent but resigned
acceptance of the imposed limitations; ideological
dissent accompanied by a denial that the rules demanded
changes from current practices; and extreme ideological
dissent with threatened noncompliance
.
1 88 One month
after the decision was announced, the Executive Director
of the International Association of Police Chiefs stated
that real compliance was impossible, while the Execu-
tive Director of the National District Attorney’s Assoc-
iation argued that if enforced, Miranda would destroy
1 08law enforcement and impose a stigma on the police.
1 OSProceedings: 18th Annual Meeting of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices. 1966
. pp. 102-103,
106ciifford M. Lytel, The Warren Court and Its
Critics (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press,
1968), pp. 86-88.
^^Mitau, p. 186.
108Lytel, pp. 87-88.
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Public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed. Mur-
phy and Tanenhaus found a 10$ increase from 1964 to
1966 in negative responses to questions concerning the
rights of criminal defendants
i
1
and a Harris Poll
taken in November 1966 found the Court to be held in
disfavor by 2 to 1.^^ It might well be argued that
this shift was produced— or finally t riggered--by
Miranda
.
Table 9 shows the responses to the issue-
content of specific decisions and may provide the break-
down of the Harris anti-Court findings. The only recen-
tly-decided issue mentioned was that of exclusion of
confessions taken in the absence of counsel. One might
infer from such evidence that it was Miranda which had
produced the Court's sudden unpopularity.
Congressional reaction was almost uniformly hos-
tile.^"* The District of Columbia "omnibus crime bill,"
which had mustered some support in earlier sessions, now
took on new and much more formidable dimensions. Consi-
^^Murphy and Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion and the
United States Supreme Court," p. 362.
^^Schubert, Constitutional Polity , p. 174,
111 See Mitau, p. 187.
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TABLE 9
HARRIS SURVEY, NOVEMBER 14, 1966: APPROVAL OF SIX
KEY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Uis-
I ssu8 Approve approve
Reapportionment 76% 24%
Desegregation of Schools 64 36
Desegregation of Public Accommodations 64 36
Permitting Communists Passports 49 51
Excluding Confessions without Counsel 35 65
Outlawing Prayers in Public Schools 30 70
Source: Mitau, p. 7,
dared originally to be primarily an anti-crime bill with
112
an appended rule to reverse the Mallory decision, it
had become an anti-Court proposal by the Fall of 1966.
Title III was still specifically designed to nullify
Mallory by permitting four-hour detention before arraign-
ment; but Title I was designed to reverse Miranda as well
by reviving the "voluntariness" standard which the
^ ^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , April 1,
1966, p. 705.
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113Court had discarded. After passing the Senate by
voice vote and the House by a vote of 208-79, 114 it
was loft to the President to underwrite the Court’s
recent decisions by pocket vetoing the proposed legis-
, . . 115lation.
It was, finally, the Republican Party which gave
ultimate indication of the Court’s fortunes during 1966,
While in January the Republican "state of the union"
message had given no attention to crime, the following
October the Republican Co-ordinating Committee emphasized
"law and order" as the major party issue. The Court
and its criminal procedures decisions had been elevated
to a new status. Not only had it created new fires of
opposition, it had rekindled old ones. While attacks
before had been relatively short-lived, those generated
^^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Novem-
ber 4, 1966, p. 2743.
1
1
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . October
21, 1966, p. 2584.
^^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Novem-
ber 18, 1966, p. 2841.
1 ^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , October
7, 1966, p. 2414.
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in 1966 did not fully subside until the Court had been
radically altered.
1967
. Nineteen sixty-seven was a year of gener-
ally heightened intensity of opposition to Supreme Court
criminal procedure decisions. The large volume of nega-
tive feedback which had attended Miranda continued thr-
ough the 1966 Term and although it eased perceptibly
in the Summer and Fall—again perhaps in response to
the Court’s quasi-retreat— it was more uniformly manifest
throughout 1967 than in any previous year. In addition,
the attack was by then quite well defined. Unlike pre-
vious years, for example, there were almost as many
issue-specific bills as there were diffuse ones among
Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress. More-
over, of the nineteen specifically anti-crime measures,
seventeen were even case-specifics thirteen predictably
sought to redress the Court’s confession rulings, Mallory
and Miranda ; the remaining four attempted to reverse
Fourth Amendment cases dating back to Mapp . Such a
delayed attack upon search and seizure decisions is
additional evidence that feedback tends to be cumulative.
An initial survey, then, would seem to find 1967
the first indication of a deviation from the feedback
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model described in Part One. To be sure, in its 1966
Term the Court had heeded the threats of its opponents;
but since those throats continued throughout the year—
and particularly in such a clear issue—and case-speci-
fic fashion—the 1967 Term’s decidedly pro-defendant
decisions were very wide of what the model would have
predicted
.
The year began with the Court’s foes in full view
and its defenders in the confused position of trying to
oppose crime yet not condemn the Court in the process.
In his State of the Union address, President Johnson
proposed two major pieces of anti-crime legislation:
the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act (S917, HR5700)
,
a benign measure designed to improve local law enforce-
ment by training and equipment grants; and the Right to
Privacy Act (S928, HR5386), banning all wiretapping except
in national security cases. Although neither bill
suggested any criticism of the Court, the occasion of
their announcement was significant in that unlike its
recent predecessors the message gave a substantial propor-
117
Congressional Quarterly Weakly Report , Febru-
ary 10, 1967, p. 199.
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tion of its time to the crime issue. 118 The Republican
counter-address also gave considerable attention to
crime but was not so charitable to the Court, Capital-
izing on crime and the Court as a future campaign issue,
the Republicans called upon the federal judiciary to
show as much concern for victims as for the accused in
criminal cases. 1 ^ ^
The President's proposed legislation was not
unexpected in Congress. There, however, the mood was
decidedly more intense about the political impact of
"law and order" and less sympathetic to the institu-
tional sanctity of the Supreme Court. Anticipating
S917 and S928, Senator McClellan in late January intro-
duced in the Senate two bills which were later incorpor-
ated into the Safe Streets Acti S674 which sought to
reverse Mallory and Miranda by admitting any "voluntary"
confession as evidence in federal court; and S675 which
greatly extended permissible wiretaps by state or federal
officers. Both bills had substantial backing from the
1 1
8
ConQressional Quarterly Weekly Report . January
13, 1967, pp. 76-81.
1
1
^
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , January
27, 1967, p. 132.
1
^See Harris, The Fear of Crime , pp. 21-51.
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start, perhaps because of their substance but probably
because of their anti-Court flavor. Richard Harris has
found evidence that the hearings scheduled by McClellan' s
Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedure as well as
much of the substantive legislation proposed by the sub-
committee were simply part of a conspiracy to attack the
Court rather than any effort to alleviate the rise in
crime. By March the Senate seemed strongly inclined
toward some form of anti-Court, anti-crime action. One
bill, S1194 introduced by Senator Ervin, provided for
reversal of Mallory and Miranda by restricting the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in confession cases. In spite of
its extreme nature, the proposal had nineteen co-spon-
sors, 1^ a measure of the severity of Senate attitudes
toward the Court.
The House had dealt much less drastically with
its version of Safe Streets, changing only the nature
of dollar allocations from the original executive propo-
123
sal, and passed it in August. Whatever might be said
1 ^ Ibid .
.
pp. 30-31.
^^Mitau, pp. 190-91.
^ 2
^
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
11, 1967, p. 1503.
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of tho noui emphasis upon local initiative and experimen-
tation, HR5037 could not be characterized as an attack
on the Court, In the Senate again, however, the House-
approved form was heavily amended by the McClellan sub-
committee, Claiming to respond to recent Court decisions,
the subcommittee included revised forms of S674, S675,
and S1194 as amendments to Safe Streets as well as pro-
posals to deny the Court appellate review of a trial
court's admission of eye-witness testimony. Indeed, it
went so far as to limit appellate jurisdiction over state
court convictions appealed on writs of habeas corpus. 124
Although the year ended without final action, the Court-
curbing mood was still at a high pitch and some form of
limitation seemed inevitable in early 1968,
The Safe Streets Act was not the only Congressional
vehicle for expression of anti-Court attitudes. In June,
by a vote of 355-14, the House again passed the District
of Columbia Omnibus Crime Bill, differing from the 1966
version only in that the anti-Mallory provision was
slightly less extreme. 125 Six months later the bill
124Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report , November
24, 1967, p. 2380.
1 25Conoressional Quarterly Uleeklv Report , June 30,
1967, p. 1108.
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cleared the Senate by 67-9 after an amendment to delete
the ant i-Mallory section had failed to gain more than
126nineteen votes* Unlike its 1966 predecessor the
1967 version was not vetoed.
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the appoint-
ment of Thurgood Marshall were another opportunity for
members of Congress to express themselves about recent
cases. The major part of the confirmation hearings was
spent either attacking or defending criminal procedure
decisions. Fred Graham characterized the hearings as
providing little more than an opportunity for Senators
to release steam about such dispositions. 127 Thus Sena-
tor Ervin used the moment to denounce a number of speci-
fic decisions including Escobedo . Miranda . Ulade . and
r .,, . 128Gilbert .
Congress was not the only source of negative feed-
1 ^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . December
22, 1967, p. 2602.
^ ^
New York Times , July 30, 1967, p. 10E
.
120
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Nomination of Thuroood Marshall to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. Hearings , 90th Cong., 1st.
sess.
,
1967, pp. 53-66, 87, 119.
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back, although it was undoubtedly the most severe. At
their annual conference the state chief justices gave
official recognition to a "dangerously low state of law
and order," a rising rate of crime, and alarming disre-
spect for the law encouraged in part by the fact that
it was increasingly difficult to convict the guilty, 129
To repair the breach the judges felt it essential that
criminals be punished when apprehended and that victim-
ized citizens be protected by the courts. 1^ Chief
Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of
Appeals used the opportunity to attack Miranda
.
The
Court, he argued, should have used its supervisory
authority to apply the rule only to federal courts,
131
since it too seriously impeded state police efficiency.
His comments were unanimously accepted by the Conference
1 32
as "an excellent expression" of the members' views.
1 29Proceedinqs : 19th Annual Meeting of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices , 1967, p. 75.
I30 lbid
.
.
p. 76.
1 31
1 bid .
,
pp. 55-59.
132
Ibid,
,
p. 77
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Lumbard had also presented his case against the Court
to Congress. Speaking before the McClellan subcommit-
tee in support of S675, he argued that cases like Buroer
v. Now York had emphasized an impossible goal to privacy
at the expense of an orderly and peaceful society,^ 33
and he urged reversal of the Court’s pro-defendant direc-
tion.
An even more damning attack came from another
quarter of the legal fraternity. A minority report
filed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice also held the Court
partially responsible for prompting criminal acts.
Singling out Escobedo and Miranda
.
the minority members
attacked the Court for having seriously restricted essen-
tial law enforcement and for having overextended the
1 34
rights of criminal defendants. But the report did not
stop at harsh criticism. Aware of recent legislative
proposals to reverse specific decisions, the report
advocated immediate support for a constitutional amend-
1 35
ment to redress the current imbalance.
^ 33New York Times . March 12, 1967, p. 13E.
134U.S., President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge—of
Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.5.G.P.U.,
1967), pp, 304-08.
I35 lbid., pp. 307-308.
The friends of the Court, while not readily
visible during this apparent onslaught, did provide
some positive feedback. It is significant, for example,
that the negative feedback of the minority members of
the President’s Crime Commission was not reflected in
the majority view in spite of the fact that the Court’s
critics had been very well represented.^ 6 In March the
National Conference on Crime Control, sponsored by the
Justice Department and composed of over 700 delegates
representing the judiciary, law enforcement, and correc-
tions services, urged passage of ponding crime legisla-
tion. Interestingly, however, the conference report
was quite moderate in tone, mildly rebuking the Court
for its Miranda decision but otherwise attaching blame
for crime elsewhere. 1 ^ 7 The annual Judicial Conference,
while giving endorsement to S675, did so with the provis
that it be modified to conform to the Court's decision
in Berqer ^ 36 Even the conservative bloc in Congress
136Kamisar, ’’When the Cops W e re Not ’Handcuffed,'
p. 110.
^^Congressional Quarterly Weakly Report , March
31, 1967, p. 499.
1
^
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Sep-
tember 29, 1967, p. 1972.
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provided some support. Roman Hruska, co-sponsor with
McClellan of the original S675, also introduced a bill
to bring the 1964 Criminal Justice Act up to date to
conform with Mem pa v. R ha y . ^ ^ ^ Thus, while not as aggres-
sive as its counterpart negative feedback, positive sup-
port was nonetheless extant prior to the 1967 Term.
The decisions of the 1966 Term had been a clear
response to intense and well-defined feedback. Attacks
upon Fourth Amendment cases wore followed by Warden v.
Hayden ; opposition to extension of the Fifth Amendment's
"self incrimination” protection was assuaged by Schmerbor
.
Ulado
.
and Gilbert ; demands for more permissive hearsay
admissibility were answered with McCray . But perhaps
the Court's response to its critics was too complete, or
the Court by the Fall of 1967 had been lulled too much
by the cyclical history of activism-retreat to realize
that at least the retreats were purposeful and not simply
natural phenomena; perhaps negative feedback in 1967 had
been too forceful early in the year and thus had made the
intensity of that in the Fall less apparent— of 19 issue-
specific anti-Court bills proposed only throe wore intro-
duced after June. Whatever the reason, the return to
139Wasby, pp. 149-50.
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pro-defendant activism was a miscalculation on the part
of the Court in the 1967 Term and the first major devia-
tion from the model. Undoubtedly some shift toward a
pro-defendant posture could have been expected; but the
degree of the actual shift in the fact of what was
actually quite uniformly negative feedback altered the
nature of the attack. Thus, not only was opposition in
1968 much more intense, but it began to take upon itself
the cast neither of simple communication, nor even of
decision-reversal, but of structure-altering reprisal,
1968 , Just as there was no slacking-off in
negative feedback at the close of 1967 there was no abate-
ment in the attack during 1968. And while 1967 was notable
for the uniform intensity of anti-Court sentiment through-
out, 1968 was equally notable for beginning at a very
high pitch and then escalating it. Three factors may
have been largely contributory* the 1968 election cam-
paign, whose central issue, whether defined for or by
the electorate, was "law and order"; the closely-related
episode of Abe Fortas* appointment and defeat as Chief
Justice; and the lack of any respite provided by the
Court from the earlier pro-defendant trend.
Both President Johnson’s State of the Union address
289
and its Republican counterpart gave more attention to
crime in the streets than to any other concern, 14 ^
Pursuant to his address, the President sent to Congress
the most comprehensive set of anti-crime proposals ever
submitted. Significantly, 1968 being an election year,
the tone of his message and proposals had by then shifted
from previously-stated concern for social action to a
considerably more punitive purpose. 141 This change in
tone was later an important factor for Court safety,
since not only was the President loath to oppose the
more drastic anti-crime legislation offered by more
conservative factions, he was also unlikely to defend
too strongly a Court that was already unpopular with
the voting public.
Congress quite early in 1968 managed to pass the
most extreme piece of court-curbing legislation since
FDR's "reform" proposal in 1937, On April 29, the
1 40Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report . January
19, 1968, p. 98 1 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report ,
February2,1968,PP» 173-75.
1 41 C onQressional Quarterly Uleekly Report , Febru-
ary 9, 1968, pp. 242-43,
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Senate Judiciary Committee, by a tie vote of 8-8, added
Title II to S917 and then reported the full measure to
the Senate as the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Con-
trol Act of 1968, 142 A creation of McClellan' s subcom-
mittee, Title II sought to overturn Mallory
. Miranda
.
and Wade as they affected suspects accused of federal
crimes. The proposal had been opposed by both the
ABA 143 and the Judicial Conference, 144 but had collected
the enthusiastic endorsements of many law enforcement
groups including the National Association of District
Attorneys, the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, 14S and assorted state court judges, 14 '
McClellan's best support, however, came neither from
1 42ConQrossional Quarterly Weekly Report . May 10,
1968, p. 1035,
143Harris, The F oar of Crime
.
144 Ibid.. p. 82
.
145 Ibid., p. 74.
146
Ibid.
,
pp. 38-39.
1 471
Ibid. pp. 37-46,
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Congress nor the legal fraternity but from Presidential
candidate Richard Nixon, whose first position paper on
crime endorsed the proposal as essential to amend the
errors of the Court. 140 As indicated, the only real
potential counter to such support--the Johnson adminis-
tration itself--was peculiarly silent at the moment when
1 49it might have helped the most.
Floor debate on the Omnibus Crime Bill began May
1 and lasted three weeks. Leading the bill’s proponents
and underscoring the sponsor's purposes, McClellan argued
that Title II served to reverse and overrule Court deci-
sions "which protect and liberate guilty and confirmed
1 50
criminals." Three amendments to delete language
directed against Miranda , Mallory and Wade were each
defeated by votes of nearly 2 to lj the most drastic
section of Title II, limiting the Court's appellate auth-
ority to review state court determination of voluntariness,
was deleted, but even such an extreme measure managed to
1 48
I bid .
.
p. 73.
1 49
I bid .
.
pp. 84-85.
1 ^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , May 10,
1968, p. 1034.
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151gain 32 backers. Title III, incorporating S675 to
give state and federal agencies broad wiretapping auth-
ority, was an obvious--and predictable
—response to
Berger and Kat z . ^^ In the end only four Senators voted
against the final version and only three of the twenty-
four absentees announced against it. Nineteen sixty-
eight was an election year and crime was the central
campaign issue. It is interesting that of the seven Sena-
tors opposing the Omnibus Crime Bill, the two who were
running for reelection both lost, in part at least because
of their opposit ion
.
The House, which had passed the Safe Streets bill
a year earlier without any attempt to chastise the Court,
took up the Senate-approved measure early in June, This
time, however, the lower chamber was even more hostile
^ ^ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
.
May 24,
1968, pp. 1181-83.
152See Laurence Speiser, "The 90th Congress: One-
Half ’the Full Catastrophe’," Civil Liberties (February
1968), p. 3. Archibald Cox similarly predicted the suc-
cess of S675 after Berger on the basis of FBI statements
regarding the importance of such powers to investigations,
Cox p. 81. Again, final passage of Title III may be seen
as an inevitability given the Court's failure in Katz to
heed such criticism of Berger .
^^Harris, The Fear of Crime , p. 102.
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to the Court in its stated intent than the Senate had
been, voting to pass the Senate form specifically to
avoid possible amendment of the anti-Court provisions
by a conference committee. 154 On Juno 6 the House passed
1 55the act 360 to 17, and on June 19, 1968 it was signed
as Public Law 90-351. Its history in both houses pro-
vides ample reason to believe that the Act— or at least
Title II--had very little to do with improving law enforce-
ment and a groat deal to do with encouraging the Court
to reverse itself, insuring that reversal in spite of
the Court, or simply casting the institution into maximum
* 5 6disfavor. There is little doubt that Congress was
prompted by the bill's emotional and political appeal
rather than by its substance. Of 212 legal academicians
asked, all felt that the Act as passed was unconstitutional
on its face. 157
The Omnibus Crime Act of 1968 was not the only
154Harris, The Fear of Crime , pp. 106-09.
1 55Conaressional Quarterly Uleeklv Report , June 7,
1968, p. 1443.
l56 Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound , pp. 319-29.
p. 320.
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manifestation of the politics of anti-crime. An Asso-
ciated Press poll of Congress taken in January on the
concerns of constituents revealed that the one believed
to be most important—more than Vietnam or such tradi-
tional election-year issues as inflation—mas crime. 156
The positions of each of the presidential candidates in
some way reflected that concern. Richard Nixon had
already taken crime as his issue and the Court as the
chief culprit; Ronald Reagan also placed primary stress
upon the crime rate; the Democrats emphasized the social
causes of crime and proposed social remedies.’ 59 With
respect to Title II, the two major party candidates had
sharply divergent views. Nixon gave unqualified endorse-
ment on the ground that if the courts would not redress
the imbalance between criminals and victims, then the
balance must be imposed; Humphrey, on the other hand,
argued that those who accused court decisions of causing
crime misled the public and ignored real causes. The
anti-Court tenor of the Nixon campaign was evidenced both
15BHarris, The Fear of Crime , p. 67.
1 ^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , May 3,
1968, pp. 987-88.
lD
°Civil Liberties. #258, October 1968, p. 2.
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beforo and after the candidate’s nominations in seeking
the nomination ho argued that "among the contributing
factors to the small figure Jof convictions in crimi-
nal casesj are the decisions of a majority of one of
1 ithe United States Supreme Court} and at the Republi-
can convention he recognized "that some of our courts
have gone too far in weakening the peace forces." 162 It
is no exaggeration to say that the domestic side of the
Republican campaign was an attack on the Supreme Court.
Richard Nixon was not the first President to have
been elected following an anti-Court campaign; nor was
he the first to promise changes in criteria for Supreme
Court appointments. But it might be fair to argue that
he is the first President elected largely because of such
a campaign and such a promise. As early as Way 1968,
Nixon had begun to follow his standard attack on the
Court’s criminal procedures decisions with the vague sug-
gestion that ho would seek only nominees who were "thor-
1 ^ U .S . News and World Report , Vol. 54 (Way 20,
1968), 98.
1 62Conoressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
16, 1968, p. 2147.
l63
Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound , p. 306.
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oughly experienced and versed in the criminal laws and
problems." 164 Statements by those considered to be
possible Nixon appointees thus became even more poignant
as feedback than they might otherwise have been. One
potential nominee, former New York Governor Thomas
Dewey, argued that since the Fifth Amendment had figured
prominently in the liberal decisions and consequently
had hampered law enforcement and increased crime, it
1 65
ought to be repealed. Federal Appeals Court Judge
Henry J. Friendly argued a similar, if not quite as
drastic line. Other possible candidates, such as
Federal Court of Appeals Judge Uiarren E. Burger, had
long opposed the Court’s pro-defendant attitude.
The stated importance of Supreme Court appoint-
ments to candidate Nixon was the source of still another
episode which had far-flung feedback implications. On
June 26 President Johnson nominated Abe Fortas to succeed
Earl Warren as Chief of Justice. Fortas, as Associate
Justice, as a close personal friend of the President,
1 64ConQressional Quarterly Weekly Report , April
25, 1968, p, 603.
165
New York Times, December 1, 1968, p. 9E
.
16
^New York Times, November 10, 1968, p. 73.
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and as a recognizable liberal member of the Warren
Court, was immediately a target for Republicans and
Court opponents alike. The politics of the confirmation
debates and Fortas* eventual defeat were characterized
by his opponents primarily as an attack on the candi-
date’s indiscretion in serving as an advocate for the
executive and in accepting funds from potential liti-
gants. In roality the crisis was provoked by those
members of Congress who wished to publicly chastise
the Court. At the outset of the debate several Senators
expressed a desire to deny confirmation in order "to
1 67
curb the self-assumed, arbitrary power of the Court."
In the Judiciary Committee’s hearings Senators Ervin,
Thurmond, McClellan, and Allot made clear that the great-
est source of that court-curbing zeal was recent criminal
procedures decisions; Fortas was merely a whipping boy
for the Warren Court.
188 For Ervin the "cutting edge"
1^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Septem-
ber 27, 1968, p. 2525; Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report
,
October 4, 1968, pp. 2614-2615.
160See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry
to be Associate Justices of the Supreme C ourt Hearings,
90th Cong., 2nd soss., 1968, pp. 114-142, 190-202, and
212 -222 .
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of tho attack was Miranda
. for which ho held fortas
partly to blame. Thurmond, on tho other hand, seemed
primarily prompted by Mallory
, docidod a full eight years
before Fortas was first appointed to tho Court. l7u
Clearly, at least tho latter could hardly claim to have
boon motivated solely by the actions of the nominee.
After five days of debate tho Senate by fourtoon votes
failed to invoke cloture and on Octobor 2, at the start
of tho 1968 Term, the nomination was withdrawn. 171
In many respects the feedback communicated to
the Court in this first Fortas episode was even greater
than that expressed in tho Omnibus Crimo Act. Tho attack
could easily bo interpreted as a repudiation of the Uiarron
Court and as a warning against further indiscretion. The
result was widely accepted as such and it was generally
believed that as a direct consequence the Court could
not but withdraw from the activist posture it had recently
assumed. 172 The 1968 1 erm seemed to fulfill that prophecy.
1f^ 9 Graham, The Self-Inflicted mound , p. 158.
1
7
^
C onoress i ona 1 Quarterly Meekly Heport , July 26,
1968, p. 2005.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , October
4, 1968, p. 2613.
172See Fred Graham, "Tho Court May Never Bo the
Same," Now York Times . October 6, 1968, p. 2E| Tom
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In 1968 the Court again expressed its concern
with the level of attack. The mere fact that four,
rather than the usual one or two members of the Court
attended the annual ABA meeting indicated a desire to
mend fences with the legal fraternity, 1 '^ Earl Warren
addressed the Conference of Chief Justices and pleaded
for more reasoned and constructive criticism than had
recently been evidenced. The general retreat by the
Court in 1968 seems to further indicate its awareness
of the power of its opponents. This time, however, the
Court appeared to have acted too late. Feedback which
had been strong and clear in 1967 and 1968 had been
ignored by the Court in its 1967 Term. It thus grew
almost unchecked through 1968 and into early 1969. By
the beginning of the 1968 Term the public held the Court
in disfavor almost 3 to 1, while a full 70% of the popu-
lace felt that rising lawlessness had been encouraged by
176
Court decisions. Whether because of intransigence,
Wicker, "Due Notice to the Warren Court," New York Times ,
October 3, 1968, p. 46.
^^
New York Times , August 2, 1968, p. 20.
l74Earl Warren, "The Administration of Justice,"
address, Proceedings: 20th Annual Meeting of the Confer;
once of Chief Justices, 1968, p. 4.
l^Harris, The Fear of Crime , p. 110.
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poor political judgment, or communication intarf eronco
,
the Court had not been responsive to feedback? even a
retreat from its pro-defendant attitude was then insuffi-
cient to avoid the forced imposition of major changes in
its composition.
III. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions
wore seen in Part Two to have proceeded term by term in
a fairly consistent pattern of activism and retreat.
Prom a very impressionistic survey of the feedback to
those terms it appears that there is a complementary
pattern of intensity in the quantity and quality of
response given by Congress and the legal fraternity.
While any conclusions drawn from the foregoing examina-
tion must necessarily bo qualified by the inexhaustive
character of the data and the unsystematic style of
analysis, it may be helpful to summarize the findings
and compare them to those in Part Two. Figure 18 serves
as a rough depiction of that comparison. Since calendar
years do not correspond to Court terms, and since Congres-
sional feedback particularly is often easily divisible
into that occurring early and that occurring late in each
session, each year has boon divided in half with a refer-
301
FIGURE 10. COMPLEMENTARY CYCLES OF NEGATIVE
FEEDBACK AND PRO-DEFENDANT DISPOSITIONS
BY THE COURT, 1962-1960
Pro-Defendant
Year Negative Feedback Dispositions Term
1962a low 1961
b low
1963a
b
moderate-low
moderate
\ moderate-
restrained
&
1962
1964a
b
moderate —
high /
active 1963
1965a
b
moderate-high_
low //
k.
retreat 1964
1966a
b
low
high
N moderate-active 1965
196?a
b
high =
moderate-highs
k
'
moderate-
restrained 1966
1968a
b
high
high
//
<
active 196?
1969a high
_ retreat 1968
ring to January through Juno, and lo to July through
December. Court Terms are placed to correspond with the
a term of the calendar year because most decisions handed
down each term appear in the period from January to July.
At first blush there seem to have been three in-
stances in which the presumed complementarity of cycles
was broken. The Court’s 1962 Term, while not charac-
terized as a retreat, was certainly not among the activist
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terms
,
yet it had followed a year of almost impercep-
tible feedback. The explanation appears to lie in the
fact that since 1953 restraint had been characteristic
of criminal procedures dispositions. In fact, the 1962
Term was somewhat more active than had been the norm.
The second apparent deviation from complementarity was
in the feedback cycle. In spite of only moderate activ-
ism on the part of the Court in its 1965 Term, negative
feedback jumped from quite low in the second half of
1965 and the first half of 1966 to high at the end of
1966 and the beginning of 1967. Again the explanation
is easily apparent. While the 1965 Term is notable for
a large percentage of either pro-defendant cases or votes,
it is notable for Miranda v. Arizona . As indicated, Mir-
anda was a kind of break-point in anti-Court activity.
In many respects the decision had the effect of galvaniz-
ing theretofore f ragmentary--or perhaps "latent"— feed-
back. It is certainly not surprising to find the
cyclical feedback pattern slightly telescoped as a result,
nor to find that opposition remained high in 1967 in spite
of a moderately restrained 1966 Term. The highly pro-
defendant 1967 Term was, in turn, responsible for esca-
176 Pye, p. 72.
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lating the feedback cycle beyond uihat the model might
have anticipated to be the threshold of the "steady
state." It is not, then, surprising that 1968 and early
1969 were the most potent feedback periods of the decade.
What remains unexplained, however, is the 1967 Term. To
be sure, it follows the Court’s cycle; but it clearly
does not complement the pattern of negative feedback.
A brief examination of that anomaly will aid in relating
the general findings to the original hypothesis.
At the outset of Part Three several possible expla-
nations for the 1967 deviation were offered: an absence
of information as to the nature of feedback; a belief
that feedback would abate by itself; or simply intransi-
gence on the part of the judges. None of these explana-
tions seems appropriate. It is unlikely, in the first
place, that the Court could have been unaware of its
critics. The storm over Miranda was intense, highly
visible, and long-lived. The Court had expressed its
great awareness of its critics in the 1966 Term and it
is difficult to believe that such interest in vigilance
would suddenly dissipate. For the same reason it does
not seem probable that the Court expected hostile public
opinion to eventually soften and catch up to the Court s
lead. Feedback was far too intense at the time and.
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although there had been periods of reduced intensity
in the past, there had been little indication of moder-
ation in public attitudes toward pro-defendant disposi-
tions in general. Thus, only three possible explanations
remain— none of which is itself satisfactory but all of
which in concert may give insight to the crisis. Al-
though the Court was obviously not unaware of its critics,
there does seem to have been some communication delay be-
tween the summer of 1967 and the early months of 1968,
Feedback which had been highly negative from January to
June may have seemed by comparison to have been mild in
the summer and fall. And while the negative response of
early 1968 is clear in retrospect it may well be that
the Court was not immediately aware of it while the bulk
of the 1967 decisions were being announced. In addition,
the Court may have become adjusted to its own cycle,
assured that a year of retreat, particularly one in which
the Court offered its opponents such a bone as the stop-
and-frisk decisions, could be followed by a year of
advance. Finally, 1967 might also have been more active
than the members of the Court anticipated or believed
prudent. Yet the retirement of Justice Clark and the
appointment of Justice Marshall placed the Court somewhat
to the left of its accustomed position and adjustment may
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have taken a full term.
Thus, the Court for the better part of the 1960's
seems to have been cognizant of negative feedback and
prudent in responding to it. At least until 1968 it
had been able so to adjust itself to the tenor of opposi-
tion that it could successfully elevate the constitutional
status of defendants in criminal cases so as to affirm the
dignity of criminals and non-criminals alike. The
question which remained following the 1967 breach of the
pattern was whether that accomplishment had been achieved
with the least possible damage to the Court and the least
178
affront to public attitudes. The answer to that ques-
tion lies in the feedback pattern of 1969 and in the sub-
sequent adjustments by the Supreme Court. But whatever
that pattern and those responses, the ultimate resolution
was to depend upon a Court far different from that which
had been responsible both for the successes and the crises
of the 1960's, for at the end of the 1968 Term Earl Warren
concluded his tenure as Chief Justice.
177 See Douglas, dissenting, Stein v. New York ,
346 U.S. 156 (1953), 207.
176Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound , p. 152
PART FOUR
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Feedback to the Warren Court's criminal procedure
decisions did not, of course, end with the retirement of
the Chief Justice, Public hostility, once kindled, has
a life and logic of its own, apart even from the stimuli
which gave it birth. So too, anti-Court legislation must
run its course even though the Court might meanwhile have
ceased to give offense. Thus, there is often a lag in
the effectiveness of judicial responses in stemming the
flow of negative feedback, a phenomenon which may provide
the best explanation for the level of hostility toward
the Warren majority even during its 1968 retreat.
On the other hand, the model developed earlier
hypothesized that ultimately the Court must always accom-
modate its publics, a suggestion which seems contradicted
by the feedback of 1969, One may well ask, then, whether
the feedback model, as formulated, and the hypotheses
drawn from it, are of real utility in understanding the
relationships between participants in the judicial pro-
cess. Before any conclusions can be made about the
apparent failure of the model to predict the 19ti9 crisis,
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however, it is imperative to recognize fully the nature
of the crisis and to understand the contributions of
the model prior to it.
I . Status of the Hypotheses
In collating the major contributions of various
studies of impact in the judicial process, Stephen Wasby
has proposed a wide-ranging set of testable assumptions,
some of which are of interest here in clarifying and
refining the original hypotheses drawn from the feedback
model. By synthesizing both sets of propositions and
summarizing some of the relevant evidence presented thus
far, it will be easier to evaluate both the significance
of the data and consequently the utility of the model
itself
,
The first hypothesis is one not specifically stated
at the outset but one which has been an almost constant
assumption throughout Part Three.
Hypothesis 1 . Feedback tends to be cumulative
over time.
Substantial evidence has been presented in Part
Three to support this assumption. We have seen that as
a general rule when negative feedback to a particular
decision goes unheeded, later decisions are attacked
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with a greater ferocity than otherwise would have been
the case. Congressional anti-Court legislation became
increasingly voluminous throughout the period under
investigation. Moreover, particular case-specific
legislation often continued to be introduced long after
the offending decision had been handed down and, in some
cases, long after subsequent modifying decisions had
been rendered. Negative public opinion, shown in Table
8 to have grown rather dramatically from 1962 to 1969,
and the increasing rates of noncompliance by the police
and lower courts also serve to support Hypothesis 1.
Similarly, the data would seem to support the
related proposition that "a line of cases will have a
2
greater impact than a single case.” Gno probable reason
for the cumulative effect of negative feedback is the
phenomenon of latent feedback indicated in the original
model. Frustrated opponents of judicial decisions are
thought to be available sources of manifest feedback in
the future. Miranda , for example, had the effect of
galvanizing fragmentary opposition which had been aroused
by earlier decisions but therefore had not been very well
^See also Wasby, p. 258.
^Wasby, p. 247.
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3
articulated. Although Ma pp had posed just as serious
a limitation to the police, the outcry against Miranda
was greater in part because its opponents were added
to those who had earlier opposed Mapp .
^
The second and third hypotheses were stated in
Part One and may be examined together:
Hypothesis 2 . Cumulative negative feedback will
produce a change in the Court’s output propor-
tional to its intensity, to the threat that is
perceived to accompany it, and to the clarity
and speed of its transmission.
Hypothesis 3
.
"When the Court 'backs off' from
disliked decisions the effect will be to reduce
political controversy . "5
Those propositions are, of course, the heart of
the model since they provide the dynamism of the feedback
process. Figure 18, which roughly summarized the infor-
mation contained in Parts Two and Three, indicated a
clear feedback relationship between the justices and
their critics: Court action, public response, Court
reaction, public response, and so on.
Hypothesis 4 . The judicial system emphasizes
primary and secondary forms of feedback because
they are most efficient.
Again, Part Three has found that most of the iden-
tifiable negative feedback to the Warren Court's criminal
^Pye, pt 72.
^Wasby, p. 162.
I b i d . , p. 247.
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procedures decisions was of either the primary or secon-
dary varieties. Pronouncements by legislators, public
officials, and members of the legal fraternity comprised
a great percentage of public criticism while general
anti-crime legislation accounted for most of the rest.
Direct and substantial attacks upon the Court's juris-
diction or membership were seldom threatened.
Since negative feedback is cumulative, since cumu-
lative negative feedback promotes change, and since
change reduces feedback, it follows that failure to
change will escalate the intensity of the feedback.
T hus
:
Hypothesis 5
.
In the event of a perceived failure
to respond to the milder primary and secondary
forms, there is an increasing tendency for the
employment of intense tertiary feedback to force
the Court into submission.
To the extent that this proposition is a synthesis
of the others, there is a certain logic for its acceptance.
Certainly it was borne out in the heat of the 1968 crisis
with the Omnibus Crime Act and the defeat of the Fortas
nomination. Even more convincing evidence of its opera-
tion will be indicated in an examination of the events
of 1969.
In addition to the aggregate data, there is addi-
tional evidence to be found in specific cases and in
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individual statements that the Court, or at least some
of its members, respond to negative feedback. The
presence of Justices Warren, Brennan, and White at meet-
ings of the Conference of Chief Justices and the ABA has
already been mentioned. Justice Warren anticipated feed-
back in his Miranda opinion by arguing that statutory
change would not affect the Court's conclusion. ^ When
Miranda was attacked on the grounds of its severe impact
on law enforcement, even the dissenters responded by
defending the ruling. In the Judiciary Committee hear-
ings concerning his nomination as Chief Justice, Abe
Fortas exposed a sensitivity to feedback and an aware-
ness that anti-defendant decisions might be used, at
least in part, for purposes of appeasement. In the face
of an attack upon a host of Supreme Court criminal pro-
cedures decisions, Fortas grasped one of the few notable
exceptions to the recent liberal trend
—
Warden v. Hayden
—and used it to defend the Court as a champion of the
. . 8police
.
6 384 U.S. 436, 490-491.
7
New York Times . August 4, 1967, p. 48.
8
U.S., Congress, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry, pp. 170
171
.
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It is also clear that some decisions were made
specifically to counter noncompliance to earlier ones.
Gideon was decided explicitly because of fear that under
the Betts rule courts were failing to adequately protect
indigent defendants. This was subsequently true of Esco-
bedo and Miranda
.
both of which stated additional fears
of police malfeasance under prevailing rules. Chimel was
also handed down to end police abuses under the Harris
and Rabinowitz precedents. In his opinion for the major-
ity, Stewart paid particular attention to the fact that
Rabin owitz had been generally condemned in professional
. 9journals
.
On the other hand, the expanded authority given
to the police in Terry was explicitly a product of the
1 0failures of Mapp to limit searches, and some have argued
that it was also an attempt by the Court "to pacify its
critics by giving the police more freedom."' 1 In the
seme sense, it has been contended that the rulings in
[YIcCrav and Hof fa expanding the use of informants were
9395 U.S. 766, 768.
10See Graham, Self-Inflicted Wound , p. 137.
^Melvin L. Ululf, "Supreme Court Scoreboard,"
Civil Liberties. September, 1968, pp. 3-4.
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provided by the Court as counters to criticism of earlier
1 olimitations on the use of confessions. z
The Mi randa sequence is particularly indicative
of the Court’s readiness to yield to criticism. Miranda
was undoubtedly the most controversial and broadly mal-
igned decision from 1962 to 1968. Its impact, and par-
ticularly the fear that it had prohibited any police
practice which used the suspect to build the case for the
prosecution, was considerably lessened a week after its
1
3
announcement by the ruling in Schmerber . It would seem
at least reasonable to speculate that the latter case was
used to divert criticism of the former. The same has
been proposed of the limitation of Miranda ’
s
retroactivity
in Johnson v. New Jersey . Interestingly, the fact that
Johnson provided some retroactivity to that ruling itself
14
-r
produced "heated criticism" of the Court, thus, one
might again speculate that Jenkins was a moans of accom-
modating the negative feedback to Johnson . The effect
12New York T irnus
,
March 26, 1967
,
p . 9E .
13
New York T imes June 21, 1966, p. 1.
1 4
^New Y ork T imes
,
November 19, 1968, p. 24.
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of J onk ins in achieving that goal--as well as other
retroactivity rulings in accommodating feedback to other
decisions— is indicated by the report of the Committee
on Post-Conviction Remedies of the Conference of Chief
Justices which, in 1966, found such limitations on retro-
activity to reduce the burdens of the federal courts which
had resulted from recent Supreme Court decisions. 15
Of course, some members of the Court seem to have
been more receptive to negative feedback than others.
Individual movements from bloc to bloc have been identi-
fied and inferences as to the motives of such changes
have been made. In addition to these general observa-
tions, some more specific judgments about individual
responsibility for strategic retreats are appropriate.
Alpheus Mason has argued that Justices Harlan and
Black wore the primary instruments in rescuing the Supremo
Court in the 1960’s from t.he fate which it narrowly
avoided in 1937--and by roughly the same tactic of deci-
sional retreat. 15 If true, it would not have been the
first such strategic gambit for Harlan since it is often
1 ^ Proceedings : 18th Annual Meeting of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices. 1966 . p. 87.
1
5
Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Ularren ,
pp. 280-82.
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suggested that he and Frankfurter were responsible for
similarly deflecting adverse Congressional action in
1959. When, in his Miranda dissent, Harlan quoted
Justice Jackson's warning that the addition of too
many now stories to the temple of constitutional law
1 ftmight well bring the edifice down, he was clearly
speaking of the Court's critics.
As for Justice Black, the sudden conservatism in
his voting behavior noted in Part Two might well be
thought to have boon a response to feedback. On the
other hand, several students of judicial behavior believe
that the turn was neither temporary nor a response to
1 9
outside stimuli. It is clear, of course, that the
events of the 1937 crisis loomed large for Justice Black
in the 1960's and undoubtedly, as demands shifted from
simple incorporation of the first eight amendments to
more substantive interpretations of the rights of criminal
175chubert, Constitutional Polity , pp. 111-12;
Spaeth, The Warren Court , pp. 374-75.
18384 U.S. 436, 526.
19See supra, p. 191; see also Harold Spaeth,
"Race Relations and the Warren Court," 45 University of
Detroit Law Journal 255 (1965), 270-71.
316
defendants, he despaired as ho had when he felt the
Hughes Court was guilty of the same offense* But under—
lying that fear of subjective judicial activism there
also seemed to bo a fear of reprisal of the kind the
Hughes Court had averted. Thus in his dissent in Spin-
al 1 i v * United States
,
Black expressed dismay that many
recent libertarian rulings wore creating great "uneasi-
ness" among members of the legal fraternity, a turn that
. 20jeopardized future decisions of the Court. And in
R e c z n i
k
v. City of Lorain his motives were even more
clear: "I regret very much that this Court, by its
hasty, summary reversal, is providing its critics with
such choice ammunition for their attacks."^ 1 There is
some evidence that such attention to anticipated food-
22back was particularly acute in search and seizure cases,
a suggestion about which more will be said shortly. In
any event, there seems little doubt that in at least some
instances negative votes were prompted by extant, and
future public hostility.
Returning to the original hypotheses, the last
20 393 U.5. 410, 432-33
21 393 U .S . 166
,
174.
22
s C0 supra, p. 102 .
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sov/en terms of the Warren Court are quite encouraging
as to the utility of the feedback model. Most of the
hypotheses have received substantial support. There
does seem to be evidence that negative feedback is
cumulative and that it will produce changes in Supreme
Court output proportional to its intensity, potency,
and clarity. Most of the negative feedback noted in
Part Throe was of the primary and secondary varieties.
The last two years of the Warren period certainly suggest
that when the critics do not feel appeased by a change
in output they increasingly tend to utilize more extreme
instruments to insure change. There has even been some
evidence to support the secondary hypotheses in Part
Two that search and seizure and retroactivity cases were
used by some members of the Court as vehicles for stra-
tegic retreats. At the very least there has been no
evidence which would lead one to discard them.
Vet since the judicial process is conceptualized
not merely as one of stimulus-response in which the Court
reacts to its hostile publics, but also as a "boundary-
interchange” system in which the Court's reactions serve
as feedback in other subsystems, ultimately the utility
of the model depends upon the status of Hypothesis e.
If, in spite of a recognizable attempt by the Court to
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back off," political controversy remains or even esca-
lates, then the feedback mechanism cannot really be said
to have provided essential stability when it was most
critical. And, although for the most part public criti-
cism has tended to abate following a Court retreat, it
did not do so in early 1969 in spite of the decisions of
the 1968 Term. There are several possible explanations:
perhaps the Court had not backed off enough or made the
retreat clear to its critics; perhaps the time-lag con-
sidered above left the Court’s efforts untransmittod to
its critics during the 1968 Term or left the information
that those decisions were not sufficient untransmitted
to the Court. Undoubtedly both factors were operative.
One preliminary conclusion, then, which might be drawn
from this ultimate systematic dysfunction is that the
feedback mechanism is sometimes cumbersome and sluggish.
The judicial system depends on it yet does not adequately
nurture and perfect it. It is undoubtedly true that
communication links between the courts and the executive
23
and legislative decision-makers are inadequate.
This sluggishness of the feedback mechanism is
23
Jacob, Justice in America , p. 147.
319
exacerbated whenever the issues involved are especially
emotion-laden--i.e., both the judges and their critics
fail to fulfill their systemic roles when they are per-
O /•
sonally committed to a policy or against it. This was
increasingly true of criminal procedure cases, and par-
ticularly with the stimulus of the 1968 campaign. As
Ulasby has suggested, a "relevant variable" affecting the
nature of decisional impact is the political and social
context into which it is thrown.^ Since the context of
1968 was unusual in the extent to which already high
emotional commitments were further stirred by the cam-
paign’s "law and order" theme, the model's momentary fail-
ure may have been an aberration. Since judges exercise
discretion only within the confines of the political
9 A
process, and "must respect the social forces that
determine elections," 27 the failure of the Court to salve
^Marshall
,
p. 183.
25,,Wasby, p. 47.
26Jack Peltason , "Judicial Process: Introduction,"
International Encyclopedia of the Soc ial Sciences , \i o 1 • 8
,
283, 287.
27
75-76
Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter; * PP»
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the wounds of its enemies in 1968 may have resulted
from a failure to recognize that its enemies had pro-
foundly changed. It had not paid sufficient heed to the
forces which prompted the election of Richard Nixon.
In any event, the close of the Warren era was as
contentious as its beginning. The issues had changed,
to be sure, yet the boldness tempered by occasional
strategic caution remained. But at the end of the era
the future seemed less in the hands of the judges than
in the hands of its antagonists. It was not to be doubted
that the efforts of the Warren majority to reform criminal
law would come to nothing unless the tide of political
2 8
opinion against the Court were reversed. Although the
feedback process seemed insufficient to allay resort to
more drastic tertiary measures, a close examination of
1968 and the first term of Warren’s successor will offer
better insight into the operation of that mechanism.
II. The Burger Court and the 1969 Term
The final months of the Warren Court witnessed the
apogee of long-accumulating negative feedback. In spite
of a general retreat in the 1968 Term, the first half of
20
Bickel, The Supremo Court and the Idea of Pro
qress
,
p. 94.
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1969 saw a continuation of extreme hostility toward the
Court at the fevered pitch of 1968. Then, in late
Spring, opposition suddenly collapsed as the critics
finally seemed to feel satisfied that their efforts
were rewarded, and all but the most convinced opponents
began to deal very differently with the Court. There
are several plausible reasons for the change: the forced
resignation of Justice Fortas in May and the seeming
catharsis which accompanied it; the appointment of Chief
Justice Burger soon thereafter and the promise of similar
"law and order" appointments to follow; the replacement
of the hysterical Court-baiting of the Nixon campaign by
executive pronouncements that the crime problem was more
complex than had earlier been suggested. Or perhaps
the change was simply the natural product of boredom and
a desire on the part of the public and Congress to turn
from a matter which had occupied their attention for too
long
«
The shift was not immediate, however, and the
first half of 1969 exemplified the extreme direction
which feedback can take when previous milder feedback is
is thought to have been ignored. Picking up where his
29See New York Times . February 2, 1969, p. 23.
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campaign had loft off, on January 31 President Nixon
proposed a twelve-point anti-crime program for the
District of Columbia which was in many respects even
more illiberal and repressive than the final version of
the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968. Included in the bill
were a broadened wiretapping authority, a search warrant
authority which permits police entry without notice, and
a provision for pre-trial detention of any suspect con-
sidered by a magistrate to be dangerous.^ Even Senator
Ervin, a major antagonist of recent criminal procedure
rulings and a contributor to the 1968 Act, called the
proposal "repressive, near-sighted, intolerant, unfair,
and vindictive." 31 Particularly contentious was the
section dealing with preventive detention which left
little doubt as to the continued response of the executive
to the Warren Court’s "criminal-coddling," on the one hand,
but which was also defended as being a necessary qualifi-
cation of the permissiveness that had seriously slowed
the legal process with myriad appeals and complex criminal
litigation. 32 Preventive detention seemed the primary
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , F ebruary
7, 1969, p. 214.
3
^ New York Times , March 30, 1970, p. 42.
32 Fred Graham, "Some Problems in the Safeguards for
Defendants," New York Times , February 9, 1969, p. 8E
.
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battle cry of Court foes in early 1969: of sixty anti-
crime anti-Court bills introduced in Congress, over half
were concerned with such a proposal. Other moasures
introduced included several to overrule such early deci-
sions as M 1 randa
,
Griffin
, and Wade and such recent ones
as Recznik
,
Spinoll
i
. and Chimel . The total number of
issue-9pecif ic and diffuse anti-Court proposals was
nearly double that of any other year, and as a percentage
of total legislation introduced it was second only to
1968.
President Nixon did not stop with preventive deten-
tion but continued his assault by endorsing several of
33the case-specific bills. By April it was widely be-
lieved that ho was preparing a message which would urge
Congress to modify certain Fourth Amendment decisions
and would propose a Constitutional Amendment designed
to alter the Fifth Amendment so as to reverse Miranda
rr A
and Ulade as they applied to the states. -
'
Apparently the 1968 Term’s retreat had not pro-
duced the mollifying effect anticipated by the model.
Clearly, in 9 pito of the aggregate statistics, cases
like Marchett
i
and Chimel were not as prudent as they
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports , May 9,
1969, p. 697.
^New York Times. April IB, 1969, p. 48.
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might have boon. Ono decision in particular, Alderman
v * United Status
,
proved to bo ospecially aggrevating
and servos as a good indication of the delicacy of
pro-defendant dispositions in periods of hostility.
There, it will be recalled, a majority of six had held
that entire transcripts of illegally monitored conversa-
tions must be given to defendants oven in national secur-
ity cases. On the basis of the political jeopardy in
which this ruling placed the Justice Department, the
government immediately asked the Court for a rehearing.'-’ 5
As is customary, the Court denied the rehearing but with-
in two weeks it announced Giordano and Taolianetti
.
which
considerably restricted the apparent breadth of the
original ruling. But as if to underscore his department's
opposition to the very audacity of Alderman
.
Katz
,
Berger
.
and other such limitations which the Court had imposed
on wiretapping authority, the Attorney General claimed
a general right by the government to eavesdrop in all
"foreign intelligence" and domestic subversion cases
without a court order, a grant of power not even con-
36
templated in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act. Executive
^ J
New York Times . March 20, 1969, p. 29.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , June 20,
1969, p. 1065.
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authority to insure national security, he argued, is
limited neither by statutory restrictions nor even by
those of the Fourth Amendment
Nor did the Attorney General confine his dismis-
sal of Supreme Court decisions to the issue of wire-
tapping, In July, testifying before the House Select
Committee on Crime, he asserted that the Justice Depart-
ment would not be bound by such rulings as Miranda or
Wade
. Thus, pursuant to his reading of Title II of the
Omnibus Crime Act, the Department would continue to intro-
duce confessions into evidence even if there had been
inadvertent failure to warn the confessor of his rights
3 Bto silence and to an attorney.
But severe as they were, neither legislation, nor
executive denunciations, nor evasions by enforcement
officials provided the Court’s opponents with final satis-
faction and release from their preoccupation with criminal
procedures decisions. The most furious and dramatic clash
37
Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law .
Order, and Freedom in America (New York: E. P. Dutton
and Co., 1970)
,
p"» 243
.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , August
8, 1969, p. 1449.
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in which tho Court had boon involved for perhaps thirty
years was the forced resignation of Justice Fortas, an
event which sated tho appetites of oven the most con-
vinced antagonists and damped tho enthusiasm of the
most ardent defenders. The Fortas crisis in one sense
may be seen as quite unrelated to tho patterns of feed-
back thus far explored. But given the circumstances of
candidate Nixon's promise to turn the Court around, on
the one handj orientation of many who were responsible
for tho confirmation defeat a year before, on the other;
and the obvious relationship between tho two factors, tho
crisis may also bo considered to have been the ultimate
expression of negative feedback; chastisement, repri-
sal, and forced alteration of the Court’s composition.
On (Yla y 5, following the publication of an article
in Life Magazine suggesting judicial impropriety in
Fortas' financial dealings, members of Congress began
39
publicly and earnestly calling for his resignation.
Whether Fortas was actually guilty of impeachable conduct
as his attackers suggested is a matter best left to the
guardians of codes of legal ethics. But it seems cleai
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , May 9,
1969, pp. 673-74.
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in retrospect that little evidence of such conduct uias
ever brought forth and that the pressures which finally
produced the resignation were those of innuendo and
half-truth. And while it may be overstating the issue
to suggest that such innuendos were consciously generat-
ed tertiary feedback, there is some supportive evidence
for it. In a "secret" meeting between Chief Justice
UJarren and Attorney General Mitchell in mid-May, for
example, Warren was urged to seek Fortas' resignation
on the grounds that the Justice Department had discovered
"far more serious" evidence than had been previously pub-
licized which would ultimately prove injurious to the
Court.^ The contents of that meeting were later leaked
to the press and served to encourage public belief that
the allegations were more than simply administration
propaganda. It does not seem likely that the source of
the leak was the Chief Justice, since the Court suffered
nearly as much as Fortas from the affair. And although
the Attorney General later declared that the meeting had
not been arranged at the President's behest, that decla-
^Conoressiona 1 Quarterly Weekly Report , May 16,
1969, p. 707.
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ration seems suspect in view of the magnitude of the
issue. One might conclude that the administration had
consciously sought to create a vacancy by the promotion
of unsubstantiated hearsay. In addition, it seems more
than coincidental that at. the same time similar s u g g e s
—
tions of impeachable conduct--again financial consorting
with criminals—wore also leveled against Justice Doug-
41las. In view of the IRS investigation leading to the
charge against Douglas, there is at least reason to ques-
tion whether this attack, coordinated with that against
Fortas, was not principally designed to force another
liberal off the Bench,
Whether the assault upon Justice Fortas was actu-
ally a manifestation of negative feedback to the decisions
of the Warren Court or simply one of honest indignation
at judicial impropriety, there can be little doubt that
it greatly weakened the Court’s prestige. Innumerable
bills were proposed in Congress to regulate the extra-
judicial activities of and establish an explicit code of
conduct for the members of the Supremo Court. Such meas-
41
Ibid
. , pp. 708-09.
^See New York Times, Way 26, 1969, p, 1.
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ures uiera headed off only by a promise that the Judi-
cial Conference would itself itioua in that direction. 43
Yet there may also have been a sudden recognition of
the Court's vulnerability, undoubtedly coupled with the
assurance of the reduced size of its liberal majority,
which produced a dramatic change in the nature and degree
of negative feedback. The climax of the Fortas affair
with his resignation seemed to provide a kind of cathar-
sis for the Ularren Court's enemies such that by late
Spring the attack which had raged for four years appeared
to be at an end. As if to signal that change President
Nixon put aside his plan, then under careful examination
in the Justice Department, to amend the Fifth Amund-
. 44
ment •
The change in negative feedback was also the
product of another closely related event which occurred
shortly after Fortas' resignation. On May 21, in fulfill-
ment of his campaign promise, the President appointed as
Earl UJarron's successor one of the most outspoken critics
of the recent Supreme Court trend in the area of criminal
43New York Times , May 25, 1969, p. 1.
44
Graham, Self-Inflicted Wound , pp. 301-02} Harris,
Justice, p. 237.
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procedures thon sitting on the federal bench, Warren
Burger. Thus, in the face of an institutional crisis,
a sense of stability and authority was provided by a
man whose views about criminal justice were closely akin
to those of the general public. In announcing the appoint-
ment, the President called particular attention to Bur-
ger's anti-defendant record and publicly hoped that the
new Chief Justice would help reverse the Court's recent
direction. The now sense of public confidence which
the appointment created might itself have rescued the
Court. In addition, the fact that the appointment was
of a Chief Justice, primus inter pares
.
rather than an
Associate Justice, undoubtedly carried with it greater
impact--and also greater imprint upon the Court of the
appointor. The Court suddenly became the Burger Court,
^Burger's position on the rights of criminal de-
fendants had been made quite clear before his appoint-
ment, Two months earlier ho had specifically indicted
the Warren majority by noting that every time the judges
added to the already myriad rules of criminal procedure,
"we make it less likely that any police officer will be
able to follow the guidelines we lay down." F razier v.
United States
.
March 14, 1969, unreported; quoted in
Graham, ibid ,
,
p. 287.
46
Ibid
., p. 306.
a product of the Nixon Administration, and thus immedi-
ately less likely to fall prey to the kinds of adminis-
tration criticism which had characterized the Nixon
campaign
.
Whether produced by the Fortas resignation or the
Burger appointment, or both, by Spring of 1969 there were
clear indications of abatement of anti-Court sentiment.
Although the level of Congressional criticism remained
quite high until after the events of Way, negative feed-
back from law enforcement personnel was slackening. In
an interview of officials in a dozen major cities, the
New Y ork T imes discovered that there had been a marked
decrease from 1968 to 1970 in police willingness to blame
47
the Supreme Court for increased rates of crime. Shift-
ing from previously stated hostility to such decisions
as Wiranda
.
police had come to realize that they could
survive even the most confining of the Court’s limita-
,
.
48
tions
.
In Congress the authority of anti-Court forces als
began to wane noticeably by the Summer of 1969. To be
47
New Y ork T imes
,
April 6, 1970, p. 1
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sure, the District of Columbia Crime Bill, including
a "no-knock" and an ant i-Mapp provision, passed the
Senate with ease. 4q But Congress’ attention had turned
to more sanguine matters. In late June the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee decided after a five year lapse to
reconsider the creation of a federal public defender
system. By Fall, the District of Columbia Committee,
having spent its anti-crime enthusiasm, reported the
proposal which was then passed as the D. C. Public
Defender Act of 1969.
^
Of considerably more importance in identifying a
change in the fortunes of the anti-Court faction in
Congress were the fates of the Nixon nominees to replace
Justice Fortas. Within four months, from December 1969
to April 1970, the nominations of Clement Haynsworth
and Harold Carswell wore defeated by the Senate. Perhaps
previous foes had suddenly seen the jeopardy in which
the Court institution had been placed; perhaps they recog-
nized that the tide of pro-defendant rulings had indeed
turned; or perhaps those responsible for the defeat of
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . December
5, 1969, pp. 2493, 2542.
^Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , July 4,
1969, pp. 1190-91.
^ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , December
5, 1969, p. 2494.
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Fortas * appointment two years earlier had been hoisted
on their own petards of judicial ethics. For whatever
reason, the defenders of the Court, all of whom had been
strangely silent in both Fortas crises, were suddenly in
a sufficiently strong position to reject Supreme Court
appointments outright, only the second and third such
defeats in this century.
Yet in retrospect, the feedback in 1969, momentary
though it was, seems to have made a deep and perhaps
lasting mark on the disposition of the Supreme Court
toward cases involving the rights of criminal defendants.
If the 1969 Term in fact can be shown to reflect a major
retreat from previous terms, one can infer additional
support for Hypothesis #1 of the feedback model. Fur-
thermore, if the retreat can be shown to be a more per-
vasive and long-lived reversal of the direction in which
the Warren Court had moved, then perhaps one can infer
support for Hypotheses #2 and #3. It might well be noted
that the Court's moderation in 1968 had been an insuffi-
cient response to the intense secondary feedback of 1968;
and that subsequent tertiary feedback, while extreme,
was in a systemic sense predictable and efficient.
There is substantial evidence to be found in the
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first year of Burger’s tenure to support these conclu-
sions. The 1969 Term represented not only a retreat
from the average pro-defendant statistics of the 1962-
1968 period, but also bore it little resemblance even
to the term immediately preceding it, one previously
indicated to have been itself a retreat (see Table 10).
Moreover, the hypotheses draw support from these data
insofar as the reduced level of negative feedback
following the Spring of 1969 seemed to have been main-
tained throughout the remainder of the year.
TABLE 10
PRO-DEFENDANT DISPOSITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT,
1962-1969
1962-
1968 1968 1969
Pro-Defendant
Cases 72% 69% 42/o
Pro-Defendant
V ot es 66% 6b% 48/o
These cases, too, indicate not only individual
retreats from decisions of the Warren majority, but also
suggest a more subtle, more far-reaching, and ultimately
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more revisionist effort to employ the strategy of judi-
cial self-restraint* The fact that no replacement for
Justice Fortas was confirmed until very late in the
Term, thus leaving only eight members sitting on the
Court, made that effort an easier one. The result was a
term in which individual decisions were deviations from
precedents and in which the sum was as undistinguished
and equivocal as it was unobtrusive. The effect, whether
by design or by accident, was to soften the impact of the
52Supreme C ourt
.
Insofar as the public response to the 1969 Term
is concerned, it is notable that less than half of the
cases decided were favorable to the defendant, and that
of those only two involved limitations on police practices.
53
One of them, Vale v, L otiis iana , applied the Chimel
ruling to hold that legitimate arrests do not justify
warrantless searches of premises even though there is
probable cause to search.
54
The second, Mora les v» New York , was a per curiam
5 ~ New York T imes , July 2, 1970, p. 30.
S -5
399 U.S. 30 (1970).
54
396 U.S. 102 (1969) .
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clarification of the "st op-and-f risk” cases. There a
majority of seven held the Sibron and T errv rule would
not alone justify the use of confessions taken during
custodial questioning of a suspect detained on less than
probable cause for arrest. As a related matter, however,
the majority accepted the trial court denial of peti-
tioners argument that although the trial was held prior
to 01 i rand a the ’’totality of circumstances’’ in a pre-
Wade line-up identification could not show sufficient
prejudice to violate the due process clause in spite of
55Davis
.
And the same day that Vale was decided, the
majority in another case deviated sharply from Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Company and Preston v. United States by
ruling that an automobile which was impounded following
arrest may be searched without a warrant since it validly
could have been searched without a warrant incident to
the arrest,^’ Justice Harlan noted in dissent that such
a conclusion ignored the import of prior decisions which
57
had sought to limit the scope of warrantless searches.
"’^Coleman v. A labaroa . 399 U.5. 1 (1970),
^’Chambers v. lYianroney , 399 U.S. 42, 9C 5, Ct,
1975, ( 1970)
.
57 90 S. Ct. 1975, 19B6-1988
.
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Not only did the Court seem to avoid the most
controversial issues of police limitation, 50 but even in
those dealing only with trial procedures the preponder-
ance of decisions were anti-defendant. The relatively
non-cont roversial world of right to counsel cases was
an exception. There the Burger Court seemed to maintain
the pro-defondant momentum of its predecessor. Rein-
forcing the Sixth Amendment guarantee of Hamilton
. White
and even Mi randa
.
Justice Brennan ruled in Coleman v.
A labama that since a preliminary hearing is a "criti-
cal stage" of prosecution, it demands the provisions of
counsel even though evidence taken at that juncture is
not used at the trial. In an even more significant
holding, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principle that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has."^
Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion in
Williams v. Illinois/11 held that statutes permitting
58mNew Y ork Times, July 2, 1970,
59
399 U.S. 1.
S0
351 u.s. 12, 19.
61 399 U.S. 235 (1970) .
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imprisonment for more than the maximum term allowed for
a crime, in order that convicts in default of payment
of fines or court costs might "work them off," violate
the equal protection of the laws clause. This ruling
was particularly acute in that forty-seven states at the
time provided for such imprisonment, c
But the willingness of the Court to maintain the
momentum of equal protection for indigent defendants
did not also extend to other Sixth Amendment issues.
Although a majority did hold that the right to a jury
trial, established against state infringement in Duncan
v. Louisiana
.
applies to all cases in which the possible
sentence is more than six months, it reversed the com-
mon law practice of twelve-member juries by upholding
a Florida statute which provided for only six.^ 4 And
in an even more remarkable decision, the Court, with
Justice Brennan alone dissenting, withdrew from prior
rulings concerning the status of "hearsay" evidence
guaranteeing the right to confront witnesses. In Cali-
6 2^
I bid . . Appendix I.
^Ba ldwin v. New York , 399 U.5. 66 (1970).
64Ulilliams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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6 5
F ornia v. Croon tho majority Found that a witness's
testimony From a preliminary hearing may bo introduced
as evidence even though it bo denied by the witness at
the trial as long as he is given tho opportunity to
explain the change. As Brennan argued in dissent, this
conclusion seems at odds with tho holding oF Douqlas v.
A labama
.
that tho right to conFront witnesses is violated
by tho use of extra-judicial statements which are not
testified to by tho witness at the trial, and that of
Barber v. Page
.
that confrontation at a preliminary hear-
ing is no substitute for the right to confront at the
trial itself. 65
Perhaps the most thoroughgoing retreats from
specific Ularren Court precedents came in the area of
self-incrimination. Although the position of Chief
fin
Justice Burger came as no surprise, it is curious that
65 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970).
66
90 S. Ct. 1930, 1953-1956.
67
Seo, for example, the discussion among Warren £
.
Burger, Walter Schaefer, Sam Dash, Robert Fu • Hutchins,
and Gresham N. Sykes, "The Adversary System," Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara,
California, Tape Recording #460.
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^our casos doaling with the issuo uioro decided by
a six-member majority, Justices Black and Douglas being
the only dissenters in each. In U) ill.jams v. Florida it
was concluded that neither the Fifth Amendment's pro-
tection against self-incrimination nor the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial are violated by
statutes which require "notice of alibi"— including
specific details as to time and place--bef ore trial.
This, it would seem, serves as an invitation for manda-
tory pre-trial disclosure of other evidence, and, in
Justice Black’s opinion, requires the defendant "to dis-
close information to the State so that the State can use
fl fl
that information to destroy him," That, in turn, would
seem to be altogether at odds with both thestatement and
the spirit of the Fifth Amendment, Similarly, in T urner
v. United States^ the majority sustained a federal law
permitting an inference of guilt of receiving illegally
imported drugs simply from the fact of possession unless
the defendant satisfactorily demonstrates that ho was
unaware of the illegal importation. The ruling not only
6fl396 U.S. 78 (1970)
.
69
396 U.S, 398 (1970).
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seem to have further shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant in violation of the Fifth Amendment, but gener-
ally to have permitted conviction on the charges wholly
7 (j 7<i
unproved. In IY1 inor v. United States the Court moved
auiay from the Loary rule by holding that a fedoral statute
which stipulated that any sale of narcotics be made pur-
suant to an official order from including the seller's
namo, i3 not an unconstitutional restriction of the
sol lor ' s right against self -incrimina t ion even though it
had already boon held to bo such a restriction upon the
72buyer. And in United States v. Knox the Court retreated
from tho closely rolated cases of Warchett
i
and Crosso by
ruling that fraudulent statements in a wagering tax form
are punishable oven though tho requirement to file tho
form had beon previously hold to bo unconstitutional.
Tho Burger Court was considerably more expansive
during its first term in Fifth Amendment "double Jeopardy"
cases. Using the recent Bent on decision to discredit tho
7USee Justice Black dissenting, ibid . , pp. 427-
429.
7
1
396 U.S. 87 (1969)
.
72
396 U.S. 77 (1969)
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long-standing precedent of Hoag v. Now Jersey . 73 a major-
ity of seven held that the federal rule of collateral
estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment and applied
V Ato the states in the F ourteenth. 1 hus, one may not bo
tried on issues which had been substantially litigated
at an earlier trial— in the instant case tried separate-
ly for robberty of several victims in a single act. And
in Price v. Georgia the Court unanimously held that
the right against double jeopardy protected a defendant
who had been tried on one charge, convicted of a lesser
offense, and subsequently had the conviction reversed
on appeal from being retried on the original charge.
The greatest deviation from the decisions of the
UJarren Court appeared in cases involving negotiated pleas
of "guilty." The retreat is perhaps most apparent—and
predictable--because of the recent vintage of the princi-
ples stated in McCarthy and boykin ; or perhaps because
of the forfeiture of numerous constitutional protections
involved in plea bargaining. In two decisions the Court
73356 U.S. 464, (1958).
7 ^
Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
75
398 U.S. 323 (1970).
76 394 U.S. 459, 466.
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hold that a plea of guilty may not be subsequently
attacked as involuntary simply because it was entered
in order to avoid the possibility of a death penalty. 77
In a third case, McMann v. Richardson . ' the Court held
that a defendant whoso plea was tendered because of the
potential introduction of his confession at a trial
could not collaterally attack his conviction on grounds
that the confession which prompted the plea had been
coerced. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent,
such a conclusion is not only a departure from the
spirit of Boykin and McCarthy . but a reversal of Harrison
v. United States which had found that where testimony is
induced by a coerced confession it must be excluded from
79
evidence as "poisoned fruit."
The total effect of the three decisions was to
make already vulnerable defendants oven more vulnerable
by "insulating all guilty pleas from subsequent attack
no matter what unconstitutional action of government may
7? Parker v. North Carolina , 397 U.S. 790 (1970)
j
B rady v • United States , 397 U.S. 42 (1970;.
?P
397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970).
79
90 S. Ct. 1441, 1453.
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have induced a particular plea. ,,RC In situations where
such guarantees as the rights to counsel, to a jury
trial, to confront witnesses, and against self-incrimi-
nation are waived at the outset, the Court hold that
those few remaining protections which might have applied
are inoperative as well, 8 ^
It is tempting, of course, to speculate that the
reversal of the Warren Court’s direction in the 1969 Term
was the direct product of the appointment of Warren Bur-
ger. Perhaps it was, insofar as the fact of the appoint-
ment and its circumstances served notice to the member-
ship that the institution was in jeopardy. But in the
direct sense of the new Chief constituting the essential
fifth vote for the conservatives, or even in the indirect
sense of his "marshalling" the Court to accept his view
of things, there is little evidence of any cause and
effect. In the first place, only three cases wore decided
by a single vote and Chief Justice Burger voted with the
80
Ibid , t 1451.
81 For example, in McMann the majority also held
that Jackson v. Denno applied retroactively only where
a confession was actually introduced at the trial and
not in cases of guilty pleas even though the plea might
have been induced by the existing practice. ^b_id . , 1450,
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majority in only two of them* Of all the cases in which
ho participated, moreover, ho voted with the majority in
only 84%, less frequently than anyone but Black and
Douglas. There is a bettor case to be made for Justice
White as the "swing" member since he was the only one to
have voted with the majority in every case which the
Court decided. The shift, instead, seems to have been
precipitated by a general move of the entire Court. In
percentages of pro-defendant votes cast, every member
dropped at least ten points even from the relatively
anti-defendant 1968 Term (see Table 11). To be sure,
the new Chief Justice had the lowest score and the jump
from Warren's 1968 figure to Burger's in 1969 was over
twice that for any individual. But the negative change
was clearly universal. Both Scale Score Indices and
simply rank orderings for the two years correlate at a
very high level: for the seven members serving both
terms, r = .91 and r
s =
.96. In other words, while the
attitudes of each member changed greatly from one year
to the next, the relative attitudes of all the members
remained constant.
As to the Chief Justice’s indirect impact on his
brethren, there is again little evidence to support the
thesis that he was responsible for the conservative turn.
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TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES
1968
CAST FOR
and 1969
CRIMINAL
TERMS
DEFENDANTS,
1968 1969
Douglas 85% 73%
Brennan 72 54
Marshall 76 54
Harlan 64 50
White 53 42
Stewart 49 36
Black 54 42
Warren 77 --
Burger — — 28
Figure 19 shows that although Burger was the primary
member of a middle bloc, the bloc was only secondary in
cohesion and was comprised of only two members, with
tangential support from Stewart, Of greater interest
insofar as the ultimate disposition of cases is concerned
is Justice White. With the shift in the Court’s center
of gravity to the right, he seems to have emerged as a
critical figure, Voting on the middle-right of a con-
servative Court, White nonetheless maintained closer
the left than did any other con-affinity with those on
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FIGURE 19. VOTING BLOCS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CASES (1969 TERM)
F actor I F act or II Factor III
Black .84 Marshall .94 Burger .91
Douglas .41 Brennan .91 White .03
Marhsall -.08 Douglas . 44 [Stewart .55
Brennan -.09 White .36 Harlan .28
White -.23 Stewart .18 Brennan .06
Burger -.24 Burger -.12 Marshall -.02
Stewart -.75 Harlan -.14 Black -.16
Harlan -.89 Black -.47 Douglas -.59
ICI = ICI = .81 ( primary) ICI = .68 (secondary)
SSI = .15 (right
)
SSI — .51 (middle) SSI = .34 (middle)
(with Douglas: (with Douglas: (with Stewart:
ICI = .20 ICI = .44 ICI = .69
SSI = .46) SSI = .60) SSI = .35)
Court SSI = .42
servative. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he
voted with the majority in all cases, including the eleven
pro-defendant., and also that of fifteen anti-defondant
decisions ho wrote the opinion of the Court in eight.
Justice Black's position on the right is also im-
portant both in its contribution to the Court's overall
posture in 1969 and also in terms of the direction the
Court was anticipated to take in subsequent years. Both
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his independence and his increasingly anti-defendant
posture were again clear* But unlike previous years,
Black’s anti-defendant position was not produced by a
large number of search and seizure cases since only two
of the 1969 decisions considered that issue. Rather, it
must be concluded that his negative attitude extended
even to those areas in which in earlier years he had been
quite libertarian. Furthermore, since the trend in Black’s
voting in criminal procedures has been consistent since
1964, it cannot very well be said to have been only momen-
tary. Yet before it bo concluded that his increased con-
servatism will be projected into the future, it must also
be recognized that Justice Douglas, the most pro-defen-
dant member of the Court, was the only one with whom
Black had any agreement. In fact, the two registered the
only dissent in four anti-defendant cases.
Ultimately, the factor-bloc analysis indicates,
as the percentages of pro-defendant votes, that the
changed direction of the Court was the result of many
factors and of the behavior of all its members. As in
1964, what had been a fairly cohesive and well-defined
left bloc from 1965 to 1968 broke apart in 1969 into
smaller, loss cohesive groups.
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The 1969 Term, both in specific decisions and in
aggregate statistics, was thus a considerable deviation
from the general direction the Court had taken from 1962
to 1968, Some have argued that the new direction was
inevitable, that the work of modernizing the laws of
criminal procedure was "finished" by the end of Warren's
tenure; others point to Hugo Black's conservative turn
•
coupled with the sudden loss of Fortas and the exchange
of Warren for Burger; still others feel that the Court
had again responded to the demands of public opinion
—
and would presumably return to the task when public sen-
Q *7
timents quiesced. There is some evidence for each of
these assertions. But the nature of the change, particu-
larly when it is seen against the feedback-response pat-
terns of 1962 to 1968, and the appointment of Harry
Blackmun, 84 suggests that the term was not an aberration
but the stable and lasting alteration of output antici-
pated by the feedback model.
Ql
New York T imes . July 2, 1970, p. 38,
P4Justice B lackmun took the oath of office on
June 9, 1970.
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III. The Court and Its Publics
Fortner Solicitor General Archibald Cox described
the criminal procedures decisions of the second half
of the Warren period as uniques "never has there been
such a thorough-going reform of criminal procedure
Q C
within so short a time." " While, in sum, one might
ultimately agree with that judgment, at least in terms
of the Court’s intent and general momentum, it has also
been shown that the process of reform was not perfectly
consistent nor were all the major decisions of the
decade protective of individual rights. There were,
in fact, identifiable respites from judicial activism.
Those pauses--whether actual retreats from an ordinarily
pro-defendant direction or simply periods of moderation
--have been seen to have corresponded rather well with
increases in negative feedback, a relationship which
might be thought inevitable given natural limitations on
the potential for Court policy-making.
Typically, the judges began to up-grade practices
in the administration of criminal justice by employing
traditional means of statutory interpretation and judicial
85
Cox, p . •
351
oversight. As unwanted practices refused to yield to
these tactics, the Court increasingly moved toward more
generalized rulings: i.e., from holding that this
application of practice A, is bad, to practice A. itself
is bad. The ^act that reform was not forthcoming from
other political institutions, particularly the states,
left the responsibility with the Court, a role with
87
which neither the states nor the Court was satisfied.
It was precisely this move in the direction of increased
intervention, of uniform rule-making, and of "constitu-
tionalizing” a process which in its nature demands
f loxibility--a move which Packer has characterized as one
O Q
of desperation by the Court --which cast the liberal
majority as villains in a period of rising crime. Since
it shouldered the task of reform, at least in its more
subtle and difficult forms, virtually alone, it necessa-
rily made itself solely responsible for many major policy
innovations of broad compass. If, as Bickel has argued,
85Herbert L. Packer, "The Courts, the Police, and
the Rest of Us," 57 Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology .
and Police Science 238 (1966 ) , 239
.
87 07Cox, p. 87.
88
Packer, " The Courts, the Police, and the Rest
of Us ." p, 240.
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there is 8 quantitative limit to the number of major*
principled interventions the Court can permit itself
89per decade,"" then the institutions responsible for the
high levels of negative feedback when the limit was
passed were also responsible for the very reforms against
which they reacted.
It would seem, then, that the feedback-response
mechanism operated upon the Warren Court with almost
dialectical inevitability. The Court’s intervention was
a predictable maneuver to fill a policy vacuum in crimi-
nal law; and, since any change which is perceived as a
threat to tho status quo tends to create substantial
resistance among those to whom the Court is most sensitive,
public hostility was equally predictable; finally, since
tho Court must yield to its critics in order to maintain
its own institutional legitimacy, the cycle completed
itself with modification of the original intervention.
Of course whether and how that modification actually
occurs in any feedback-response situation depends primar-
ily upon the nature and intensity of the feedback. It
is, as previously indicated, difficult to assess feedback
89Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Prooress
.
p. 94,
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with any quantitative precision. 90 Yet it is clear that
the critics of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure de-
cisions constituted—
— or at least were perceived to have
const ituted--a serious and persistent threat throughout
the 1960’s. Indeed, the attack may, in a sense, bo seen
as one of the most severe in the Court’s entire history,
since it tended to be long-lived, diverse, and—because
feedback seems also to be cumulat ive--increasingly in-
. 91tense
.
Considerable evidence of these tendencies has
been presented which, when related to decisional fluctu-
ations, seems to support the assumptions of the feedback
model. The fact that the Warren majority was finally
unsuccessful in accommodating its critics and that the
primary and secondary forms of feedback apparently failed
when they were most needed for assuring the persistence
of the system, indicates the limits of the feedback
mechanism and the tendency of competitive political
relationships to resist control.
In the end, of course, the Court and its critics
were brought to some reconciliation—the process was one
See supra
, p. 67.
91
See Arthur A. North, The Supreme Court t The Ju-
dicial Process and Judicial Politics jlMew York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1966), p"! 155
,
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of a judicial racognition of the limits of its power and
a public recognition of the dangerous consequences of
its own victory over the Court. It was finally essen-
tial that each participant yield for the sake of systemic
stability. Ultimately, the persistence of the judicial
system is dependent upon feedback mechanisms to inform
courts of impending assaults and the willingness of the
courts to withdraw from offending areas when the con-
sequences are grave. So too, however, the system also
depends upon the like willingness on the part of the
Court's antagonists to limit their attacks in response
to judicial retreat. The feedback process in this sense
is thus double-edged.
F red Graham and other journalists have begun to
note how the new trend in decisions after the Warren era
points up what was suggested at the outset of this study:
namely, that the Court's activist role depends to a
considerable degree, one which has been too often neglect
ed by students of the Court, upon the acceptability of
92
its decisions by other institutions external to it.
What has seldom been mentioned, however, is the fact that
92New York Times, July 2, 1970, p. 3ti.
355
the Court, by those very retreats from activism
.
plays
an important role in shaping those external forces.
There seems to be little doubt that the Court responds
to negative feedback by moderating its decisions; but
there is equally little doubt that negative feedback
ebbs and flows in relation to that moderation. The pro-
cess is one of communication and learning, of adjustment
and readjustment, of confrontation and accomodation.
The mechanism of feedback and response is thus in an
important sense responsible both for the dynamics of the
American judicial system and also for its persistence.
APPENDIX I
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48 2 + + J. + + + + + + 9-0 0
41 3 + (-) + + + + + + + 8-1 1
43 4 + + + + + + + -1-
|
— 8-1 0
49 5 + + J- + + + + — — 7-2 0
42 6 JL (-) + + + JL. - - 6-3 1
50 7 + + * •f - - 0 (+) 6-2 2
46 8 “f 0 + 2-7 1
45 9 «L + 2-7 0
51 10 4* 4. 2-7 0
52 11 J. + 2-7 0
44 12 0-9 0
Votes + 11 8 7 7 7 6 6 5 4 107
Votes 1 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 8
Incon-
sistencies 030000011 5
CR = 1 - = .94
_
_5 =
40CS = 1 88
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Scale #5
Guttman Scale of All Criminal Procedure Decisions (1965
Term)
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53 1 4- + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
54 2 + + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
55 5 4- + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
57 4 + + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
63 5 + 4- 4- 4* + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
62 6 + + + 4" 4- 4- 4- 4- 8-1 0
65 7 + + + + _L 4- 4- 4- — 8-1 0
60 8 + 4- + 0 4- 4- 4- 4- — 7-2 1
59 9 4- + 4* + 4- 4- + [ — — 7-2 0
68 10 + + 4” + 4- 4- 0 — 7-2 1
61 11 4" 4- _L 0 4- - 0 — 5-4 2
66 12 + + 4- + 4- - - - - 5-4 0
56 13 4- * * + - - - - - 2-5 0
69 14 ~r 4- + - - - - - 4-5 0
58 15 4- -I- - - - - - — — 2-7 0
67 16 ±1 - - 0 - - - - - 2-7 164 17 0-9 0
Votes + 16 14 13 13 12 10 10 9 5
Votes - 12345778 12
Incon-
sistencies 0003001 1 0
OR = 1
- ^
= .94
cs = 1
- 2^1
= .88
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Scale #6
Guttman Scale of All Criminal Procedure Decisions (1966
Term)
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•H O0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 •H 0 0 > O0 o O O 0 0 1 1 1 1 p P 0 •H 0
o co P !3 pq pq o CO p H
72 1 4- + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
73 2 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- + 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
82 3 + + + 4- + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
86 4 + + 4- 4- + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-o 0
87 5 + 4- + 4- + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
89 6 + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
90 7 + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
91 8 -i- + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-o 0
93 9 + 4- 4- 4- 4- -1- 4- 4- 4- 9-o 0
96 10 + + 4- 4- 4" 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-o 0
80 11 + + + 4- 9 4- 4- 4- 4- 8-1 1
94 12 + + 4- 4- 9 4- * 4- 4- 7-1 1
77 13 + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- - 8-1 0
83 14 + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- — 8-1 0
70 15 + * + 4- 4- 4- * - — 5-2 0
92 16 + + + 4- 9 4- 4- - - 6-3 1
97 17 + + + 4- q 4- - 9 - 6-3 2
98 18 + + + 4- 4- 4- - - - 6-3 0
101 19 + + + 4- 4- -1- - - - 6-3 0
78 20 + + + 4- 4- - - - - 5-4 0
79 21 + + + 4" 4- - — - - 5-4 0
85 22 + + + 4- — - 9 - - 5-4 1
100 23 + + + 4- - 9 - - - 5-4 1
81 24 + + + 4- - - - - - 4-5 0
84 25 + + 4 - 4- - - - - - 4-5 0
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Scale #6 Continued
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88 26
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71 28
102 29
103 30
7^ 31
76 32
95 33
75 34
4-5 0
4-5 1
3-6 0
3-6 1
3-6 1
1-8 0
1-8 0
1-8 0
1-6 1
Votes + 33 29 29 26 20 20 15 15 12 5Q1
Votes - 1 3 5 8 14 14 16 19 22
Incon-
sistencies 001071110 11
CE = 1
- ^ = .94
11
87cs
= 1 87
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Scale in
Guttman Scale of All Criminal Procedure Decisions (1967
Term)
SSI = 92 81 81 81 81 73
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54 43 30
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d •H CO
cd M CO d
i
—
i o •H o
d cd > o
cd 1—
1
•H d
W pq P H
105 1 4- + + + +
107 2 + + + + +
109 3 + + H- + +
121 4 + + + + +
127 5 + + + + *
110 6 + + + 0 *
111 7 + + + (-) *
112 8 + + + 0 +
113 9 + + + + +
125 10 * + + + +
128 11 + + + + +
108 12 + + + + *
132 13 + + + + *
135 14 + + + + +
116 15 + + + + *
119 16 + + + + *
118 17 + + + + +
120 18 + + + + +
123 19 + + + + +
124 20 + + + + +
122 21 + + + + *
131 22 + + + + +
137 23 -L. + + + +
106 24 + + + + +
129 25 + + + + +
136 26 + + + + - 1-
+ + + + 9-0 0
+ 4- + 4" 9-0 0
+ + + + 9-0 0
+ 4- + 4* 9-0 0
+ + + + 8-0 0
+ + + + 7-1 1
+ + -i- 7-1 1
+ + + _L 8-1 1
+ + (-) 8-1 1
+ + + * 7-0 0
+ 4- + + 9-0 0
+ 9 4* — 6-2 1
4- + + — 7-1 0
4- + + 8-1 0
+ (-) 4* — 6-2 1
+ 0 + — 6-2 1
+ + 7-2 0
+ 4- — 7-2 0
0 + — 0 7-2 20 4* — 0 7-2 2
4- _ 0 6-2 1
+ (0 7-2 1
+ 0 7-2 1
6-3 0
+ 6-3 0
-1- 6-3 0
Scale //7 Continued
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Votes + 33 30 30 27 22 25 17 17 17
Votes - 3 7 7 10 5 12 20 20 19
Incon-
sistencies 000302337
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Scale #8
Guttman Scale of All Criminal Procedure Decisions (1968
Term)
SSI = 90 79 76 7^ 72 64 56 49 36
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£ 0 •H O
CG cti P fH U U CD •H fH 03 cO > O
CO O O O cO cO U p cO -P 1—
1
•H cO CO Pi P S P CO pq p H
141 1 4- + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
142 2 4- + + 4- + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
147 3 + + + + 4- + 4- 4- 4 9-0 0
149 4 4- + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
151 5 + 4- + + 4- 4- + 4- 8-0 0
160 6 + + + + + 4- + + 4- 9-0 0
162 7 4- * 4~ + 4- 4- 4- + 4- 8-0 0
166 8 4- + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4" 9-0 0
167 9 + + + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 9-0 0
172 10 + + 4- 4- 4- 4- ~h 4- 8-0 0
173 11 + + + 4- 4- + 4- 4- 8-0 0
175 12 4- + + + + 4- 4- 4- 8-0 0
178 13 4- + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 8-0 0
144 14 4- + + + + 0 4- 4- 4- 8-1 1
146 15 + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- - 8-1 0
174 16 4- + + 4- 4- 4- 4- - 7-1 0
179 17 + + + 4- 0 4- 4- * 6-1 1
170 18 + + 4- 4- 4- 0 4- — 6-2 1
176 19 4- + 4- 4" 0 4- 4- — 6-2 1
163 20 + * + + 4- H- 4- — - 6-2 0
150 21 + 0 * + + 4- 4- - - 5-3 1
157 22 -f- * 4* + 4- 0 + - 0 6-2 2
177 23 -I- *T H- 4- + - - 0 6-2 1
152 24 + + * 4- 4- 4- — - - 5-3 0
148 25 + + _L + + - — 0 7-2 1
145 26 + 4- 4- + 4- 1 - - - - 5-4 0
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Scale if-Q Continued
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159 27
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161 29
153 30
154 31
168 32
143 33
165 34
169 35
155 36
156 37
158 38
164 39 - *
5-4 0
3-5 1
3-5 2
3-5 1
3-6 1
3-6 2
2-7 1
2-
7 1
3-
5 2
0-9 0
0-9 0
0-9 0
0-8 0
Votes +
Votes
33 16 30 26 28 25 21 19 21
6 7 9 8 11 14 18 20 17
Incon-
sistencies 21 01 04507
CR = 1 - 18151
20
109
= .88
325
20
CS = 1 82
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Scale #9
Guttman Scale of All Criminal Procedure Decisions (1969
Term)
SSI = 73 54 34 42 38 35 CNoj 15
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1
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1
> bO o •H o
W d d d CD •H d CD d d > od o o d d dl d -P d 1—
1
•H dO CO O S pq K m pq pq n H
188 1 + + + + + 4- + + 8-0 0
192 2 + 4" + + + 4- + + 8-0 0
196 3 + + + + + 4- 4- + 8-0 0
205 4 -1- + + + 4* + 4~ + 8-0 0
181 5 + + + + 4“ + + - 7-1 0
184 6 T -t- + + + + + — 7-1 0
194 7 + * + + + + + - 6-1 0
189 8 + + + + 4_ + — (+) 7-1 1
201 9 "1" + + + + + — 6-2 0
204 10 + + + + + — — (+) 6-2 1
197 11 + + + + — — — (+) 5-3 1
190 12 + + + — — — — 3-5 0
191 13 + + + — — — — — 3-5 0
195
180
14
15
4- + 4- - - - - 3-5 0
1•+ — — — — — — (0 2-6
183 16 4” (+) 2-6 1
185 17 *r (0 2-6 1
199 18 -f- _ — — — — — (0 2-6 1
186 19 + 1-7 0
198 20 (+) 1-7 1
200 21 (+) — — — — — 1-7 1
202 22 _ (+) — — — 1-7 1
203 23 — — — (+) * * - 1-5 1
182 24 0-8 0
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Scale #9 Continued
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187 25 0-8 0
192 26 0-8 0
Votes + 19 15 15 11 12 9 7 11 206
Votes - 7 11 11 15 14- 16 18 15
Incon-
sistencies 01102007 11
CR = 1 = .93
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Scale #10
Guttman Scale of All Search and Seizure Decisions (1962 -
1968 Terms)
SSI = 86 73 66 64 59 59 38 30 22 16 10
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30 1 4 4 4 +
31 2 4 4 4 4
53 3 4 4 + 4
151 4 4 4 4 4 *
178 5 4 + 4 4
94 6 4 4 4 4
125 7 4 + 4 4 4
108 8 4 4 4 4 *
152 9 4 4 + 4 4
135 10 4 4 4 4 4
42 11 4 4 4 4
179 12 4 4 4 4 4
116 13 4 + + 4 *
131 14 4 4 “1* 4 4
176 15 4 -1- 4 4
163 16 4 * •It 4 4
37 17 4 4 4 4
138 18 4 4 4 4 +
150 19 4 0 + 4 *
70 20 4 * 4 4
97 21 4 4 4 4
139 22 4 4 4 4 4
152 23 4 4 4 4 *
5 24 4 4 4 4
35 25 4 4 4 +
159 26 + -1- 4 + 4
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4 + 4 4 4 9-0 0
+ + 4 4 4 9-0 0
4 4- 4 4 4 9-0 0
+ 4 4 + 8-0 0
4* 4" 4 4 8-0 0
+ 4- * 4 - 7-1 0
+ 4 4 * 8-0 0
+ 4 4 — 7-1 0
+ 4 4 — 8-1 0
+ 4 4 — 8-1 0
0 4 4 - - 6-3 1
+ 4 - * 7-1 0
4" 4 — — 6-2 0
+ — — 7-2 0
+ 4 — — 6-2 0
4- — 0 — 6-2 1
4- — 0 - - 6-3 1
4 — — 6-3 0
4- — 0 — 5-3 2
— — * 0 0 5-2 2
_ 0 — 0 — 6-3 2
— 5-4 - 0
_ — 0 — 5-3 1
— —
— 0 5-4 1
_ —
— — 0 5-4 1
— _ — 5-4 0
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Scale ft10 Continued
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— 4-5 0
- 4-5 0
(+) 4-5 2
- 4-5 0
- 4-5 0
- 3-6 0
- 3-6 1
- 3-5 1
- 3-6 1
2-7 1
(+) 2-7 1
(0 2-7 1
(+) 2-7 1
1-8 0
1-7 0
1-8 0
1-8 0
1-6 1
0-9 0
0-8 0
0-9 0
0-9 0
0-8 0
0-8 0
Votes + 43 20 32 9 11 21 16 14 6 12
Votes - 7 11 18 16 4 6 29 34 32 19 36
Incon-
sistencies 0112103^ Z|- 27
OR = 1
- jII = .92
CS = 1
- ^ = .83
430
22
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Scale #11
Guttman Scale of All Self Incrimination Decisions (1962 -
1968 Terms)
SSI = 96 96 93 83 70 56 52 48 39 - -
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36 1 + + + + 4- 4“ + + + 9-0 0
72 2 + + + + + + + + + 9-0 0
166 3 _1_ + 4" + + + + 9-0 0
167 4 + + + + + 4" J- + + 9-0 0
83 5 + + + + + + + -h — 8-1 0
94 6 + + + 0 4_ 4~ + + * 7-1 1
110 7 + + (-) _L + + + * 7-1 1
111 8 + + + 0 + 4” + + i. 8-1 1
116 9 + 0 + + + 0 + + * 6-2 2
118 10 + 0 + + + + + — + 7-2 1
120 11 + 0 + + + + — + 7-2 1
59 12 + + 4* + + + + — — 7-2 0
50 13 + + * .1. + — — 0 + 6-2 1
55 14 + + 4- + — — — + 5-4 0
78 15 + + + + + _ — _ — 5-4 0
79 16 + + + + + — — — — 5-4 0
56 17 + + * * iiS — — 2-5 0
69 18 4* + + + — — — — — 4-5 0
3 19 + + + 3-6 0
102 20 + + _L 3-6 0
18 21 + + 2-7 0
45 22 + + 2-7 0
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Scale //II Continued
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Votes - 4 4 0 6 7 10 11 12 14-
Incon-
sistencies 0504001 01
CR = 1 - ~ .96
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Scale #12
Guttman Scale of All Right to Counsel Decisions (1962 -
1968 Terms)
SSI = 92 92 89 77 77 62 46 35 31 - -
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co
CD
-P CO
O CD
> -H
O
O CD
-P
0 co
O -H
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7 1 + + + + + + + + + 9-0 0
16 2 + + + + + + + 4~ 9-0 0
63 3 + + + + 4- + 4~ + + 9-0 0
87 4 + + + + + + + + + 9-0 0
91 5 + + 4- + + + + + 9-o 0
107 6 + + + H- + + + + + 9-0 0
141 7 + 4* + + + + + + -i- 9-0 0
142 8 + 4- 4" + + + + + + 9-0 0
157 9 + + * 4- + 0 + 4- 6-2 1
148 10 + 4" + -L + — 7-2 0
8 11 + 4" + + 0 + — — + 6-3 1
92 12 0 + + + + — 6-3 1
98 13 + + -j_ 4” + _i_ - - - 6-3 0
101 14 + + + + + + — — — 6-3 0
33 15 + 4" + 0 - - 0 5-3 2
100 16 + (-) + + 4- + - - 5-4 1
106 17 + 0 + + + 0 - — + 6-3 2
39 18 + + + + — — — - + 5-4 0
66 19 + + + + + — — - - 5-4 0
159 20 + 0 + + -i- - - - + 5-4 1
102 21 4* + + 3-6 0
103 22 + + 3-6 0
169 23 + + — — — — 0 - - 3-6 1
67 24 + + 2-7 0
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Scale it12 Continued
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75 25 * © __ _ — 1-7 1
164 26 — — * — — ~ — _ — 0-8 0
Votes + 24 20 16 21 20 9 14 10 9
Votes - 2 6 2 5 6 8 12 16 17
Incon-
sistencies 0 4 01 0221 1
CR = 1
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CS = 1 - 7=7^ = • 82
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Scale #13
Guttman Scale of All Coerced Confession Decisions (1962 -
1968 Terms)
SSI = 95 95 91 86 86
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cti 0 pi cti
CD 1—1 p P CD p
CD pH hO 0 P u CO
CO Cti 3 cti 1—1 Ph U
Cti O O 1—1 0 cti cti0 m P pq O S
12 1 + + + +
91 2 + + +
-105 5 + + + +
109 4 + + + +
80 5 + (-) +
43 6 + + + +
68 7 + + +
128 8 + + + +
144 9 + + + +
118 10 + + + +
9 11 + + + +
38 12 + + + +
117 13 + + + +
136 14 + - + +
6 15 + + + +
23 16 + + + +
59 17 + + + +
66 18 + + +
161 19 9 9 + +
169 20 + + - -
67 21 + + -
82 82 4-5 41 32 23
CO
CD
-P CO
O CD
> •H
0
pi
O CD
-P
Pi CO
Pi -p 0 •H
cti CO Pi u •H CO
£ cti Cti cti CD M CO Pi
Pi -p 1—
1
5 -P U •H 0
CD u P^ CD •H co > 0
P-t 0 cti -P p l—
1
•H Pi
pq Ph W 0 p H
+ + + + + 9-0 0
+ + 4- + + + 9-0 0
+ + + + + 9-0 0
+ + + + + 9-0 0
+ + + + + 8-1 1
+ + + + - 8-1 0
+ + 9 + + - 7-2 1
+ + + + — 8-1 0
+ + + + — 8-1 0
+ * + -
9
6-2 0
+ - - - 6-3 1
+ - - 9 - 6-3 1
+ + — — — 6-3 0
+ + — + — 6-3 2
+ — — — — 5-4 0
+ — — - - 5-4 0
+ — — — — 5-4 0
+ + - - - - 5-4 0
- 9 - - 3-5 3
— 9 — — 3-5 1
2-7 0
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Scale #13 Continued
p
o
•H
P -P
<D -Hp cq
B 0 bD c—1
P PH cq P r—
t
cd CD P cd
CD i—
1
P P CD P
CD 1 1 hD O P P cq
CQ cd P cd 1 1 P P
cd 0 O 1—1 O cd cdO 02 PI PP ci> 5s S
104 22
cq
(D
-P CQ
O CD
t> *H
O
'H 0
O <1)
-P
P CQ
P -P 0 •H
cd CQ P P •H CQ
P cd cd cd CD p CQ P
P •P H -p p •H O
CD P P CD •H cd > O
P 0 cd P P 1—
1
•H P
pq P « ca 35 O P H
0-9 o
Votes + 20 18 7 19 8 18 10 11 10 9 3
Votes - 2 4- 0 3 2 4 2 1112139
Incon-
sistencies 1 3000003120
in
CR = 1
- TO = *91
11
CS = 1 - = .78
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APPENDIX II
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 1962 TERM - 1958 TERM NUMBERED
IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER AS USED IN GUTTMAN SCALES
1. United States y. Sampson
.
371 U.5. 75 (1962)
2. Jones v. C unningham
.
371 U.S. 236 ( 1963)
3. Shotwell Manufacturing Company y. United States.
371 U.S. 341 (1963)
4. Cleary v. Bolger
.
371 U.S. 392 (1963)
5. Wong Sun y. United States
.
371 U.S. 471 (1963)
6. T ownsend v. Sain
.
372 U.S. 293 (1963)
7. Gideon y. Uiainwriqht
.
372 U.S. 335 (1963)
8. Douglas v. California
.
372 U.S. 353 (1963)
9. f_ax v. Noia . 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
10. Lane v, Brown
.
372 U.S. 477 (1963)
11. Draper v, Uiashinqt on
.
372 U.S, 487 (1963)
12. Lynum v. Illinois
.
372 U.S. 528 (1963)
13. Bush v. T exas
.
372 U.S. 586 (1963)
14. Downun v. United States
.
372 U.5. 734 (1963)
15. Sanders y. United States
.
373 U.S. 1 (1963)
16. Johnson v. V ir qinia
.
373 U.S. 59 (1963)
17. Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S, 83 (1963)
18. Namet y. United States , 373 U.S. 179 (1963)
19. Andrews y, United States . 373 U.S. 334 (1963)
20. N o r v e 1.
1
v. 1 1 linols
.
373 U.S. 420 (1963)
21. Lopez y. United States . 373 U.S. 427 (1963)
22. Campbell v. United States , 373 U.S, 487 (1963)
23. Haynes v. Uiashinqt on . 373 U.S. 503 (1963)
24. R ideau v. Louisiana . 373 U.S, 723 (1963)
25. K er v. Calif ornia , 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
26. Bart one v. United States . 375 U.S. 52 (1963)
27. F ahy v, C onnect icut . 375 U.S. 85 (1953)
28. United States v. Behrens , 375 U.S. 162 (1963)
29. Hardy v. United States , 375 U.S, 277 (1964)
30. Prest on v. United States , 376 U.S. 364 (1954)
31. Stoner v. California , 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
32. Ruoendorf v. United States . 376 U.S. 528 (1964)
33. Massiah v. United States . 377 U.S, 201 (1964)
34. United States v. Tateo , 377 U.S. 463 (1964)
35. Malloy v. Hogan . 3'7 8 U.S. 1 (1964)
36. Murphy y. Waterfr ont Commission of New Y ork Harbor,
3^8 U.S, 52 (1964)
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37. Agui 1 ar v. T exas
. 378 U.5. 108 (1954)
38. Jackson v. Denno
. 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
39. E sc nV'Qilo v. I llinois
.
378 U.S. 478 (1964)
40. Lonna rd v. United States
.
378 U.S. 544 (1964)
41. Boles v. St ovonson
.
379 U.S. 43 (1964)
42. Beck v. Ohio
,
379 U.S. 89 (1964)
43. T urn e
r
v. Louisiana
. 379 U.S. 466 (1955)
44. Singer v. United States . 380 U.S. 24 (1965)
45. United States v. Gainey
.
380 U.S. 63 (1965)
4fi
.
United States v. Vantrosca
. 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
47. Pointer v. Texas
, 38Q~u;s. 400 (1965)
48. Douglas v. Alabama
. 380 U.S. 445 (1965)
49. Jenk i ns v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965)
50. Grim n v. California
.
380 U.S. 609 (1965)
51. Linklettor v. Walker
.
381 U.S. 618 (1965)
52. Angel et v. Fav, 381 U.S. 654 (1965)
53. James v. Louisiana
.
382 U.S. 36 (1965)
54. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965)
55. Glaccio v. Pennsylvania
.
382 U.S. 399 (1966)
56. T ehan v. United States ex. rel Shott
.
382 U.S. 406
(1966)
57. Baxt rom v, Horold
.
383 U.S. 107 (1966)
58. United States v. Ewell
.
383 U.S. 116 (1966)
59. Stevens v. Marks
.
383 U.S. 234 (1966)
60. Pat
e
v. Robinson , 383 U.S. 375 (1966)
61. Kent v. United States
.
383 U.S. 541 (1966)
62. Brookhart v. Janis
.
384 U.S. 1 (1966)
63. Westbrook v. Arizona
.
384 U.S. 150 (1966)
64. United States v. Blue
.
384 U.S. 251 (1966)
65. Rinaldi v. Yeager , 384 U.S. 305 (1966)
66. Miranda v. Arizona
.
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
67. Johnson v. Now Jersey
.
384 U.S. 719 (1966)
68. Davis v. North Carolina . 384 U.S. 737 (1966)
69. Schmerber v. California . 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
70. B lack v. United States
.
385 U.S. 26 (1966)
71. Chichos v. Indiana . 385 U.S. 76 (1966)
72. 0 * Connor v. Ohio
.
385 U.S. 92 (1966)
73. L onq v. District Court of Iowa . 385 U.S. 192 (1966)
74. Lewis v. United States , 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
75. Hof fa v. United States . 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
76. 0 s b o r
n
v. United States . 385 U.S. 323 (1966)
77. Parker v. Gladden , 385 U.S. 363 (1966)
78. Garrlty v. Now Jersey , 385 U.S. 493 (1967)
79. 5 pevack v. Klein , 385 U.S. 511 (1967)
80. Sims v. Geoi qia . 385 U.S. 538 (1967)
81. S pencer v. T exas , 385 U.S. 554 (1967)
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82,
83.
84.
85.
86
.
87.
88
.
89.
90.
91 .
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100 .
101 .
102 .
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110
.
Ill .
112 .
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120 .
121 .
122 .
123.
124.
125.
126.
filler v. Pate
.
386 U.S. 1 (1967)
Chapman v/ . California
. 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
Cooper v. California
. 386 U.S. 58 (1967)
Giles v. Maryland
. 386 U.S. 66 (1967)
K 1 o
p
r e
r
v. North Carolina
. 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
Swenson v. Bosler . 386 U.S. 258 (1967)
McCray v, Illinois
. 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
Nowakow^k
i
v, Maroney
.
386 U.S. 542 (1967)
Specht v. Patterson
.
386 U.S. 605 (1967)
C lewis v. T exas
, 386 U.S. 707 (1967)
Anders v. California
.
386 U.S. 738 (1967)
Cnt sminoer v. I owa
.
386 U.S. 748 (1967)
Hof fa v. United States
.
387 U.S. 231 (1967)
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294
(1967)
Washinqt on v
.
erqer v . Now
United States
Texas
.
388 U.S. 14 (1967)
York
.
388 U.S. 41 (1967)
United States
United States
G i lbert v
Gilbert v
St ova 1
1
v
Pinto v.
Beecher
Burqet
t
Mempa v
Katz v.
v, Wade (Part #1'
v. Wade (Part #2
v. Wade (Part #3,
California (Part #1
Calif ornia (Part #2
U.S. 293
388 U.S,
388 U.S,
388 U.S
388 U.S
388 U.S
(1967)
218
218
218
263
263
(1967)
(1967)
(1967)
(1967)
(1967)
.
Denno
.
388
Pierce
.
389 U.S. 31 (1967)
v. A labama
,
389 U.S. 35 (1967)
v. Texas
.
389 U.S. 109 (1967)
Rhay
.
389 U.S. 128 (1967)
nited States
.
389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Georgia
,
389 U.S. 404 (1967)5 1ms v
.
Marchotti v. United States . 390 U.S. 39 (1968)
Grosso v. United States . 390 U.S. 62 (1968)
United States
.
390 U.S. 85 (1968)
Illinois , 390 U.S. 129 (1968)
United States
.
390 U.S. 234 (1968)
.
United States (Part #1 ) , 390 U.S. 377)
, United States (Part #2), 390 U.S. 377)
v, Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968)
Haynes v
Smith v .
Harris v
Simmons ’
Simmons '
Greenwald
ndorson v. Nelson , 390 U.S, 523 (1968)
United States v. Jackson , 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
F ont a i ne v . Calif ornia , 390 U.S. 593 (1968)
Barber v. Page , 390 U.S. 719 (1968)
Bruton v , United States , 391 U.S. 177 (1968)
Duncan \i . L ouisiana . 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
B 1 oom v. 1 1 1 inois , 391 U.S. 194 (1968)
Dyke v. Tavlor I mplement Manufacturing Company
"(Part #1) , 391 U.S. 216 (19681
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Company
X^aTt #2), 391 U.S. 216 (19681
387
127. Caraf as v. LaValleo
. 391 U.S. 234 (1968)
128. Darwin v. Connecticut
. 391 U.S. 346 (1968)
129. Witherspoon v. Illinois
. 391 U.S. 510 (1968)
130. Bumper v. North Carolina (Part #1 ) , 391 U.S. 543
(1968)
131. Bumper v. North Carolina (Part #2), 391 U.S. 543
(1968)
132. Sabbath v. United States . 391 U.S. 585 (1968)
133. Johnson v. Florida
.
391 U.S. 596 (1968)
134. Terry v. Ohio
,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)
1 35 . Sibron v. Nei^ York
.
392 U.S. 40 (1968)
136. Harrison v. United States
, 392 U.S. 219 (1968)
137. Roberts v. Russell
,
392 U.S. 293 (1968)
138. Mancusi v. Deforte
,
392 U.S. 364 (1968)
139. L_ee v. Florida
.
392 U.S. 378 (1968)
140. DeStafano v, Woods
.
392 U.S. 631 (1968)
141. McConnell v. Rhay
,
393 U.S. 2 (1968)
142. Arsenault v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts
.
393 U.S.
5 (1968)
143. Fuller v. Alaska
.
393 U.S. 80 (1968)
144. Smith v. Yeager
,
393 U.S. 122 (1968)
145. Recznik v. City of Lorain
,
393 U.S, 166 (1968)
146. Johnson v. Bennett
.
393 U.S. 253 (1968)
147. Berger v. California
.
393 U.S. 314 (1969)
148. Cardnor v. California
,
393 U.S. 367 (1969)
149. Smith v. Hooey
.
393 U.S. 374 (1969)
150. Spinelli v. United States
,
393 U.S. 410 (1969)
151. Alderman v. United States
.
394 U.S. 165 (1969)
152. Kaufman v. United States . 394 U.S. 217 (1969)
153. Desist v. United States . 394 U.S. 244 (1969)
154. Kaiser v. New York
.
394 U.S. 280 (1969)
155. Giordano v. United States . 394 U.S. 310 (1969)
156. Taalianetti v. United States . 394 U.S. 316 (1969)
157. Orozco v. T exas
.
394 U.S. 324 (1969)
158. Cardinal
e
v. Louisiana , 394 U.S. 437 (1969)
159. Foster v. California , 394 U.S. 440 (1969)
160. McCarthy v. United States . 394 U.S. 459 (1969)
161. Boulden v, Holman ( Part #1 ) , 394 U.S. 478 (1969)
162. Boulden v. Holman (Part #2), 394 U.S. 478 (1969)
163. Davis v. Mississippi . 394 U.S. 721 (1969)
164. F raz ier v. Cupp . 394 U.S. 731 (1969)
165. Halliday v. United States , 394 U.S. 831 (1969)
166. Leary v. United States . 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
167. United 5tates v. Covington . 395 U.S. 57 (1969)
168. Frank v. United States , 395 U.S. 147 (1969)
169. Jenkins v. Delaware
,
395 U.S. 2)3 (1969)
388
170, Boykin v, Alabama
. 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
I 7 *!* Harrinqi- on v . California
, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)
172. Rodriquez v. United States . 395 U.S. 327 (1969)
173. lAi 1 1 .1 • am? v. Oklahoma City
. 395 U.S. 458 (1969)
174. North Carolina v. Pierce (Part #1 ) . 395 U.S. 711
{1969)
175. V t h Carolina v. Pierce (Part #2). 395 U.S. 711
(1969)
”
6. Chime 1 v. California
.
395 U.S. 752 (1969)
177
. Benton v, Maryland
.
395 U.S. 784 (1969)
178. VonC leef v. New Jersey
.
395 U.S, 814 (1969)
179. Shipley v. Calif ornia , 395 U.S. 818 (1969)
180. Minor v. United States
.
396 U.S. 87 (1969)
181. Morales v. New York
.
396 U.S. 102 (1969)
182. Conway v. California Adult Authority
. 396 U.S. 107
(1969)
183. United States v. Knox
.
396 U.S. 77 (1969)
184. Wade v. Wilson
.
396 U.S. 282 (1970)
185. T urner v. United States
.
396 U.S, 398 (1970)
186. Sioler v. Parker
.
396 U.S, 482 (1970)
187. Illinois v . Allen
.
397 U.S. 337 (1970)
188. Waller v. Florida
.
398 U.S. 914 (1970)
189. Ashe v. Swenson
.
397 U.S. 436 (1970)
190. McMann \i . Richardson . 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
191. Parker v. North Carolina
,
396 U.S. 807 (1970)
192. B rady v. United States , 396 U.S, 809 (1970)
193. Dickey v. Florida
.
398 U.S. 30 (1970)
194. Maxwell v. Bishop
.
398 U.S. 262 (1970)
195. Moon v. Maryland
.
398 U.S. 319 (1970)
196. Price v. Georgia
.
398 U.S. 323 (l970)
197. Baldwin v. Mew York . 399 U.S. 66 (1970)
198. Ui i 1 1 jams v. Florida (Part #1 ) * 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
199. Williams v. Florida (Part #2), 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
200. Calif ornia v. Green . 399 U.S. 149 (1970)
201. Vale v. Louisiana . 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
202. Chambers v. Maroney . 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
203. Coleman y. Alabama (Part #1 ) , 399 U.S. 1 (1970)
204. Coleman v, Alabama (Part if 2), 399 U.S. 1 (1970)
205. Will jams v, I llinois
,
399 U.S. 235 (1970)
APPENDIX III
METHOD OF FACTOR-BLOC DETERMINATION
I • Computation of Scale Matrix by Diads of Agreement j
A. For each decision, the cell common to judges
A^ and £ equals j
1 . 1 , if A and B. vote together in the
minority without explicit agreement
with one another nor explicit agree-
ment with a common third member.
2. 2, if A, and t3 vote together in the
majority or the minority with explicit
agreement with one another o£ with a
common third member.
3. 2, if A. and JB vote together in the
majority without separate opinion.
B, Compute the ratio of raw scores to prefect
agreement
.
II. Calculation of Factors:
(factor analysis program using each column of the
scale matrix computed above as an actor and each
row as an observation; computes correlation matrix
and determines factors with an eigenvalue of .5)
III. Identification of Blocs
A. Factor loadings of .60 or greater are blocked
in solid line as positive relation to the
factor
.
B. Factor loadings of .40 to .60 are blocked in
broken line to indicate tangential relation
to the factor.
C. All other loadings are listed to suggest pos-
sible relationships both positive and negative.
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IV
. Significance of Blocs
for each bloc an Intercorrelation Index (ICI) is
computed - i.e., the mean diadic correlation for
the members of the bloc.
A, if ICI = .75 or greater the bloc is primary .
B. if ICI = less than ,75 the bloc is secondary .
V
. Bloc Disposition
for each bloc and for the Court as a whole, a
Scale Score Index (SSI) is computed - i.e., the
mean ratio each member’s scale score to a perfect
scale score (see scale computation)
;
N ,B
,
disposition the depends upon the significance
of the scale - i.e., as the CR declines so does
the significance of this disposition.
A. if bloc SSI = Court SSI 10, or above,
bloc is left .
B. if bloc SSI = Court SSI - 10, or below,
bloc is right .
C. if bloc SSI falls within Court SSI ± 9,
bloc is middle.
APPENDIX IV/.
ANTI-COURT LEGISLATION PROPOSED, 1962 - 1969
1962
HR IO656, 3/12/62
HJ Res 772, 6/28/62
HJ Res 790. 6/29/62
HJ Res 841, 7/30/62
S 2900, 10/4/62
S Cong Res 96, 9/27/62
1963
HR 121, 1/9/63
HR 336, 1/9/63
HR 1771, 1/4/63
HR 2978, 1/29/63
HR 3055, 1/31/63
HR 3*444, 2/5/63
HR 4020, 2/21/63
HR 4063, 2/21/63
HR 4746, 3/11/63
HR 6893. 6/10/63
HR 8724, 10/7/63
HJ Res 59 » 1/9/63
HJ Res 102, 1/9/63
HJ Res 364, 4/1/63
HJ Res 365, 4/1/63
HJ Res 366, 4/1/63
HJ Res 370, 4/3/63
HJ Res 371, 4/3/63
HJ Res 374, 4/4/63
HJ Res 537, 7/1/63
HJ Res 555. 7/15/63
S 67, 1/14/63
S 222, 1/15/63
S 1012, 3/7/63
SJ Res 114, 3/15/63
SJ Res 42
,
2/14/63
1964
HR 9947, 2/7/64
HR 11075. 4/29/64
HR 11076, 4/29/64
HR 11077. 4/29/64
HJ Res 1012, 4/29/64
HJ Res 1121, 7/22/64
HJ Res 1133, 7/29/64
HJ Res 1158, 8/14/64
HJ Res 1163, 8/19/64
1965
HR 134, 1/4/65
HR 536, 1/4/65
HR 713. 1/4/65
HR 782, 1/4/65
HR 887, 1/4/65
HR 2058, 1/7/65
HR 2660, 1/13/65
HR 4348, 2/4/65
HR 4624, 2/9/65
HR 5765. 3/3/65
HR 6786, 3/25/65
HJ Res 7. 1/4/65
HJ Res 34, 1/4/65
HJ Res 84, 1/4/65
HJ Res 192, 1/13/65
HJ Res 267, 2/1/65
HJ Res 297, 2/8/65
HJ Res 586, 7/21/65
HJ Res 638, 8/24/65
HJ Res 645, 8/31/65
HJ Res 647, 8/31/65
s 291, 1/6/65
s 299, 1/7/65
S 798. 1/28/65
S 980, 2/3/65
s 2578, 9/30/65
SJ Res 21
, 1/15/65
1966
HJ Res 825, 2/8/66
HJ Res 1051, 4/6/66
HJ Res 1124, 4/26/66
HJ Res 1168, 6/14/66
HJ Res 1139. 5/9/66
HJ Res 1182
,
6/27/66
HJ Res 1260, 8/4/66
HJ Res 1281, 8/25/66
HJ Res 1302, 9/13/66
SJ Res 179, 7/22/66
SJ Res 196 , 9/30/66
1967
HR 146, 1/10/67
HR 1049, 1/10/67
HR 4236, 1/31/67
HR 6386, 3/1/67
HR 6400, 3/1/67
HR 6709, 3/7/67
HR 6944, 3/9/67
HR 7092, 3/13/67
HR 8652, 4/17/67
HR 8653. 4/17/67
HR 9679, 5/4/67
HR 9681, 5/4/67
HR 10089, 5/17/67
HR 10814, 6/14/67
HR 11007, 6/2/67
HR 11176, 6/27/67
HR 11267, 6/29/67
HR 11922, 7/31/67
HR 11940, 7/31/67
HR 12992, 9/19/67
HR 13976, 11/13/67
HJ Res 32, 1/10/67
HJ Res 59, 1/10/67
HJ Res 147, 1/16/67
HJ Res 173, 1/18/67
HJ Res 203, 1/24/67
HJ Res 243, 2/1/67
HJ Res 333, 2/21/67
HJ Res 365, 2/28/67
HJ Res 418, 3/9/67
HJ Res 420, 3/9/67
HJ Res 443, 3/9/67
HJ Res 465, 3/22/67
HJ Res 466, 3/22/67
HJ Res 607, 6/6/67
HJ Res 681, 6/27/67
HJ Res 738, 7/24/67
HJ Res 838, 9/20/67
HJ Res 841, 9/21/67
s 674, 1/25/67
392
S 1130, 3/1/67
S 1194, 3/7/67
S 1518, 4/13/67
SJ Res 22
, 1/23/67
SJ Res 38, 2/8/67
1968
15329, 2/15/68
15555, 2/26/68
15556, 2/26/68
16106, 3/20/68
16365. 4/1/68
16908, 4/1/68
17741, 6/10/68
17745, 6/10/68
17773, 6/11/68
17808, 6/12/68
17871, 6/13/68
17876, 6/13/68
17978, 6/19/68
17979, 6/19/68
18103, 6/25/68
18343. 7/3/68
18346, 7/3/68
18376, 7/8/68
18703, 7/18/68
18841, 7/23/68
19328, 8/2/68
HJ Res 988, 1/22/68
HJ Res 996, 1/23/68
HJ Res 997, 1/23/68
HJ Res 998, 1/23/68
HJ Res 1038, 2/1/68
HJ Res 1094, 2/15/68
HJ Res 1126, 2/26/68
HJ Res 1127, 2/26/68
HJ Res 1149, 3/5/68
HJ Res 1172, 3/14/68
HJ Res 1192 , 3/20/68
HJ Res 1220, 4/4/68
HJ Res 1279, 5/22/68
HJ Res 1282, 5/23/68
HJ Res 1369, 6/26/68
HJ Res 1370, 6/27/68
HJ Res 1373, 6/27/68
HJ Res 1374, 6/17/68
HJ Res 1386, 7/3/68
HJ Res 1387, 7/8/68
HJ Res 1399, 7/10/68
HJ Res 1400, 7/10/68
HJ Res 1401, 7/10/68
HJ Res 1407, 7/11/68
HJ Res 1409, 7/12/68
HJ Res 1418, 7/24/68
HJ Res 1423
,
7/29/68
HJ Res 1424, 7/29/68
HJ Res 1426, 7/29/68
HJ Res 1427
,
7/29/68
HJ Res 1428, 7/29/68
HJ Res 1438
,
8/2/68
HJ Res 1439, 8/2/68
HJ Res 1448, 9/10/68
HJ Res 1456, 9/12/68
HJ Res 1467, 10/7/68
HJ Res 1469, 10/10/68
HJ Res 1470, 10/10/68
1969
HR 869, 1/3/69
HR 1317, 1/3/69
HR 1331, 1/3/69
HR 7507, 2/24/69
HR 7739, 2/26/69
HR 7782, 2/26/69
HR 8014, 3/3/69
HR 8930, 3/13/69
HR 8960, 3/13/69
HR 10964, 5/6/69
HR 11820, 6/3/69
HR 14210, 10/6/69
HJ Res 45, 1/4/69
HJ Res 66, 1/3/69
HJ Res 68, 1/3/69
HJ Res 71 , 1/3/69
HJ Res 82
,
1/3/69
HJ Res 94, 1/3/69
HJ Res 101, 1/3/69
HJ Res 103, 1/3/69
HJ Res 124, 1/3/69
HJ Res 125, 1/3/69
HJ Res 133, 1/3/69
HJ Res 155, 1/3/69
HJ Res 169, 1/3/69
HJ Res 183, 1/6/69
HJ Res 193, 1/7/69
HJ Res 242, 1/13/69
HJ Res 297, 1/23/69
HJ Res 331, 1/29/69
HJ Res 471, 2/19/69
HJ Res 557, 3/17/69
HJ Res 558, 3/17/69
HJ Res 671, 4/23/69
HJ Res 692 , 4/30/69
HJ Res 693 , 4/30/69
HJ Res 700, 5/6/69
HJ Res 720, 5/15/69
HJ Res 723, 5/19/69
HJ Res 730, 5/20/69
HJ res 741, 5/22/69
HJ Res 758, 6/3/69
HJ Res 759, 6/3/69
HJ Res 768, 6/5/69
HJ Res 774, 6/11/69
HU Res 796, 6/25/69
HJ Res 817, 7/15/69
SJ Res 3, l/l5/69
SJ Res 64, 3/4/69
WORKS CITE D
Books
Abraham, Henry Julian, The Judicial Process: An Intro -
ductory Analysis of the Courts of the United
States, England, & France . New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968.
Barker, Lucius J. and Barker, Twiley U)
. ,
Jr. F reedom
,
Courts, Politics: Studies in Civil Liberties
.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
Becker, Theodore L., ed. The Impact of Supreme Court
Decisions . New York: Oxford University Press,
1969.
Beth, Loren P. Politics, The Constitution, and The
Supreme Court . New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
Bickel, Alexander. The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress . New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
Black, Charles L., Jr. The People and the Court: Judi -
cial Review in a Democracy . Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.s Prentice-Hall, 1960.
, Perspectives in Constitutional Law .
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Cannon, Walter B. The Wisdom of the Body . 1932.
Revised and enlarged edition. New Yorks Norton,
1963.
Cardozo, Benjamin N. The Nature of the Judicial Process
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.
Cox, Archibald. The Warren Court: Constitutional De -
cision as an Instrument of Reform . Cambridge,
Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1968.
Crime and Justice in America . Washington, D.C. Congres
sional Quarterly Service, August, 1967.
394
Deutsch, Karl W . The Nerves of Government
. New York:
The Free Press, 1963.
Dunham, Allison and Kurland, Philip B., eds. IYlr. Jus -
tice
. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1964.
Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis .
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
.
A Systems Analysis of Political Life ,
New York: Wiley Press, 1965.
Everson, David H., ed. The Supreme Court as Policy -
Maker: Three Studies on the Impact of Judicial
Decisions
. Carbondale, 111.: Public Affairs
Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University,
1968.
Freund, Paul. The Supreme Court of the United States:
Its Business, Purposes, and Performance . Cleve-
land, Ohio: Meridian, 1961.
Goldman, Sheldon and Jahnige, Thomas. The Federal Courts
as a Political System . New York: Harper and Row,
1971.
Graham, Fred P. The Self-Inflicted Wound . New York:
Macmillan, 1970.
Grey, David L. The Supreme Court and the News Media .
Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press,
1968.
Grossman, Joel B., and Tanenhaus, Joseph, eds. F ron -
tiers of Judicial Research . New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1969.
Haines, Charles Grove. The Role of the Supreme Court
in American Government and Politics: 1789-1835 .
New York: Russell and Russell, 1960.
Haines, Charles Grove and Sherwood, Foster H, The Role
of the Supreme Court in American Government and
Politics: 1835-1864 . Berkeley, Calif*: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1957.
395
Hall, Livingston and Kamisar, Yale, eds. Modern Criminal
Procedure
. 2nd. ed
. ,
St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub-
lishing Co
. ,
1966
.
Harris, Dale C. Introduction to Feedback Systems
. Neui
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961.
Harris, Joseph P. The Advice and Consent of the Senate:
A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by
the United States Senate . Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1953.
Harris, Richard. The Fear of Crime . New York: Praeger,
1969.
.
Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order, and
Freedom in America . New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970,
Hyneman, Charles S. The Supreme Court on Trial . New
York: Atherton Press, 1963.
Jackson, Robert H. The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy .
New York: Random House, 1941.
Jacob, Herbert. Justice in America: Courts. Lawyers .
and the Judicial Process . Boston: Little Brown,
1965.
Jacob, Herbert, ed. Law, Politics, and the Federal
Courts . Boston: Little Brown, 1967.
Jahnige, Thomas P. and Goldman, Sheldon, eds. The Federal
Judicial System: Readings in Process and Behavior .
New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1968.
Johnson, Richard M. The Dynamics of Compliance . Evans-
ton, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
Krislov, Samuel. The Supreme Court in the Political
Process . New York: Macmillan, 1965.
Kurland, Philip B., ed. The Supreme Court Review 1960.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
396
•
The Supreme Court Review 196B . Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1968,
Lewis, Anthony, Gideon's Trumpet , New York: Random
House, 1964,
Lewis, Ulalker. Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of
Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
Lytel, Clifford M. The Warren Court and Its Critics
.
Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1968.
McCloskey, Robert. The American Supreme Court
. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Manwaring, David R. Render Unto Caesar: The Flag Salute
Controversy
. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962.
Marshall, James. Intention in Law and Society . New York:
Funk and Wagnalls, 1968.
Mason, Alpheus T. The Supreme Court From Taft to Warren .
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968.
Mason, Alpheus T. and Beaney, William B. American Con -
stitutional Law . Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1964.
.
The Supreme Court in a Free Society . Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959.
Mendelson, Wallace. Justices Black and Frankfurter:
Conflict in the Court . Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1961.
Mishkin, Paul J. and Morris, Clarence. On Law in Courts:
An Introduction to Judicial Development of Case
and Statute Study . Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation
Press, 1966.
Mitau, G. Theodore. Decade of Decision: The Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Revolution 1954-1964 . New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967.
397
Miur, William K. Prayer in the Public Schools . Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Murphy
,
Walter F
. Congress and the Court . Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962.
• Clements of Judicial Strategy
. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Murphy, Walter F. and Pritchett, C. Herman, eds. Courts.
Judges, and Politics
. New York: Random House.
1961.
North, Arthur A. The Supreme Court: Judicial Process
and Judicial Politics
. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1966.
Packer, Herbert L. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, I960.
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System
. Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1951.
.
Structure and Process in Modern Socie -
ties . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960.
Peltason, Jack W, Federal Courts in the Political Pro -
cess . Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co.,
1955.
Pritchett, C. Herman. The American Constitutional Sys -
tem
.
Neui York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
.
Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court .
Chicago: University Press, 1954.
.
The Roosevelt Court; A Study in Judicial
Policy and Values, 1937-1947 . New York: Mac-
millan, 1947.
Rosenblum, Victor. Law as a Political Instrument . Gar-
den City, N.Y.: Doublday, 1955.
Rumble, Wilfrid E. Jr. American Legal Realism . Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960.
398
Say ler
,
Richard H. t Boyer, Barry 6., and Gooding, Robert
E. Jr., eds. The Warren Court; A Critical Analy -
sis , New York: Chelsea House, 1968.
Schmandt, Henry J. Courts in the American Political
System
. Belmont, California* Dickenson Publish-
ing Co., 1968.
Schmidhauser
,
John, ed. Constitutional Law in the Poli -
tical Process
. Skokie, 111.: Rand McNally, 1963.
Schubert, Glendon. The Constitutional Polity
. Boston:
Boston University Press, 1970.
, ed . Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory
and Research
. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
_,ed, Judicial Decision-Making
.
London: The
Free Press, 1963.
,
The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and
Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices. 1946-1963 .
Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press,
1965.
.
Judicial Policy-Making . Glenview, 111.:
Scott, Foresman, 1965.
,
Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Beha -
vior . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959.
Schwartz, Bernard. Rights of the Person . 2 vols.,
New York: Macmillan, 1968.
Shapiro, Martin M. Freedom of Speech: The Supreme
Court and Judicial Review . Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
. Law and Politics in the Supreme Court:
New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence .
New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
, ed • The Supreme Court and Public Policy .
Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1969.
399
Sheldon, Charles S. The Supreme Court: Politicians
in Robes
. bev/erly Hills, Calif,: Glencoe Press,
1970.
Sigler, Jay A, An Introduction to the Legal System
.
Homeuiood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1968.
Skolnick, Jerome. Justice Without Trial: Law Enforce -
ment in Democratic Society
. New York: John Uliley
and Sons, 1^67
.
Spaeth
,
,
Harold J. The Warren Court: Cases and Commen-
tary
.
San Francisco: Chandler, 1966 •
Sprague, John D. Voting Patterns in the Uni ted States
Supremo Court. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Morrill
,
1968.
Swisher, Carl B. Roger B. Taney. New York: Macmillan
,
1935.
Tocqueville, Alexis do. Democracy in America . Edited
by Richard D. Heffner. New York: New American
Library, 1965.
\l ose, Clement E. Caucasians Only . Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1967.
Warren, Charles. The Supreme Court in United States
History . Vols. I and II. Boston: Little
Brown, 1922.
Wasby, Stephen L. The Impact of the United States
Supreme Court . Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press,
1960.
Uliener, Norbert. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communi -
cation in the Animal and the Machine . 2nd, ed
.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.
Ulilson, James Q. Varieties of Police Behavior . Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press^ 1968
.
Young, Oran R. Systems of Political Science . Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
400
Periodicals
Alfange, Dean, Jr. "Congressional Investigations and
the Pickle Court." 30 University of Cincinnati
Lam Review 113 (1961).
Barrett, Edward L., Jr. "Personal Rights, Property,
and the Fourth Amendment." The Supreme Court
Review 1960
. Edited by Philip B. Kurland.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Beaney, William M
. "Civil Liberties and Statutory
Construction." 8 Journal of Public Law 66 (1959).
Beaney, William M. and Beisor, Edward INI. "Prayers and
Politics: The Impact of Engle and Schempp on the
Political Process." The Impact of Supreme Court
Decisions
. Edited by Theodore L. Becker. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Birkby, Robert H. "The Supreme Court and the Bible
Belt." The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions
.
Edited by Theodore L. Becker. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969.
Braden, George D. "The Search for Objectivity in Con-
stitutional Law." 57 Yale Law Journal 571 (1948).
Brennan, William. "Some Aspects of Federalism." Pro-
ceedings: 16th Annual Meeting of the Conference
of Chief Justices, 1964 .
Chanin, Michael. "Comment: Constitutional Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Application of Link-
letter." 16 Journal of Public Law 193 (1967).
Chase, Harold W. "The Warren Court and Congress," 44
Minnesota Law Review 595 (I960).
Civil Liberties. October 1968, p. 2.
Civil Liberties. October 1969, p. 31.
401
Conference of Chief Justices. Proceedings: Annual Meet -
ing of the Conference of Chief Justices
. 1963-1969
inclusive.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Reports
. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1962-1969 inclusive.
"Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-
1957." 71 Harvard Lam Review 1324 (1958),
"Consent Searches: A Reappraisal after Miranda v. Ari -
zona . " 67 Columbia Lam Review 130 ( 1967 )
.
Crosskey, William W. "Mr. Chief Justice Marshall." Mr
.
Justice . Edited by Allison Dunham and Philip B.
Kurland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1964.
Currier, Thomas S. "Time and Change in Judge-Made Laws:
Prospective Overruling." 51 Virginia Law Review
201 (1965).
Danelski, David. "Public Law: The Field." I nt erna -
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
.
Vol.
13. New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan,
I960.
.
"Values as Variables in Judicial Decision-
Making." 19 Vanderbilt Law Review 721 (1966).
Deutsch, Karl W. "Communication Theory and Social
Science." 22 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry
469 (1952)
.
Dolbeare, Kenneth M. "The Public Views the Supreme
Court." Law, Politics, and the Federal Courts .
Edited by Herbert Jacob. Boston: Little Brown,
1967.
,
"The Supreme Court and the States: From
Abstract Doctrine to Local Behavioral Conformity."
In The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions , edited
by Theodore L. Becker. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1969.
402
Driver, Edwin D. "Confessions and the Social Psychology
of Coercion." 82 Harvard Law Review 42 (1968).
Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Politi-
cal Systems." 9 World Politics 383 (1957).
Elliot, Sheldon. "Court Curbing Proposals in Congress."
33 Notre Dame Law Review 597 (1958).
Enkor, Arnold N. and Elsen, Sheldon H. "Counsel for
the Suspect: Mass iah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois." 49 Minnesota Law Review
47 (1964) .
"Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to
State Courts Since 1941." 67 Harvard Law Review
1251 (1954).
"Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and
Remanded by the Supreme Court, October Term 1931
to October T nrm 1940," 55 Harvard Law Review 1357
(1942).
Frankfurter, Felix. "Mr Justice Roberts." 104 Univer -
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review 34 (1955).
Friendly, Henry J. "The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure." 53 California Law Review
929 (1965).
Galbraith, J. Allen. "Comment: Linkletter , Shott , and
the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo ." 64
Michigan Law Review 832 ( 1966 )
.
Goldman, Sheldon and Jahnige, Thomas. "Systems Analysis
and Judicial Systems: Potential and Limitations."
Unpublished paper presented at the 1969 Annual
Meeting of the American Poltitical Science Associa-
tion, New York, N.Y., Sept. 2-6, 1969.
Graham, Fred P. "The Court May Never Be the Same."
New York Times . October 6, 1968.
.
"The Court May Propose but the Police
7" New York Times. Dec. 1, 1968.Dispose
.
"Soma Problems in the Safeguards for
Defendants." New York Times
. Feb. 9, 1969.
Gregor, A. James.
F uncti onal
Review 425
"Political Science and the Uses of
Analysis." 62 American Political Science
(1968).
Grossman, Joel B. "A Model for Judicial Policy Analysis:
The Supreme Court and the Sit-In Cases." F ron -
tiers of Judicial Research . Edited by Joel B.
Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus. Now York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969.
. "Dissenting Blocs on the Ularren Court:
A Study in Judicial Role Behavior." 30 J ournal
of Politics 1068 (1968).
.
Review of Voting Patterns of the United
States Supreme Court
,
by John D. Sprague. 63
American Political Science Review 188 (1969).
Hackman, Nathan. "Lobbying the Supreme Court--An Apprai-
sal of ’Political Science Folklore'." 35 F ordham
Law Review 15 (1966).
Harper, Fowler V.
Before the
Law Review
and Etherington, Edwin D.
Court." 101 University of
1172 (1953) .
"Lobbyists
Pennsylvania
Hart, Henry M. "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jur
isdiction of Federal Courts." 66 Harvard Law
Review 1362 (1953).
Hogan, James E. and Snee, Joseph M, "The McNabb-Ma llory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue." 47 George -
town Law Journal 1 (1958).
Inbau, Fred E. "The Arrestee and Legal Counsel." Pro -
ceedings: 15th Annual Meeting of the Conference
of Chief Justices. 1963 .
"The Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in
Federal Courts." 53 California Law Review 840,
August, 1965.
Kamisar, Yale. "Some Comments on the 'New' Fifth Amend-
ment." Proceedings: 18th Annual Meeting of the
Conference of Chief Justices. 1966
.
404
.
"When the Cops Wore Not 'Handcuffed'."
Now York Times Magazine
. Nov. 7, 1965.
.
"Wolf and Lustig Ton Years Later: Ille-
gal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts."
43 Minnesota Lam Review 1083 (1959).
Karpatkin, Marvin M. "The Supreme Court 1966-1967:
Review of the Last Term and a View of the Next."
Civil Liberties
. Sept., 1967.
Kessel, John. "Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court."
10 Midwest Journal of Political Science
,
167(19_j_
Kitch, Edmond W. "Katz v. U.S.: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment." The Supreme Court Review .
Edited by Philip B. Kurland. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Klonoski, James R. and Mendelsohn, Robert I. "The Allo-
cation of Justice: A Political Approach." 14
Journal of Public Law 326 (1965).
Kurland, Philip B. "Forward: 'Equal in Origin and Equal
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Government'." 78 Harvard Law Review 143
(1964)
.
Lewis, Anthony. "Earl Warren." The Warren Court: A
Critical Analysis . Edited by Richard S. Sayler,
Barry B. Boyer, and Robert E. Gooding. New York:
Chelsea House, 1968.
McCloskey, Robert. "Reflections on the Warren Court."
Law, Politics, and the Federal Courts . Edited by
Herbert Jacob. Boston: Little Brown, and Co.,
1967.
McKay, Robert B. "The Supremo Court and Its Lawyer
Critics." 28 Fordham Law Review 617 (1959-1960).
Manwaring, David R. "The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio .
"
The Supreme Court as Policy-Maker: Three Studios
on the Impact of Judicial Decisions . Edited by
David H. Everson. Carbondale, 111.: Public
Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity, 1968.
405
Meltzer, Bernard D. "Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility between Judge and
Jury." 21 University of Chicaoo Laui Review 317
(1954).
Milner, Neal. "Comparative Analysis of Patterns of
Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: 'Mir-
anda' and the Police in Four Communities." 5
Law and Society Review 119, 1970.
Mishkin, Paul J. "Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and The Due Process of Time and Law." 79
Harvard Law Review 56 (1965).
Murphey, Michael J. "Problems of Compliance by the
Police." The Federal Judicial System: Readings
in Process and Behavior
. Edited by Thomas P.
Jahnige and Sheldon Goldman. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart, and Winston, 196B.
Murphy, Walter F. "The Judiciary: Judicial Values."
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
.
Vol. 8. New York: Crowell Collier and Mac-
millan, Inc., 1968.
.
"Lower Court Checks on the Supreme Court,"
The Federal Judicial System: Readings in Process
and Behavior . Edited by Thomas P. Jahnige and
Sheldon Goldman. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and
Winston, 1968.
Murphy, Walter F. and Tanenhaus, Joseph. "Public Opinion
and Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign." 32
Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1968).
.
"Public Opinion and the United States Su-
preme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Pre-
requisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Chan-
ges." Frontiers of Judicial Research . Edited by
Joel B, Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus. New York:
John Wiley and Sons 1969.
Nagel, Stuart. "Court-Curbing Periods in American His-
tory." The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions .
Edited by Theodore L. Becker. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969.
406
-
• "Judicial Backgrounds
53 Journal of Criminal Lam. C
Police Science 333 (1969^.
and Criminal Cases
riminoloQy. and
M
-
• "Testing the Effects
gaily Seized Evidence." 1965
sin Law Reviem 283 (1965).
of Excluding Ille-
Universitv of Uiiscon-
National ^Association of Attorneys General. Proceedinos
fif the Confe rence of the National Association nf
Attorney s General
. 1962-1969 inclusive. —
Norland .Chester A. "Legal Periodicals and the UnitedStates Supreme Court." 3 midwest Journal of Poli-
tical Science 58 (1959).
"Press Coverage of
Supreme
(1964) .
Court." 17 Western
New York Times. June 21, 1966.
New York Times. march 12, 1967.
New York Times. march 26, 1967.
New York Times. Aug. 4, 1967.
New York Times. Aug. 2, 1968.
New York Times. Nov. 10, 1968.
New York Times. Nov. 19, 1968.
New York Times. Dec. 1, 1968.
New York Times, Feb. 2, 1969.
New York Times. march 20, 1969.
New York Times. April 18, 1969.
New York Times. may 26, 1969.
New York Times. July 30, 1969.
N ew York Times. march 30, 1970.
New York Times
. April 6, 1970.
New York Times . July 2, 1970.
Packer, Herbert L. "The Courts, the Police, and the
Rest of Us." 57 Journal of Criminal Law, Crimi -
nology. and Police Science 238 (1966).
Patman, Wright. "Lobbying Through Law Reviews." C ourt
s
Judges, and Politics . Edited by Walter F. Mur-
phy and C, Herman Pritchett. New York: Random
House, 1961.
Pelaston, Jack W. "Judicial Process: Introduction."
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
Uol. 8, New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan,
1968.
Petrick, Michael G. "The Supreme Court and Authority
Acceptance." 21 Western Political Quarterly 5
(1968)
.
Pfeffer, Leo. "Justice for the Accused." The Nation .
Oct. 10, 1966, pp. 351-354.
Pritchett, C. Herman. "Constitutional Law: Introduc-
tion." International Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences
,
Mol, 3 New York: Crowell Collier and
Macmillan, 1968.
"Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application on
the Federal Courts." 71 Yale Law Journal 907
(1962)
.
Pye, Kenneth A. "The Warren Court and Criminal Proced-
ures." The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis .
Edited by Richard S. Saylor, Barry B. Boyer, and
Robert E. Gooding. New York: Chelsea House,
1968.
Reiblich
,
G. Kenneth. "Summary of October 1958 Term."
79 Supreme Court Reporter 154. St. Paul. Minn.:
West Publishing Co., 1960.
Roche, John P. "Judicial Self-Restraint," 49 American
Political Science Review 762 (1955).
406
Hodell, Fred. "It is the Earl Ularren Court." New York
I imes Magazine
. March 13, 1966.
banders, Paul H, "The Ularren Court and the Lower Federal
Courts." Constitutional Law in the Political Pro-
cess
. Edited by John Schmidhauser
. Skokie, 111.:
Rand McNally, 1963.
Savas, E. S. "Cybernetics in City Hall." Science. May
29, 1970, pp. 1066-1071.
Schubert, Glendon. "Civilian Control and Stare secisis
in the Warren Court." Judicial Decision-Making
.
Edited by Glendon Schubert. London: The Free
Press, 1963.
Schwartz, Herman. "Retroactivity, Reliability, and
Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin."
33 University of Chicago Law Review 719 (1966).
"Searches of the Person," 69 Columbia Law Review 866
(1969)
.
Shannon, Claude 1. "The Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation." 27 Bell Systems Technical Journal 397
(1948)
Spaeth, Harold J. "Race Relations and the Ularren Court."
45 University of Detroit Law Journal 255 (1965).
Spector, Arlen. "Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora’s Problems for
the Prosecutor." Ill University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 4 (1962),
Speiser, Laurence. "The 90th Congress: One Half 'the
Full Catast ropho ' . " Civil Liberties , February,
1968, p. 3.
Stagnor, Ross. "Homeostasis." International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences , Vol. 6 New York: Crowell
Collier and Macmillan, Inc., 1968.
Stumpf, Harry P. "Congressional Response to Supreme
Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Poli-
tics." 14 Journal of Public Law 377 (1965).
409
"The Supreme Court, 1962 Term," 77 Harvard Law Review
62 (1963).
"Supreme Court, 1963 Term." 78 Harvard Law Review 143
(1964).
"Supreme Court, 1964 Term." 79 Harvard Law Review 56
(1965).
~
"Supreme Court, 1965 Term." 80 Harvard Law Review 91
(1966).
"The Supreme Court, 1966 Term." 81 Harvard Law Review
69 (1967).
Sutherland, Arthur E. "Detention, Interrogation and
the Right to Counsel." Proceedings: 16th Annual
Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, 1964 .
Tanenhaus, Joseph. "Judicial Process: Judicial Review."
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
.
Vol. 8. New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan,
1968.
Tanenhaus, Joseph; Schick, Marvin; Muraskin, Mathew;
and Rosen, Daniel. "The Supreme Court's Certiorari
Jurisdiction: Cue Theory." Judicial Decision-
Making . Edited by Glendon Schubert. New York:
The Free Press, 1963.
Tustin, Arnold. "Feedback." 187 Scientific American ,
no. 3, September, 1952, pp. 48-55.
Ulmer, S. Sidney. "Homeostasis in the Supreme Court."
Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research .
Edited by Glendon Schubert. Chicago: Rand Me
Nally and Co., 1964.
.
"The Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo
Layfayette Black: Parabolic Support for Civil
Liberties, 1937-1967." Unpublished paper presented
at the 1970 meeting of the American Political
Science Association. Los Angeles, Calif., Sept.
7-12, 1970.
U.S. News and World Report. May 20, 1968.
410
Van Alstyno, Ulilliam. "In Gideon's Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the 'Successful' Criminal Appel-
lant." 74 Yale Law Journal 606 (1965).
Vorenberg, James. "Police Detention and Interrogation:
The Supreme Court and the States." Proceedings
:
16th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief
Justices. 1964
.
Uose, Clement E. "Litigation as a Form of Pressure
Group Activity." 319 Annals of the Academy of
Political and Social Science 20 (1958).
Wald, Michael S., et.al. "Interrogations in Now Haven:
The Impact of Miranda . " The Impact of Supreme
Court Decisions . Edited by Theodore L. Becker.
New Y n rk: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Warren, Earl. "The Administration of Justice." Pro -
ceedings: 20th Annual Meeting of the Conference
of Chief Justices. 1966 .
Wells, Richard S. and Grossman, Joel b. "The Concept of
Judicial Policy-Making." The Federal Judicial
System: Readings in Process and behavior . Edited
by Thomas P. Jahnige and Sheldon Goldman. New York:
Holt, Rhinohart, and Winston, Inc., 1968.
Wicker, Tom. "Due Notice to the Warren Court." New York
T imes . Oct. 3, 1968.
Williams, Edward B. "The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Defense Counsel's View." 44 Minne -
sota Law Review 855 (1960).
Wulf, Melvin L. "Supremo Court Scoreboard." Civil Liber -
ties . September, 1968, pp. 3-4.
Zion, Sidney. "Another Short Circuit for the Art of
Bugging." The New York Times . June 18, 1967.
Public Documents
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary.
Nomination of Thurqood Marshall to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. Hearings . 90th
,
Cong., 1st sess., 1967.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary,
Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry
to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
Hearings
.
90th Cong., 2nd sess., I960.
U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice. The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society . Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1967.
TABLE OF CASES
Adamson v . California
,
332 U.S. 46, 1967.
Aguilar v . Texas
,
378 U.S. 108, 1964.
Alderman v. United States
,
394 U.S. 165, 1969.
Anders \i . California
.
386 U.S. 738, 1967.
Anqelet v/ . Fay
,
381 U.S. 654, 1965.
Arsenault u. Massachusetts
,
393 U.S. 5, 1968,
Ashe v . Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 1970,
Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S 186, 1962.
Baldwin v. Now Y ork
,
399 U.S. 66, 1970.
Barber \/ . Page , 390 U.S. 719, 1968,
Barenblatt \j . United States , 360 U.S. 109, 1959.
B eck v. Ohio
,
379 U.S. 89, 1964.
Benant
i
.
v. United States , 355 U.S. 96, 1957.
Benton \j . Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 1969.
Berger v. Calif ornia , 393 U.S. 314, 1969.
Berger v . New York , 388 U.S. 41, 1967 .
Betts v. Brady , 316 U.S. 455, 1942.
Black v. United States , 385 U.S. 26, 1966.
Bloom v. I llinois , 391 U.S. 194, 1968.
Boykin v/ . A la ba ma , 395 U.S. 238, 1969.
Brady v. United States , 396 U.S. 809, 1970.
413
Briscoe \j . Bank of Kentucky
,
11 Peters 257, 1837,
Brown v. Board of Education
.
347 U.S, 483, 1954 and
349 U.S. 294, 1955.
Brown \/
. Maryland
.
12 Ulheaton 419, 1827.
Bruno v. United States
.
308 U.S. 287, 1939.
Bruton v. United States
,
391 U.S. 123, 1968.
Bumper v. North Carolina
,
391 U.S. 543, 1968.
Burqett v. 1 exas
.
389 U.S. 109, 1967,
Cal if ornia v. Green
,
399 U.S. 149, 905 Ct . 1930, 1970.
Carnley v. C ochran
,
369 U.S. 506, 1962.
Carroll v . United States , 267 U.S. 132, 1925.
C hambers v. Marsnoy , 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1970.
Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 1967.
Chapman v . United States , 365 U.S. 610, 1961.
Charles River Bridge Company v . Warren Bridge Company ,
11 Peters 438, 1837.
Chimel v . California t 395 U.S. 752, 1969.
Chisholm v. Georqia , 2 Dallas 419, 1793.
C ohens v . \l irqinia , 6 Wheaton 264, 1821.
C oleqrov/e v . Green , 328 U.S. 549, 1946.
Coleman v. A labama , 399 U.S. 1, 1970.
Conway v. California Adult Authority , 396 U.S. 107, 1969.
Cooper v. Calif ornia , 386 U.S. 58, 1967.
Craig v. Missouri , 4 Peters 410, 1830.
Crookor v. Ca lif ornia
,
357 U.S. 433, 1958.
41 4
Dartmouth College v. Woodward
. 4 Wheaton 518, 1819.
Pavis v. Mississippi
. 394 U.S. 721, 1969.
Davis v. North Carolina . 384 U.S. 737, 1966.
Delli Paoli v. United States
. 352 U.S. 232, 1957.
Desist v. United States
. 394 U.S. 244, 1969.
DeStefano v. Woods
.
392 U.S. 631, 1968.
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 1970.
Douglas v. California
. 372 U.S. 353, 1963.
Draper v. Washington
. 372 U.S. 487, 1963.
Dred Scott v. Sanford
.
19 Howard 393, 1857.
Duncan v. L ouisiana
.
391 U.S. 145, 1968.
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Company (Part #1 ) , 391 U.S.
216, 1968.
Cscobedo v. I llinois
.
378 U.S. 478, 1964.
F ahy v. Connecticut
.
375 U.S. 85, 1963.
Fay v. Noia
.
372 U.S. 391, 1963.
F eldman v. United States , 322 U.S. 487, 1944.
F ontain v. California
,
390 U.S. 593, 1968.
Foster v. California
,
394 U.S. 440, 1969.
F rank v. United States , 395 U.S. 147, 1969.
Fuller v. Alaska , 393 U.S. 80, 1968.
Gibbons v. Ogden , 9 Wheaton 1, 1824.
Gideon v. Wainwriqht
,
372 U.S. 355, 1963.
Gilbert v. California
,
388 U.S. 263, 1967.
415
Giordano v. United States
. 394 U.S. 310, 1969.
Goldman v. United States . 316 U.S. 319, 1942.
Gouled v. United States
. 255 U.S. 298, 1921.
Griffin v. California
. 380 U.S. 609, 1965.
Griffin v. Illinois
.
351 U.S. 12, 1956.
Hall ida
v
v. United States
.
394 U.S. 831, 1969.
Harrinot on v. California
.
395 U.S. 250, 1969.
Harris v. United States
.
390 U.S. 234, 1968.
Haynes v. United States
.
390 U.S. 85, 1968,
Haynes v. Ulashinqton
.
373 U.S. 503, 1963.
Hepburn v. Grismold
,
8 Wall. 603, 1870.
Herndon, In re
,
394 U.S, 400, 1969.
Hoffa v. United States
,
387 U.S. 231, 1967.
I llinois v. Allen
,
397 U.S. 337, 1970.
Jackson v . Denno
.
378 U.S. 368, 1964.
Jencks v. United States , 353 U.S. 657, 1957,
Jenkins v. Delaware , 395 U.S. 213, 1969,
Johnson v. New Jersey , 384 U.S. 719, 1966.
Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493, 1958.
Jones v. United States . 362 U.S. 257, 1960.
Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 1967.
K er v. California , 374 U.S. 23, 1963,
K lopf or v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 313, 1967.
K na pp v/. Schmeit zer , 357 U.S. 371, 1958.
416
Leary v. United States
. 395 U.S. 6, 1969.
Lae v. Florida
,
392 U.S. 378, 1968.
Le.mj-s v. United States
. 385 U.S. 206, 1966.
L ink let t er \i
. Walker
. 381 U.S. 618, 1965.
L °Pez v. United States
. 373 U.S. 427, 1963.
L ynum v. Illinois
. 372 U.S. 528, 1963.
McCardle
,
Lx Parte 7 Wallace 508, 1868.
McCarthy v. United States . 394 U.S. 459, 1969.
McConnell v. Rhay
.
393 U.S. 2, 1968.
McCray v. I llinois
. 386 U.S. 300, 1967.
McDonald v. United States
. 335 U.S. 451, 1948.
McMann v. Richardson
. 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 144, 1970.
Mallory v. United States
. 354 U.S. 449, 1957.
Malloy v. Hogan
.
378 U.S. 1, 1964.
Mancusi v. DeF ort
o
.
392 U.S. 364, 1968.
Marchett
i
v. United States
,
390 U.S. 39, 1968.
M a s s i a
h
v. United States
.
377 U.S. 201, 1964.
Maxwell v. Bishop
,
398 U.S. 262, 1970.
Mayor of New York v. M i 1
n
.
11 Peters 102, 1837.
Mempa v. Rhay
.
389 U.S. 128, 1967.
Miller v. Pat
e
,
386 U.S. 1, 1967.
Miller v . United States , 357 U.S. 301, 1958.
Minersv/ille School District y. Gobit is
,
310 U.S. 586,
1940.
Minor v . United States, 396 U.S. 87, 1969.
417
Mjanda v. Arizona
. 384 U.S. 436, 1966.
Moon Maryland
. 398 U.S. 319, 1970.
Morales v. New York
. 396 U.S. 102, 1969.
Em P fry v * Waterfront Commission of Ne w York Harbor 378
U.sV 52, 1964.
North Carolina v. Pearce
. 395 U.S. 711, 1969.
O’Conner v. Ohio
.
385 U.S. 92, 1966.
Olmstead v. United States
. 277 U.S. 438, 1928.
Orozco v. T exas
.
394 U.S. 324, 1969.
Osborn v. United States
. 385 U.S. 323, 1966.
Palermo v • United States. 360 U.S. 343, 1959.
Parker v/
.
North Carolina. 396 U.S. 807, 1970.
Peters v. New York. 389 U .S. 950, 1968.
Pickelseimer v. Wainwriqht
. 375 U.S. 2, 1963.
Pittsburgh Pla te Glass Company v. United States, 360 U.S.
395, 1959.
Pointer v. T exas
.
380 U.S. 400, 1965.
Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company
.
157 U.S. 429
and 158 U.S. 601, 1895.
Preston v. United States
.
376 U.S, 364, 1964.
Price v. Georgia
.
398 U.S. 323, 1970.
Rea v. United States
.
350 U.S. 214, 1956.
Reck v. Pat
e
.
367 U.S. 433, 1961.
Recznik v. City of Lorain . 393 U.S. 166, 1968.
Roberts v. Russell
,
392 U.S. 293, 1968.
Rosenberg v/ . United States, 360 U.S. 367, 1959
418
Roviaro v. United States . 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
Ruqendorf v. United States
. 376 U.S. 528, 1964.
Sanders v. United States . 373 U.S. 1, 1963.
Schmerber v. California
. 384 U.S. 757, 1966.
Sibron v. New York
. 389 U.S. 950, 1968.
Sigler v. Parker
. 396 U.S. 482, 1970.
Simmons v. United States . 390 U.S. 377, 1968.
Singer v. United States . 380 U.S. 24, 1965.
Smith v. Bennett
. 365 U.S. 708, 1961.
Smith v. Yeager
.
89 S. Ct. 277, 1968.
Spano v. New York
. 360 U.S. 315, 1959.
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 1967.
Spinelli v. United States
. 393 U.S. 410, 1969.
Stein v. New York
.
346 U.S. 156, 1953.
Stoner v. California
.
376 U.S. 483, 1964,
Stovall v. Denno
,
388 U.S. 293, 1967.
T aqlianett
i
v. United States . 394 U.S. 316, 1969.
T ehan v. United States ex rel. Shott
.
382 U.S. 406, 1966.
Terry v. Ohio
.
387 U.S. 929, 1967.
T ownsend v. Sain
.
372 U.S. 293, 1963.
T urner v. United States . 396 U.S. 398, 1970.
T wining
.
v. New Jersey
.
211 U.S. 78, 1908.
United States v. Gainey
.
380 U.S. 63, 1965.
United States v. Jackson
,
390 U.S. 570, 1968.
41 9
ignited States v. Knox
. 396 U.S. 77, 1969.
United States v. Murdock
. 284 U.S. 141
, 1931 .
United States v
. Vent rasca . 380 U.S. 102, 1965.
United States v. Wade
. 388 U.S. 218, 1967.
Vale v. Louisiana
. 399 U.S. 30, 1970.
^g. de Wilson . 396 U.S. 282, 1970.
Uiallar v. Florida, 398 U.S. 914, 1970.
Warden v* Hayden
. 387 U.S. 294, 1967,
Washington v. T exas
. 368 U.S. 14, 1967.
Watkins v. United States
. 354 U.S. 178, 1957.
W est Virginia State B oard of Education v. Barnette. 319U.S. 624, 1943.
W h *
t
e Maryland
. 373 U.S. 59, 1963.
Williams v. Florida
. 399 U.S. 78, 1970.
v. Illinois
. 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 1970.
Wilson v. United States
. 221 U.S. 361, 1911.
Witherspoon v. Illinois
. 391 U.S. 510, 1968.
Wong Sun v. United States . 371 U.S. 471, 1963.
Worcester v. Georgia
. 6 Peters 515, 1832.
mm*
